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Foreword
I imagine you reading the first page of this book with a sense of anticipation and, perhaps, a
degree of trepidation. This is a big book that addresses big questions. It will take you on a long
journey, probably through unfamiliar terrains. This book addresses one of the most important
challenges facing science and philosophy; namely a deep and easy understanding of ourselves.
This is clearly not a trivial challenge. Indeed, despite remarkable progress over the past century,
no single discipline has provided a satisfactory answer. The path taken in this book captures and
incites a paradigm shift in neuroscientific thinking; it transcends any single discipline to provide an
inclusive and principled approach to questions about why we are here and how we work. Its agenda
is to establish a cognitive biology that situates cognitive neuroscience in its biological substrates.
This approach allows the author to call upon powerful constraints and constructs, which are used
to dissolve fundamental problems in cognitive science and related fields. The result is a picture of
the brain that is illuminated from several perspectives; a picture that could describe any adaptive,
self-organizing biological system.
The inclusive and eclectic treatment o"ered by this book rests on building bridges between
di"erent disciplines and formalisms. For example: bridging between quantum physics and informa-
tion theory; information theory and perception; perception and semiotics; semiotics and behavior.
The author’s remarkable capacity to bridge these distinct fields reflects his role as Professor at
the Pontifical Gregorian University. The breadth of knowledge and scholarship that underwrites
this grand synthesis is truly remarkable. I was genuinely surprised to find that one person could
write so fluently and didactically about so many diverse scientific takes on the same problem.
Furthermore, in the areas that I am familiar with, I found his treatment very contemporary; as
if the author had magically attended all the key conferences and workshops relevant to this work
in the past couple of years. His panoramic approach works very well and enables each part of the
synthesis to be presented in a concise and contextualized fashion.
This book has three parts, all framed around the notion of information. The first deals with
the fundamental nature of information, its acquisition and measurement. The second considers
information in the exchange of agents with their environment and considers the general principles
of self-organization and dynamics in biological systems. In the third part of the book, we turn to
the interpretation of information, touching on high-level issues that attend language acquisition
and awareness. Information is a crucial theme throughout; it ties together the most elementary
formulations of our physical world, in terms of quantum physics, all the way through to symbolic
representations and pragmatics. It speaks to the underlying premise that the brain is an active
organ constructing, selecting and exchanging information with its environment. This builds upon
the early work of physicists like Helmholtz, who viewed the brain as making inferences about its
sensorium, generating predictions and testing hypotheses through interaction with the world. This
vii
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viii Foreword
view has dominated modern treatments of brain function (and indeed machine learning) in recent
years. Information is inherently probabilistic and is only defined in relation to some model of the
system generating information. Again, this probabilistic view is very current and is at the heart of
things like the Bayesian brain hypothesis. However, this book takes us beyond the Bayesian brain
and considers why the selection and control of sensory information is mandated in all complex
self-organizing systems. It is this contextualization of modern treatments of the brain that lends
the author’s synthesis simplicity and substance.
If you read this book you will learn a lot. Furthermore, it may help leverage your own insights in
a larger context. Having said this, there are lots of ideas and material that need to be assimilated.
This assimilation is made relatively easy by the book’s primer-like style when covering technical
material. I confess I was a bit surprised that the publishers allowed so much mathematics to adorn
the text. Although it looks a little daunting at first glance, the mathematics are used in a largely
iconic and useful way and, with a little perseverance from the reader, it works very well.
We are invited to start this book with some quantum physics. Although this is probably
not in the comfort zone of most neuroscientists, let me reassure you and encourage you to start
reading. The quantum mechanical treatment is simply presented to underscore the fact that
information is inherently probabilistic and is the product of an explicit measurement or action.
In one sense, we are invited to engage in our own information acquisition at this level, and realize
the book’s latent information, in terms of our understanding of what we are. I guarantee that
when you reach the end of the book you will look at the brain, and perhaps yourself, in a new light.
Karl J. Friston!
University College London
! Professor Karl J. Friston MB, BS, MA, MRCPsych, FMed.Sci, FRS Scientific Director: Wellcome Trust Centre for
Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, UCL, k.friston@fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk.
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Author’s Preface
This book is the result of a lifetime of study and especially of ten years of intensive research. The
original idea was to search for the biological bases of cognition. However, during this preparatory
study I understood that we cannot deal with this issue without resorting to an engagement
with both physics and information theory. These two aspects are deeply connected in quantum
mechanics and, as the reader will see, in many respects this is very helpful for reading the book.
The turning point in my research was when I became acquainted with the work of those
neuroscientists who, against a traditional cognitivist understanding of cognition, have stressed the
active role of the brain. I recall here Marc Jeannerod in particular. This framework was particularly
suitable to me since I was (and still am) very much influenced by C. Peirce’s pragmatism. The
insights provided by this neurological approach allowed me to consider the role of cognition for
biology for the first time.
A second step was represented by the contributions coming from biology, especially from the
field of studies known as epigenetics and its impact on traditional evolution theory (the so-called
Evo-Devo). Here, I was very much influenced in particular by the work of Scott Gilbert. This was
a new, dynamic and interactive way of understanding the organism. Such a point of view was not
only in perfect agreement with the previous one but opened the door to unexpected possibilities
of conceiving the interconnections between cognition (understood here in the largest sense of the
word) and biology. In such a context I was also supported by the important insights developed by
Francisco Ayala on the distinction between teleonomy and teleology. I wish also to recall here that
some interactions with George Ellis (Capetown University) were very fruitful for the definition of
complexity and the issue of top-down causation.
A third important turn was when I became aware of Karl Friston’s research. His work on
Bayesian probabilities and on the connection between lowering the informational surprisal and
lowering the statistical equivalent of the free energy provided me with strong ties between cognitive
and biological processes, at least at an ontogenetic level. Moreover, it explained how the specific
information-controlling activity of organisms could have arisen at all. Previously, I had looked
on my own for a connection between inverse Bayesian probabilities and information in order to
establish an informational framework in which the specific activity of organisms in controlling
their environment could have arisen. Unfortunately, I could not arrive at a straight result like
that provided by Friston, so that when I had the opportunity to read his papers it was a sort of
revelation.
This book is addressed to any scholar (from undergraduate students to senior researchers)
interested in learning a little more about biology and cognition. It is not necessary to read the
whole book but is also possible to simply read specific arguments or select a personal reading path
thanks to the summary, indexes, definitions, and cross-references. Moreover, interested scholars
ix
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do not need to be in the field of biology and cognitive or neurological sciences: Anybody interested
tangentially in these issues may benefit from reading the book or some of its parts. I expect that
philosophers, ethologists, primatologists, physicists, and chemists in particular will be interested,
at least for methodological reasons. There are no specific preliminary requirements for reading
this book: Basic information for each field or problem is provided. It is true that this book uses
some mathematics, but in general a high-school level is su!cient. More sophisticated mathematical
topics have been kept separated in the appendices.
Finally, allow me to thank all the people who have helped me in this enterprise. I would like
very much to thank my coworkers Ivan Colagé and Paolo D’Ambrosio for their constant and
very engaging interaction with me, and the numerous suggestions and improvements that they
proposed. I also warmly thank Marc Jeannerod (French Institute for Cognitive Sciences) who
not only provided me with important insights but encouraged and helped me to make this work
possible. A special thanks to Karl Friston (University College, London) for having supported me
with open-mindedness and friendship as well as for having kindly accepted to write a Foreword.
I also warmly thank Francisco Ayala (University of California, Irvine) for the many discussions
and his authoritative sympathy for my work. Moreover, I wish to thank Jean-Pierre Changeux
(Institut Pasteur), Simon Conway-Morris (University of Cambridge), Geo"rey Cook (University
of Cambridge), Miguel R. Fuentes (Pontifical Gregorian University), Arthur Gibson (University of
Cambridge), Scott Gilbert (Swarthmore College), Sir Brian Heap (University of Cambridge), Stuart
Kau"man (University of Calgary), Giorgio Parisi (University La Sapienza), Angelo Tartabini
(University of Parma), and Robert E. Ulanowicz (University of Maryland) for their very helpful
and constructive contributions. I cannot omit to thank my student Carly Andrews for having
helped me to purify my English. Finally, I would also like to thank Sonke Adlung, senior editor at
OUP, very much for his kind assistance and help.
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Nature is not economical of structures: only of principles of fundamental applicability.
[SALAM 1979]
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Introduction
Biological and cognitive sciences are at a conceptual turning point at the beginning of this century.
Let us consider first biology and then the cognitive sciences.
• There have been amazing steps taken at the level of both molecular and evolutionary biology
(the extent of their progress will be shown in the following chapters). However, we also have the
growing feeling that traditional reductionist methodologies are largely insu!cient for dealing
with the complexity of systems and problems that are increasingly at the core of our current
scientific inquiry.1 The traditional language of biology has its roots in the classical language
of physics and its explanatory machinery. The latter consists in mechanical causation and its
proper terminology is that of mass, energy, and force, which at a molecular and chemical level
involves molecular forces, concentration of certain chemicals, rate of a reaction, and so on, which
is a formal language that does not seem completely satisfactory today when dealing with higher
levels of biological organization. It is much more suitable here to deal with parameters like
formal constraints, dissipative events, di"erential timing, degenerate states and processes. As
we shall see all these aspects are crucial for epigenetic processes. Moreover, from the following
inquiry it will become evident that top-down constraints must be added to the list of explanatory
mechanisms. All these processes and features are rooted in the language and the mechanisms of
complexity theory.
• On the other hand, cognitive science (cognitive psychology, cognitive neuropsychology, neural
network theory, and so on) has also taken huge steps in conceptualization and experiments.
However, the general trend, at least in the last decades, has been a sort of functionalism through
which the mind or the brain is conceived as an entity separated from its biological background.
The functionalist language of cognitive science is rooted in cybernetics. The aim of cybernetics
was the utilization of the framework of classical information and communication, as it was
firmly established by Shannon,2 for the foundations of cognition.3 For reasons that will be clear
in the following chapters, the final result of this scientific enterprise was relatively unsatisfactory.
Artificial intelligence (AI), the most qualified scientific vector of cognitive sciences, did not lead to
the expected successes.4 This methodology does not seem to catch the fundamental complexity
of the brain and the mind as it is rooted in biology. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of this
scientific enterprise, it was assumed that the brain represented the external world in a passive
1[GORDON 1999]. 2[SHANNON 1948].
3[WIENER 1948][ASHBY 1956]. Wiener stressed that cybernetics can be seen as an attempt at transforming com-
munication engineering in a branch of statistical mechanics, and this could not be resolved without a classical theory of
information [WIENER 1948, p. 10].
4[HAWKINS/BLAKESLEE 2004, pp. 13–18].
1
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2 Introduction
manner, mirroring external objects and their properties, and that the role of thought consisted
essentially of classically (logically) processing the information acquired in this way. In the latter
20 years there has been a growing body of evidence that this is not the right story. The brain
has been increasingly understood not only as an active and interactive entity (as biological
systems already are) but as a system whose nature lies rather in perception–anticipation and in
strategic pursuit of aims.5 These results have completely transformed the character, scope, and
methodologies of the cognitive sciences. For these reasons, a new language is required, centered
on concepts like information sharing and information selection out of an initial variety. The
roots of this language can be found in the basic theory of our physical universe, i.e. in quantum
mechanics, and especially in the growing field known as quantum information.
• Finally, I stress that the tendential split between a too reductionist understanding of biology and
a functionalist approach to cognition may have controversial implications for future development
in natural sciences. As a matter of fact, today we understand more and more that cognition
is rooted in biology. This means that we must find in biology the elements or at least the
presuppositions that lead to cognition. However, this also implies that cognitive processes (even
at a very elementary level) are important for the organism’s survival. To this extent, cognition
is not irrelevant to biology just as biology is not irrelevant to cognition.6 Thus, the object of this
book should be considered as an attempt at building a new discipline, that of cognitive biology,
which endeavors to bridge these two domains. From what has been said before, a reference to
physics seems unavoidable here, especially when foundational issues are at play.7 This was the
path chosen by thinkers like W. Wundt or H. von Helmholtz in the 19th century.8 E. Mach
opened his book on sensation with a presentation of classical mechanics.9 Only this approach
can assure a su!cient solid framework for dealing with the foundations of biology and cognition.
The specific problem that we are concerned with in cognitive biology is to find an opportune
mediation between the theory of complexity (helpful for biology) and the quantum-mechanical
treatment of information (helpful for cognition). As we shall see this connection can be found in
the notion of information control that bridges metabolic processes and informational aspects. It
is understood that I am not claiming that quantum mechanics or the theory of complex systems
o"ers a direct solution to biological and cognitive issues. However, those physical disciplines
provide us with a general conceptual and methodological framework that is useful for dealing
with these problems: My principal aim in this book is to show that the notion of information
control implies a shift from explanations that are centered on single trajectories, properties,
behaviors and systems, to explanations focused on classes of behaviors and systems.10
Such an aim cannot be accomplished without simplifying strategies11; however, these must avoid
opposing and risky oversimplifications:
(1) The elimination of the specificity of any level of complexity involved in the investigation, which
can be the consequence of assuming that the same basic laws apply to, and the same structures
form all domains of reality. Therefore, the specific form that my methodology takes is to
recognize that any system or aspect of reality under consideration is operationally complete,12
that is, (a) its behavior is determined by laws that are specifically formulated for that level
of reality and (b) lower levels of reality are integrated into those laws and structures at the
5[JEANNEROD 2006].
6It is likely that the first scholar to have understood this connection is Herbert Spencer [REZNIKOVA 2007, p. 4].
7[WOODGER 1929, p. 84]. 8[WUNDT 1873–4] [VON HELMHOLTZ 1867]. 9[MACH 1875, pp. 6–22].
10[PARISI 1999]. 11[ROBERT 2004, p. 3]. 12[NEWELL 1990, 49].
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higher level, assuring the ability to work in the proper way (for instance, no biology without
chemistry).
(2) When investigating a specific domain, the risk is to completely isolate it from its contingencies
connected with the rest of reality. Indeed, in any work like this the di"erent stages considered
are neatly separated and abstractly distinguished. In fact, things are much more entangled
and the evolution of species on the Earth shows many mixed cases and exceptions. This fact,
however, does not diminish the importance of a systematic treatment of the matter at the
specific level. A tension between the latter approach and a strict empirical or historical one is
natural and even salutary.
Therefore, much of what I shall say is hypothetical. I will explicitly stress this point many times.
However, the book tries to gather some of the best hypotheses that we can advance given the
current data at our disposal. A significant number of concepts introduced here have an empirical
basis and will be presented in this way. On the other hand, it is very di!cult to proceed in science
in a fruitful and long-ranging perspective without formulating hypotheses.13 If this investigation
is of any interest, perhaps further research will fill some gaps, reformulate and even disprove some
assumptions. This is what I expect and hope. A research program will be judged not by the labels
one attaches to it but by the practical e"ects that it will eventually produce. In the words of
Francis Bacon:
Qui tracteverunt scientia aut Empirici aut Dogmatici fuerunt. Empirici, formicæ more, congerunt tantum
et utuntur; Rationales, aranearum more, telas ex se conficiunt: apis vero ratio media est, quæ materiam ex
floribus horti et agri elicit, sed tamen eam propria facultate vertit et digerit. Neque absimile philosophiæ
verum opificium est; quod nec mentis viribus tantum aut precipue nititur, neque ex historia naturali et
mechanicis experimentis præbitam materiam, in memoria integram, sed in intellectu mutatam et subactam,
reponit.14
Some of the main results of many disciplines have been used in order to provide the necessary
theoretical framework and empirical evidence for the necessity of new foundations of life and
cognitive sciences. My work could therefore be defined as a cross-disciplinary enterprise, i.e. as an
investigation connecting various and even distant fields with the aim of finding specific results and
indicating a general research path. My own work strongly relies on recent results that have been
developed in these di"erent fields. What I have done is to establish connections between di"erent
approaches and problems as well as to infer some theoretical conclusions in order to make the
scientific community aware that we have already entered into a new stage of research and even
set the presuppositions for a new research strategy. It should be clearly understood that it has
not been my aim to present or to develop these research areas on their own (which is probably an
impossible task). Indeed, the specialist may find that the empirical material adduced in his or her
field is not su!cient or has been selected by criteria that he or she does not share. In the words of
Martha Farah,15 the story of this book “can be told from start to finish only if one is willing to
accept educated guesses at some junctures and frank declarations of ignorance at others.”
13[PEIRCE 1898] [BERNARD 1865, pp. 35–47].
14Those who have handled sciences have been either men of experiment or men of dogmas. The men of experiment are
like the ant, they only collect and use; the reasoners resemble spiders, who make cobwebs out of their own substance. But
the bee takes a middle course: it gathers its material from the flowers of the garden and of the field, but transforms and
digests it by a power of its own. Not unlike this is the true business of philosophy; for it neither relies solely or chiefly on
the powers of the mind, nor does it take the matter which it gathers from natural history and mechanical experiments and
lay it up in the memory whole, as it finds it, but lays it up in the understanding altered and digested [BACON 1620, I, 95].
15[FARAH 2000a, p. 1].
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4 Introduction
In connecting so many di"erent fields, one of the main tasks of this book is to help in providing a
fundamental conceptual clarification about many terms that are currently used in cognitive sciences
(this is less true for biology where the terminology is much more fixed). Indeed, many terms are used
in di"erent ways in adjacent sciences (that somewhat intersect), and even in the context of a single
science, they are mostly used in a slippery way. For instance, words like “semantics,” “reference,”
“representation,” “image,” “concept,” “category,”16 and so on, even in specialized sciences like the
neurological ones and by famous scientists, are used in a questionable form, sometimes covering
aspects and issues that are not only di"erent but often unrelated. For these reasons, I have also
changed the meaning of many words as they are currently used in some disciplines, and I have
introduced new terms. There may indeed be objections to many terms I have coined; I will not
claim that my terminology is the definitive one, but I would ask that the reader appreciate my
e"ort at univocity. In this e"ort of clarification, I have also sometimes changed the terminology
that I have used in my own previous papers and books. The glossary is useful whenever di!culties
arise and in such cases I suggest that the reader refer to it.
Finally, for the sake of clarity I shall give a brief overview of the structure of the book. The order
of the topics follows pragmatic principles, so that a deep and easy understanding may be acquired.
The first part is centered on the concept of information acquisition. Chs. 1–2 are rather abstract
and introductory but provide the general framework in terms of information and system theory,
presenting the basic notions which we shall deal with later. Chs. 3–5 provide some fundamental
elements of information-acquiring especially regarding the human brain, considered here solely in
its function as an information-acquiring device. These elements will turn out to be relevant for
many issues treated in the second part of the book, in particular in Chs. 12–17.
The second part of the book is about information control and related semiotic processes.
Ch. 6 is again an abstract and fundamental treatment of basic physical notions dealing with
self-organization and complexity. Ch. 7 gives a basic notion of the cell, while Ch. 8 introduces the
notion of the organism as a cybernetic system. Chs. 9–11 are an analysis from an informational and
systemic point of view of the three basic processes of life: Phylogeny, ontogeny, and epigeny. Ch. 12
represents a new start, dealing extensively with the representational processes of life. Chs. 13–14
come back to an analysis of the brain, but this time treated as an information-control system
rather than as an information-acquiring device, as it was still considered in the first part of the
book. Chs. 15–17 deal with the three fundamental functions of behavior, learning, and memory.
The third part of the book is about information interpretation and symbolic activity. Ch. 18 is
devoted to conceptualization, the problem of choice and empathy. In Ch. 19 a basic treatment of
symbolic activity is provided. Chs. 20–22 are devoted to the issues of intentionality, consciousness,
development, and culture. Ch. 23 deals with language, while a short examination of the mind–body
problem follows in Ch. 24. Finally a concluding chapter will draw some main philosophical lessons.
16[THOMPSON/ODEN 2000].
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Part I
Acquiring Information
One of the prime characteristics of science is . . . its success in linking together diverse strands of
nature that had previously seemed unrelated.
[STAPP 1993, p. 120]
It is not possible to do the work of science without using a language that is filled with metaphors.
Virtually the entire body of modern science is an attempt at explaining phenomena that cannot
be experienced directly by human beings . . . Such explanations, if they are to be not merely formal
propositions, . . . must necessarily involve the use of a metaphorical language.
[LEWONTIN 2000, p. 3]
Facts are always examined in the light of some theory and therefore cannot be disentangled from
philosophy.
[VYGOTSKY 1986, p. 15]
978–0–19–960848–5 01-Auletta-01-drv Auletta (Typeset by SPi) 6 of 869 June 13, 2011 14:45
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 13/6/2011, SPi
978–0–19–960848–5 01-Auletta-01-drv Auletta (Typeset by SPi) 7 of 869 June 13, 2011 14:45
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF –REVISES, 13/6/2011, SPi
1
Quantum Mechanics as a General
Framework
When dealing with the relations between biology and physics, three paths are theoretically possible:
(1) To rely on classical physics and the old reductionist methodology. This has led to very important
results and still will, but (as I hope this book will show) such an approach appears to be increasingly
insu!cient and not in accordance with the developments of physics. (2) To reject any connection
with physics in order to guarantee an autonomous foundation of biology. This is scientifically very
questionable and leads finally to a form of vitalism. (3) The third possibility is to show that the
most revolutionary physical theory, i.e. quantum mechanics, allows a connection with physics that
is both much more interesting for biology and su!ciently soft to allow an autonomous foundation
without any violation of physical laws. I have chosen this third perspective. This justifies, I hope, the
present and the next chapter. In the next part of the book I shall also consider another important
contribution coming from physics, namely the theory of complex systems. Although crucial for the
understanding of the topic of this book, the latter theory is less general than quantum theory and
therefore less indicated as a start.
In this chapter we shall deal with quantum physics at a conceptual level. After having explained
the main reasons for starting with a summary of quantum mechanics in a book about biological
and cognitive processes, I shall try to summarize what are the main characters of quantum theory
and which are the main general lessons. We shall discover that a quantum system shows not only
well-localized properties but also nonlocal features.
1.1 Why Quantum Mechanics?
In some papers in biological sciences and in many in cognitive sciences one refers to physics
as the science to which biological and neurological or psychological sciences should be reduced.
Any attempt at developing an autonomous theory of biological and cognitive systems is often
stigmatized as folk physics or folk psychology. As an extreme but interesting case of this form of
ontological reductionism,1 let us consider the example of G. E. Allen who a!rmed that “Spemann’s
Nobel Prize should be revoked because organization did not seem to be a specific phenomenon
describable in physical and chemical terms”.2 So, the problem we have still today is that of an
autonomous (i.e. not reducible to physics and chemistry) foundation of biological sciences,3 an
issue to which I hope this book will make a contribution.
1The interested reader may have a look at [MURPHY/BROWN 2007, pp. 47–8] or [VAN GULICK 2007].
2Quoted in [GORDON 1999, p. 14]. See also [ANDERSON 1972].
7
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8 Quantum Mechanics as a General Framework
Unfortunately, all those authors who speak of a reduction of biology to physics (or chemistry)
have in mind classical physics (or chemistry), as if it were the ultimate paradigm of science.
Actually, classical physics (as well as classical chemistry) has been overcome.4 I will not deny that
it still has many interesting applications and is very useful for solving a lot of practical problems,
just as Ptolemaic astronomy is still used in navigation. However, classical mechanics is no longer
the physical explanation of our world. It has been reduced to a sort of approximation. Quantum
mechanics has replaced it as the ground physical theory.5 According to Stapp,6 there are two main
revisions in physics: Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations and the introduction of random events in
physics. As we shall see, uncertainty relations are a consequence of quantum correlations. Anyway,
both of these two fundamental revisions are due to quantum mechanics. These are the profound
reasons why we need to start with such a theory.
It is true that, at a physical level, there are still a lot of problems in unifying quantum mechanics
and relativity. However, any further progress in sciences (string theories, great unification, or
further possibilities) will never bypass what has already been established on the firmest grounds
by the most tested theory in history having the widest range of applications, i.e. by quantum
mechanics. Moreover, it is already foreseeable that in the next 50 years quantum mechanics will
progressively replace classical mechanics also in those macroscopic domains where a more detailed
description becomes increasingly necessary.
I recall here that the first scientists to have suggested the necessity to find a connection between
biology and quantum mechanics in order to build a new type of physical explanation more suitable
for biology were some leading personalities in quantum mechanics like Bohr, Jordan, Delbrück, and
especially Schrödinger.7 Moreover, much later Roger Penrose remarked that a specific biological
system such as the brain does not work like a classical computer.8 Indeed, a brain can perform
calculations even if the problem is not well-defined, in the sense that some of the data are lacking
that are necessary for finding the solution through classical computational methods. He suggested
that quantum mechanics could be the solution for this anomalous information treatment.9 Even
if it is not necessary to assume that brains directly follow quantum-mechanical laws (due to the
very high complexity of their organization), the main idea was really revolutionary.
When we consider quantum physics, we are led to the conclusion that in this domain physical
laws are very di"erent from what one could expect in a classical framework.10 Quantum laws do not
rule single properties of physical systems but probability amplitudes and hence probabilities that
these properties occur. By property I understand here the value of a physical quantity contributing
to the description of a physical system’s state (physical quantities are energy, time, speed, and so
on). By system, in all its generality, I understand here a complex of interrelated elements that show
some regularity in space or time. By physical system, I understand a system that can be (directly
or indirectly) an object of experience through our senses. This means that quantum-mechanical
laws rule our world on a global level (at the level of the possible general evolutions of the system
that are described by those probabilities), but they do not determine singular and local events.11
3[GORDON 1999, pp. 12–6]. 4[SMOLIN 1997, p. 25]. 5[AULETTA 2006c]. 6[STAPP 1992].
7[SCHRÖDINGER 1944]. See [SLOAN/FOGEL 2009]. 8[PENROSE 1989, PENROSE 1994].
9We do not need to follow Penrose in all details as some aspects of his proposal may not be confirmed. They have
actually been criticized by Tegmark [SEIFE 2000].
10Obviously, any formulation of laws in the framework of a theory cannot be understood as immediately representing the
order of nature. They are the result of incomplete inferences and therefore at most fallible approximations. Nevertheless,
to deny that they refer, although in an imperfect way, to such an order would be even worse. In the following I shall give
some grounds for assuming that our inferences are not devoid of a certain objectivity.
11[AULETTA 2006b].
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What Quantum Mechanics Is 9
This is completely di"erent relative to classical physics where laws were thought of as ruling single
events. This is a very interesting standpoint, as one of the first sciences to have provided a place
for chance events in nature was biology, with the Darwinian theory of evolution.
Now, the fact that quantum mechanics does not rule single events has a very important
consequence: There is room for the emergence of new types of physical systems. If, on the contrary,
the world were strictly ruled by classical-mechanical laws, this would be impossible.12 This state
of a"airs explains why, from the perspective of classical mechanics, living beings were always seen
as exotic absurdities when not reducible to mechanical engines.13 This is no longer the case when
approaching the problem starting with quantum mechanics. As we shall see, it indeed provides
some necessary conditions for a world in which life is possible.
1.2 What Quantum Mechanics Is
As we have seen, quantum systems do not behave in the same way as ordinary macroscopic bodies,
neither they do follow the laws of classical physics. In particular, the whole of classical physics is
based on two fundamental assumptions14: That any physical process and relevant parameter are
continuous (continuity principle) and that all the properties of a physical system are determined
(classically called omnimoda determinatio15 or principle of perfect determination). Both these
fundamental assumptions are violated in quantum mechanics: The principle of continuity by
the quantization principle and the assumption of the perfect determination of the state by the
superposition principle. Let us consider now the first violation.
1.2.1 Some Historical Remarks
The first time that an explanation violating the continuity of the classical world was proposed was
in 1900, when Planck16 introduced the idea that the energy of the resonators (here, the elements
of matters emitting electromagnetic radiation) of an internal surface of a so-called black body
(a hollow sphere that only absorbs but does not emit radiation) could be discontinuous.17 Classical
physics is not able to correctly predict the spectral properties of the black body. In fact, it predicts
an infinite total intensity of the emitted radiation. This situation is called ultraviolet catastrophe,
and contradicts experimental evidence. In order to solve this problem, Planck assumed that the
energy of the resonators and of the electromagnetic radiation emitted was quantized (discrete).
Planck’s solution was the result of an abduction, which is the inferential process leading to a solution
of a conflict between accepted laws and experimental evidences by pointing out new properties of
the system under consideration,18 which, although representing a novelty relative to any behavior
previously observed under those laws, do not contradict the latter. In this case, the new property
is the quantization of the emitted radiation. Planck’s assumption may be formulated in a general
12Obviously, I am speaking of a classical world in which there is no complexity or chaos. It is true that these aspects
have been successively englobed in the classical framework of physics. However, as a matter of fact the strong dependence
of complex and chaotic systems on the initial conditions does not agree very well with the classical-mechanical assumption
of the complete reducibility of these initial conditions to classical-mechanics laws.
13[SMOLIN 1997, p. 25].
14[AULETTA 2004]. For a whole examination of this section the interested reader may deepen their knowledge by making
use of the textbook [AULETTA et al. 2009]. That book actually represents the foundations of all that I shall say in this
chapter.
15[BAUMGARTEN 1739, Par. 148] 16[PLANCK 1900a, PLANCK 1900b].
17[KUHN 1978] [MEHRA/RECHENBERG 1982–2001]. 18[PEIRCE 1878b, PEIRCE 1903d][AULETTA 2006a].
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Fig. 1.1 Phase of a wave (on the right) relative to a reference wave (on the left) whose peak is individuated
by the vertical line at the origin (0!). Since the behavior of a wave is oscillatory, it has a cycle (from 0! to
360! (or 2!), when it comes back to the initial situation). Its amplitude is the distance between a peak and
the baseline. Its wavelength " is the distance between two subsequent peaks and is inversely proportional to
the frequency #, that is, " = v/#, where v is the velocity of the wave (which in the case of light can be taken
to be a constant when going though void space).
form as follows: The energy E of the electromagnetic radiation in certain contexts can only assume
discrete values for each of its frequencies !, according to the formula
E = nh!, (1.1)
where n = 1, 2, . . ., and
h = 6.626 ! 10!34J · s (1.2)
is the Planck constant that is expressed in terms of Joules times seconds. The frequency is inversely
proportional to the wavelength—the distance between two peaks of a wave [Fig. 1.1].
This assumption was later used by Albert Einstein, who introduced the idea that the light
could consist not of waves but of small, particle-like quanta (later called photons), to explain the
photoelectric e"ect, i.e. the emission of electrons by a metal surface illuminated by light.19 In fact,
the classical picture of light in terms of waves was unable to account for the photoelectric e"ect:
For a wave, a certain amount of time (of the order of several seconds) would be needed in order
to deliver the energy required for the atoms to emit the electron. However, it is experimentally
known that the e"ect is almost instantaneous. This is understandable only if one admits that light
is made up of well-localized energy packets. It turns out then that the energy of photons occurs
in quantized amounts, as proposed by Planck in 1900 as a solution to the black-body radiation
problem.
This assumption was also, later on, applied by Niels Bohr to the atomic model.20 In fact, in
a continuous framework (like that proposed by Rutherford), negative-charged particles (electrons)
revolving around a positive-charged nucleus (made of protons) would fall in a short time into a
spiral trajectory into the latter. However, this would contradict the experienced stability of matter,
which is, on the contrary, accounted for by discrete (quantized) energy levels.
I wish to stress, in conclusion, that the quantization assumption ran in contradiction with the
whole understanding of physics at that time. Indeed, at the threshold between the 19th and 20th
centuries a continuist view was dominant. All phenomena were essentially understood as local
19[EINSTEIN 1905]. 20[BOHR 1913].
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Fig. 1.2 Schematic setup of the Mach–Zehnder interferometer (top-down lateral view). The source beam
coming from the laser is split at the first beam splitter BS1. After reflections at the two mirrors M1 and
M2, the upper and lower paths are recombined at the second beam splitter BS2 and then detected at the
photodetectors D1 and D2. PS denotes a phase shifter which causes a relative phase shift $ of the upper
beam.
propagation phenomena.21 Light, in analogy with acoustic phenomena, was understood as the
local vibration of elements of a medium called aether, so that nothing was really in motion.22
1.2.2 The Superposition Principle
Let me stress that, being the quantum of light, a photon can be absorbed and emitted by single
atoms. As a consequence, photons can be detected in well-defined positions, as happens for ordinary
particles, by certain apparata (called photodetectors). It is worth mentioning that in optimal
conditions a single photoreceptor (rod) of a human eye is able to detect a single photon23 and
therefore to function as a photodetector (even though with a small e!ciency).
To see that and to infer another basic aspect of quantum mechanics let me describe an ideal
experiment. The setup is shown in Fig. 1.2 and is known as a Mach–Zehnder interferometer. It
essentially consists of two beam splitters, i.e. two half-silvered mirrors which partly reflect and
partly transmit an input light beam, two mirrors, and two photodetectors. All the devices present
in this setup are linear, i.e. such that the output is proportional to the input. Linearity is a
mathematical property given by the combination of additivity
f(x + y) = f(x) + f(y), (1.3a)
21Today general relativity supports this understanding of gravitational force.
22[VON HELMHOLTZ 1883, pp. 593–4]. 23[HUBEL 1988].
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Fig. 1.3 Constructive and destructive interference depending on the phases of the photons. In the former
case they are in phase, in the latter case they are completely out of phase (intermediate possibilities result
in intermediate interferences).
for some function f and variables x and y, and of homogeneity
f(n · x) = n · f(x), (1.3b)
where n can be any scalar number (multiplier).
A light beam coming from the source is split by the first beam splitter (BS1) into the upper
and lower paths. These are reflected at the mirrors M1 and M2 and recombined at the second
beam splitter BS2, placed before the photodetectors D1 and D2, which we assume to be ideal, i.e.
with 100% e!ciency. In the upper path a phase shifter (PS) is inserted in order to create a relative
phase di"erence " between the two component light beams. A phase shift which is a multiple of 2#
(360") brings the situation back to the original one, while a phase shift " = # corresponds to the
completely out-of-phase situation [Fig. 1.1]. At BS2 the two beams interfere and such interference
may be destructive (" = #) or constructive (" = 0) [Fig. 1.3]. For example, destructive interference
at D2 means that the observed intensity at the photodetector is equal to zero (dark output). This in
turn means that D1 will certainly click (here there is constructive interference). The transmission
and reflection coe!cients T and R of the beam splitters can both vary between 0 and 1, with
R2 + T2 = 1. When T = R = 1/
"
2, we have a 50% # 50% beam splitter.
We then see that, to a certain extent, photons still behave as classical light, that is, have wave-
like properties. Since we have also seen that light can be considered as composed of corpuscular
entities, this suggests a picture according to which light may display both wave-like and corpuscular
aspects. We face here a new and surprising situation that appears paradoxical from a classical
viewpoint. In the next subsections I shall try to explain this state of a"airs and draw the necessary
consequences. Let us first imagine what happens when we send a single photon at a time through the
Mach–Zehnder interferometer. At each experimental run the photon will be detected either at D1
or at D2. This is because experimental evidence shows that the photon cannot be divided, which in
turn means that to our knowledge the photon is an elementary (and discontinuous) entity. However,
after many runs, which are required in order to obtain good statistics, we will experimentally
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Fig. 1.4 The two curves show the statistical results of photon counting at detectors D1 and D2. N1 and N2
denote the number of photons counted at detectors D1 and D2, respectively. It should be noted that, for each
value of $, obviously N1($) + N2($) = N .
observe that the detector D1 will click N(1 + cos ")/2 times and detector D2 N(1 # cos ")/2 times,
where N is the total number of experimental runs. Repeating the same experiment for a large
number of times with di"erent values of ", we would obtain the plots shown in Fig. 1.4. This
behavior represents a typical maximal interference. Since at most one photon at a time is present
within the apparatus, one can speak of self-interference of the photon. This is something very
surprising, needing some further consideration.
Because the photon cannot be split, self-interference forces us to admit that the photon is not
localized in either of the two arms. For the sake of clarity, let us suppose that we remove BS1.
Then the photon will certainly travel along the lower path (it is fully transmitted). We can label
the state of the photon in such a case by the symbol | l$ , where l denotes the lower path. In the
following, I will use the symbol | ·$ to indicate the state of a physical system. On the other hand,
if BS1 is replaced by a 100% reflecting mirror, the photon will take with certainty the upper path
and its state may then be denoted in this case by the symbol |u$ , where u denotes the upper path.
As a consequence, when the half-silvered mirror BS1 is put in its place, we are led to the conclusion
that the state of the photon should be a combination (a superposition) of both the states | l$ and
|u$ associated with the two arms of the interferometer. Therefore, we state in general terms the
first theoretical consequence of our ideal experiment:
If a quantum system S can be in either of two states, then it can also be in any linear combination
(superposition) of them.
Due to linearity [Eqs. (1.3)], inputs are added and multiplied in a way that holds also the output
to be proportionally added and multiplied. In the example above, the total state of the photon
after BS1 that we may conventionally denote with |$$ can be expressed as the superposition
|$$ = cu |u$ + cl | l$ , (1.4)
where cu and cl are some coe!cients whose meaning will be explained below. Eq. (1.4) represents
the above conclusion: It is not possible to assign a well-defined path to the photon, but this takes
a combination of the two paths and is delocalized. We should emphasize that this state of a"airs is
a clear violation of the classical principle of perfect determination according to which the photon
should be either in the upper path or in the lower path. This means that Eq. (1.4)—describing a
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Fig. 1.5 The quantum state |%! is a vectorial sum of |u! and | l! . The contribution of each basic state
vector is a function of the angle &.
superposition of states—cannot be interpreted as a superposition of classical waves, since, in the
latter case, the components of the superposition would be two di!erent spatial waves, whereas in
the case of Eq. (1.4) the components | l$ and |u$ represent possible states of the same photon.
Therefore, the wave-like properties of the photon discussed above cannot be taken in any classical
sense. For that reason, the superposition principle is not just a consequence of our ignorance of
the path actually taken by the photon.
Summing up, quantum mechanics corrects classical mechanics on two crucial points24:
(a) There is not a continuity of motion and of the relevant physical parameters when systems
interact, and (b) material elementary (local) entities are not identifiable.
1.2.3 Vectorial Nature of Quantum States
Quantum states can geometrically be represented as state vectors in a given vectorial space (called
a Hilbert space). For instance, the superposition (1.4) may be considered as a vectorial sum of two












which corresponds to the x and y vectors of the Cartesian plane.
On the other hand, the coe!cients cu and cl will represent the weights with which the two
component vectors participate in the resulting state vector |$$ . In other words, they can be
understood as functions of the angle % that separates the vector |$$ from |u$ or from | l$ , as
shown again in Fig. 1.5. Therefore, allowing us to write any arbitrary state vector as their sum,
these two vectors are called a basis, and this is written as {| l$ , |u$}. In the bidimensional case
(with two basis vectors), we may then represent the coe!cients as sine and cosine as follows
[Fig. 1.6]:
|$$ = sin ! |u$ + cos ! | l$ . (1.6)
24[MARGENAU 1961, p. 131].
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Fig. 1.6 Representation of sine and cosine. The sine of the angle ! is given by PQ/r, where r is the ray of
the circumference: It is 0 for ! = 0! (PQ = 0), 1 for ! = 90! (PQ = r), 0 for ! = 180!, and "1 for ! = 270!
(because we are considering here the negative part of the y axis). The cosine is given by PR/r (or OQ/r). It
is equal to 1 for ! = 0! (since OQ = r), 0 for ! = 90! (OQ = 0), "1 for ! = 180!, and 0 for ! = 270!. If we
plot sine and cosine according to those values, we shall obtain two curves like those shown in Fig. 1.4, where
N1 would represent the cosine and N2 the sine.
In Fig. 1.5, |$$ is depicted as a symmetric vector, i.e. ! = 45" and therefore, in this case, we have





(|u$ + | l$). (1.7)
However, the contribution of |u$ and | l$ may also be asymmetric, as happens for the vector
|$#$ , also shown in Fig. 1.5. Obviously, the dimensions of a system may be greater than 2. These
dimensions can be understood as the possible outcomes that we obtain when we measure a system.
In other words, they must be understood as the alternative properties that a quantum system can
instantiate; for example, to be localized in the upper path (|u$) or to be localized in the lower path
(| l$) of an interferometer.













which allows us to write the coe!cients cl and cu as













where %l | $$, e.g., is the scalar product between the vectors | l$ and |$$ . The scalar product can
be computed in this way: The row vector on the left multiplies the column vector on the right
(the first element in the row with the first element in the column and the second element in the
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row with the second element in the column), and then these results are summed, so as to obtain:
1 · cl + 0 · cu = cl. Similarly for the second scalar product: %u | $$ = 0 · cl + 1 · cu = cu. The scalar
product indicates the amount of proximity of these two vectors (indeed, when the two vectors
coincide it is equal to 1, and when the two vectors are orthogonal it is equal to 0), explaining, in
this way, at a general level, what is expressed in Fig. 1.5 with the angle !.
1.2.4 Quantization Principle
We have seen that the energy of a quantum system can be quantized in certain circumstances.25
Indeed, Planck assumed that otherwise continuous, radiation, when it was emitted by the black
body’s surface, was quantized [Subsec. 1.2.1]. Also Einstein’s photoelectric e"ect concerns a certain
interaction with light and matter. This shows that light, when interacting with matter, displays
discontinuous aspects, and this is a key to our understanding of quantum mechanics. Indeed, such
a situation can be generalized in a quantization principle:
When several quantum systems interact, they manifest discontinuous properties.
I wish to stress that not only energy can behave in this way, but also other physical quantities
describing a quantum system (like speed), apart from those (like charge) that are intrinsically
discontinuous. A consequence of this situation is that it is impossible to represent physical
quantities in quantum mechanics with mathematical variables. Variables are in fact continuous
whereas the behavior of quantum physical quantities can be both continuous or discontinuous.
Mathematical entities able to represent this situation are operators, whose spectrum (the set of
possible values of the corresponding physical quantity that one would obtain by measuring it) can
indeed be continuous, discontinuous, or a combination of both.
An operator can be understood as the mathematical representation of an operation, e.g. a
rotation. It is well known that the specific sequence in which several operations are executed
does matter. For instance, if one walks and first turns left and then right, one would arrive at a
di"erent point than if one first turned right then left. In other words, the result of a sequence of
operations will be di"erent if the order of the operations is changed. In the general case, a sequence
of operations is mathematically represented by a product of the operators representing the single
operations. In our case, we have
L̂R̂ &= R̂L̂, (1.10)
where R̂ and L̂ represent the operation of turn-to-right and turn-to-left, respectively, and the
hat denotes here and in the following any operator. Eq. (1.10) represents a very interesting
mathematical property, called non-commutativity.26 In fact, variables and functions of variables
(that represent classically physical quantities) do commute, that is, the product between any two
variables or functions of variables is indi"erent to the order of the factors, which means that, for
any arbitrary couple of numbers a and b, we always have
ab = ba. (1.11)
On the contrary, given two arbitrary quantum observables Ô and Ô#, we may have
ÔÔ# # Ô#Ô &= 0. (1.12)
25[SCHRÖDINGER 1926a, SCHRÖDINGER 1926b, SCHRÖDINGER 1926c].
26A property first discovered by Heisenberg [HEISENBERG 1925].
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The quantum physical quantities will be called in the following “observables” in order to distinguish
them from the classical variables.
Let us come back to the formal aspects. Any (finite-dimensional) operator can be written as a







which represents a generalization of the concept of vector (we have now not only a column but
also rows). All the elements of a matrix (a, b, c, d, here) are numbers. The sum and product of
bidimensional (with 2 columns ! 2 rows) matrices Ô and Ô# is given by












a + a# b + b#














aa# + bc# ab# + bd#
ca# + dc# cb# + dd#
&
, (1.15)
respectively. The result of the product is given by four elements, which respectively represent the
first row times the first column, the first row times the second column, the second row times the
first column, and the second row times the second column. A matrix can have complex elements.
However, a matrix representing an observable must have real values, which we impose therefore as
a requirement.
An example of operator is represented by projectors, for instance P̂u = |u$ %u | and P̂l = | l$ %l |;



























where we have the first row times the first column and times the second column, and the second
row times the first column and times the second column. Note that the order of row and column
matrices is inverted relative to the scalar product (1.9). The action of these projectors on a state
vector (a ket, in short)
|$$ = cu |u$ + cl | l$ (1.18)
is shown in Fig. 1.7 and can be mathematically described as
P̂u |$$ = |u$ %u | (cu |u$ + cl | l$ )
= cu |u$ %u | u$ + cl |u$ %u | l$ = cu |u$ · 1 + cl | l$ · 0
= cu |u$ ,
978–0–19–960848–5 01-Auletta-01-drv Auletta (Typeset by SPi) 18 of 869 June 13, 2011 14:45
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 13/6/2011, SPi






Fig. 1.7 Action of projectors. We have indeed P̂u |%! = cu |u! and P̂l |%! = cl | l! , which nicely shows that
the projection on |u! and | l! is shorter than |u! and | l! themselves, since (for reasons that will be explained
at the beginning of Subsec. 1.2.7) both cu and cl are # 1 (when cu or cl is equal to 1, the other coe!cient is
zero: In that case we are projecting a vector onto itself, e.g. P̂u |u! = |u! ).
P̂l |$$ = | l$ %l | (cu |u$ + cl | l$ )
= cu | l$ %l | u$ + cl | l$ %l | l$ = cu | l$ · 0 + cl | l$ · 1
= cl | l$ , (1.19)
where I have made use of the properties of the scalar product %u | l$ = %l | u$ = 0 and %u | u$ =
%l | l$ = 1.
The fact that operators representing quantum physical quantities (energy, momentum, i.e. speed
times mass, and so on) may not commute has some interesting consequences. The most important
are known as the uncertainty relations, derived and stated for the first time by Heisenberg,27
which define the minimum value of the product of the uncertainties of two conjugate observables.
Both in classical physics and in quantum mechanics, conjugate variables or observables are the
following couples: Position and momentum, time and energy, angle and angular momentum, and
so on. Momentum, energy, and angular momentum are called dynamic variables or observables,
while position, time, and angle are called kinematic variables or observables. The uncertainties
#x and #px of the one-dimensional position and momentum operators x̂ and p̂x = mvx (mass m






where ! = h/2#. Needless to say, similar expressions hold for the y and z components. Moreover,
analogous uncertainty relations can be written also for other pairs of conjugate observables. The
relation (1.20) states that, when one tries to reduce the uncertainty of one of the two conjugate
observables, then necessarily the uncertainty of the other increases. In particular, it is possible to
have an infinitely precise measurement of one of the two observables, say the position (#!x = 0).
27[HEISENBERG 1927].
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But, in this case, the price one has to pay is that the momentum observable is completely
undetermined (#!px = (). The value !/2 represents then the maximum attainable certainty,
i.e. the minimum uncertainty product allowed by the uncertainty relations. Let us consider this
situation a little.
1.2.5 Features and Quantum State in Phase Space
It is important to stress that, exactly as it happens for classical-mechanical states, we have a
description of the state of a quantum-mechanical system represented by the state vector |$$ .
That is, the vector |$$ contains everything we may know about the system, i.e. it represents the
maximal amount of information about the system at a given moment. However, while in classical
mechanics, all properties of a physical state are believed to be simultaneously instantiated and
therefore can also be in principle jointly measured, the uncertainty relations forbid one to acquire
all the information that is contained in the quantum state vector |$$ . In other words, although
the quantum state also represents a stock of complete information about the system in a given
moment, this information is not accessible in its totality to any observer and for any possible
operation. We must conclude that, while classical mechanics is ruled by the principle of perfect
determination and therefore a classical state is characterized by a complete collection of properties,
the quantum mechanical state is intrinsically probabilistic and a!ected by uncertainty, i.e. not all
the observables can be completely determined at the same time.
The question is why we have such a situation. We have already met the phenomenon of self-
interference [Subsec. 1.2.2]. It is a manifestation of a deep quantum reality: Quantum correlations,
that is, interdependencies among the components of the state (for instance, paths in the inter-
ferometer) or even the subsystems of some quantum system. They may be called features of a
quantum system (quantum features or simply features when no ambiguity arises), because they
are characters of the state of the system that need to be distinguished from true properties, which
are always localized.28 Then, features are responsible for any interference and non-local behavior
of quantum systems, and therefore also for the impossibility of having access to the whole of
information contained in a quantum state. This is expressed by the uncertainty relations. It is true
that we arrived at uncertainties by starting from noncommutativity which in turn we took as a
consequence of the interaction between quantum systems. However, we have such discontinuities
precisely because the interacting quantum systems display features.
The concept of quantum state now has deep implications that can be examined using the
phase-space representation of a system. A phase-space representation of a system is given by the
representation of its state(s) in a reference frame whose axes are represented by position and
momentum: In classical mechanics, position and momentum are the variables that determine the
state of the system (at least in the most elementary cases). A classical representation in phase
space is necessarily point-like. Indeed, when the principle of perfect determination is assumed,
momentum and position always both have a perfectly determined value. If one considers the time
evolution of the system, then the point representing the state of the system at a certain time will
trace a well-defined trajectory in the phase space [Fig. 1.8].
On the contrary, due to the uncertainty relations, a phase-space representation for a quantum
system at a given instant cannot be point-like: Such a representation must reflect the fact that the
uncertainties in position and momentum are both finite and that their product cannot be smaller
than !/2. Therefore, we may depict this circumstance by a spot in the phase space whose horizontal
28[AULETTA/TORCAL 2011].
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Fig. 1.8 Time evolution of a classical degree of freedom in phase space: At any time t, the state of the





Fig. 1.9 Graphic representation of a “point” in the quantum-mechanical phase space. According to the
uncertainty relations, a single degree of freedom should be represented by a spot. Shading has only aesthetic
value.
and vertical dimensions are equal to the position and momentum uncertainties [Fig. 1.9]. Moreover,
any improvement in the determination of momentum will be paid in terms of a proportional increase
in uncertainty for position and vice versa [Fig. 1.10].
This has important methodological and philosophical consequences. In fact, since we cannot
have perfect determination of two conjugate observables simultaneously, if we wish to know with
great accuracy the value of one of the two, then we are obliged to choose between measuring position
and measuring momentum. It is clear that quantum mechanics forces us to consider knowledge as
a matter of choice rather than of a mirror image of a datum.29 This completely changes the way
29On this point see [WEYL 1950, p. 76].
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Fig. 1.10 Inverse proportionality between momentum and position uncertainties. When the position is
accurately determined, the momentum becomes highly uncertain (a), and vice versa (b).
in which we consider our knowledge relative to the world. One might be led to the conclusion that
quantum mechanics implies some form of subjectivism. However, this is not the case, as we shall
see below.
Another consequence of this situation is that trajectories do not exist in quantum mechanics.
This is true both in the phase space (for what we have said above) and in the configuration space
(the space “in which” quantum systems actually move). In fact, if one could define a trajectory, say,
of a one-dimensional particle, then it would also be possible to determine the velocity and therefore
the momentum of the particle, violating the uncertainty relations. This has the consequence that
quantum systems mostly follow a superposition of di"erent trajectories, a multipath dynamics,
which strongly undermines the possibility of making causal inferences.30
1.2.6 Complementarity Principle
It is clear from Subsec. 1.2.2 that, e.g., for " = 0, Detector D2 will never click. This dark output
may even be used to detect the presence of an obstacle in one of the two paths without directly
interacting with it. Let us place an object in the lower arm of the interferometer and set " = 0.
Then, the presence of this object will prevent the interference at the second beam splitter (BS2),
shown in Fig. 1.2, and allow, at least with some probability di"erent from zero, that the photon
will actually be detected at D2. This phenomenon is known as an interaction-free measurement31:
We can state that, when the relative phase is set to " = 0, a detection event in D2 tells us with
certainty that an object is in one of the two arms and that the photon has taken the other arm to
the detector, i.e. it has now been localized. It should be noted that, in some cases, the photon will
not be detected at all because it will be absorbed by the object. Still, in those cases when detector
D2 clicks, we have learned about the presence of the object without directly interacting with it,
something which classically would evidently not be possible.32 As I have already anticipated, it is
clear that interference (and its features) cannot be a manifestation of subjective ignorance: If this
30[AULETTA 2005a]. 31[ELITZUR/VAIDMAN 1993].
32This has far-reaching consequences, if one thinks that the 1971 Nobel Prize winner in physics, Dennis Gabor, supported
the idea that one cannot acquire information about an object system if at least one photon does not interact with it
[KWIAT et al. 1996].
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were the case, the presence or absence of features would not allow us specific detection events and
the objective acquisition of information.
A further consequence is that every time that the photon is localized (i.e. we know with certainty
that it has taken either the upper or the lower arm), interference is actually destroyed (since this
is a direct consequence of the superposition of |u$ and | l$ ). In other words, we cannot acquire
information about the path actually taken by the photon without disturbing the interference and
changing the state of the photon itself. As I have said, interference is a manifestation of the presence
of quantum features. Since, on the contrary, complete information about a quantum system can
only be obtained through a measurement event, we are then forced to generalize the previous
examination as follows
Events and features are complementary.
This principle states that to experience events and therefore to acquire information is complemen-
tary to the existence of global features: Information-acquiring implies lowering interference (which
is due in turn to the existence of features).33 A word of warning is necessary here: Complementarity
is not a sharp yes/no alternative but rather a trade-o" between partial gain of information
and partial interference.34 In other words, full localization (“particle-like” behavior) and full
interference (“wave-like” behavior) are only limiting cases of a continuous range of behaviors.
Therefore, quantum systems can neither be considered as classical particles, nor as classical waves.
1.2.7 Dynamics and Measurement
The complementarity principle [Subsec. 1.2.6] can be reformulated as a dynamic trade-o" between
the continuous and interference-like features displayed by the superposition principle [Subsec. 1.2.2]
and the discontinuous properties displayed by the quantization principle [Subsec. 1.2.4]. In par-
ticular, when a quantum system is free, that is, when it does not interact with other systems,
it displays a continuous behavior. When it interacts with other systems, it displays more or less
discontinuous properties. Therefore, the complementarity principle tells us that, when two or more
quantum systems interact, in the general case both quantum features and discontinuous properties
are involved.
A particular case of dynamics is represented by measurement. Here, the most discontinuous
situation occurs: A detection event [see again Subsec. 1.2.2]. To understand this process, let us
consider the vectors |u$ and | l$ in Eqs. (1.4) or (1.6). They can be understood as possible outcomes
when we perform a certain measurement of the path of a photon going through the interferometer
shown in Fig. 1.2: The states |u$ and | l$ represent the upper and the lower paths taken by the
photon, and since there is no other possible forms of localization in the interferometer (that is, the
photon is found either in the upper or in the lower path when detected), these two states can be
taken as the possible output states when the position of the photon is measured. However, what is
crucial to understand is that in order to get one of these two possible outcomes we need to prepare
the system beforehand in the state |$$ (i.e. to let it go through a beam splitter). Preparation is
therefore the first step of measurement.
The states associated with possible outcomes are called eigenstates or eigenvectors of the
corresponding observable, that is, here |u$ and | l$ are eigenstates of the position observable of
33The complementarity principle was first formulated by Niels Bohr at the Como Conference in 1927 and communicated
to a large audience in an article in Nature [BOHR 1928].
34[GREENBERGER/YASIN 1988].
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Fig. 1.11 Change of basis. The basis {| b! , | b"!} is obtained from the original basis {|u! , | l!} by a
counterclockwise rotation of 45!.
the photon. Moreover, the two coe!cients cu and cl represent the probability amplitudes to obtain
|u$ or | l$ as measurement outcomes. Probability amplitude (connected with the wave amplitude)
means a quantity whose square modulus gives the relative probability (the classical intensity of
the wave), i.e.
p(u) = |cu|2 and p(l) = |cl|2 , (1.21)
or simply the squares of the coe!cients, if these are not complex numbers. The square modulus
of a number c is the square of the absolute value of c, where by absolute it is understood that
any minus sign before the whole expression c is dropped. The point now is that we could also
have decided to measure another observable that is not commutable with position. How can we
represent the eigenvectors of such an observable? We know (through the uncertainty relations)
that in this case we face a choice. Indeed, the eigenvectors of this other observable can be defined
by two vectors, say |b$ and |b$$ , that are di"erent from |u$ and | l$ and represent therefore an
alternative basis for the system being in the state |$$ [Fig. 1.11].35
Summarizing, several observables may have distinct eigenvectors and each observable consti-
tutes a di"erent eigenbasis. This has an important consequence: Superposition is indeed a concept
relative to a given observable. In fact, considering again Fig. 1.11, we immediately see that, for
instance, the vector |u$ , which is an eigenvector of the position, represents simultaneously a
superposition of the vectors |b$ and |b$$ , which are eigenvectors of the non-commutable observable
we have introduced—let us recall Eq. (1.5). For this reason, when measuring an observable it is
very important to know whether the state |$$ , in which the system has been prepared, is an
eigenvector of the observable to be measured or a superposition of its eigenvectors. If it is already
an eigenvector, then the measurement of a quantum system is an analogue of the measurement of a
classical system. That is, the state of the system does not change as a consequence of measurement,
and apparently here we limit ourselves to register the value that the measured observable already
had given the system’s state.36
35For a careful and technical account of these issues see [AULETTA et al. 2009, Ch. 9].
36The issue is a little bit more cumbersome [AULETTA/TORCAL 2011].
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Let us suppose that this state is a certain (arbitrary) superposition |$$ [Eq. (1.18)] of |u$ and
| l$ . If the prepared state is a superposition, the quantum theory of measurement shows features
that have no classical counterpart. Indeed, when measuring in this case, we have a discontinuous
jump from the initial superposition state |$$ to a final outcome represented by either |u$ or | l$ .
The problem here is that it is impossible to have such a transformation at a general level according
to the laws of quantum mechanics. All quantum-mechanical laws, which are in accordance with the
superposition principle, are indeed reversible. These laws express a peculiar form of determinism
because it is a determinism of probabilities. Indeed, provided that there is no detection event,
we have a general delocalized state ruled by probability amplitudes [Subsec. 1.2.2]. Instead, the
evolution from |$$ to either |u$ or | l$ , in all its generality, is irreversible: A detection event tells
us that a system is, for instance, either in the state |u$ or in the state | l$ , and this cannot be
undone (for instance, a detected photon has been absorbed by the photodetector). The argument
can be considered in this way. To have a reversible (a so-called unitary) transformation, it is like
rotating a certain basis (from the initial basis {|u$ , | l$} to the basis {|b$ , |b$$}) of a certain angle.
However, such a general transformation providing a rotation starting from any superposition and
getting one of the two components does not exist, since it would be like rotating the axis of any
possible angle with a single transformation (I recall that the coe!cients cl and cu represents the
angle of the relative components with respect to |$$ ), which is clearly impossible. Resuming,
the (superposition) state of a quantum system evolves in time and is ruled by deterministic and
reversible laws (according to the superposition principle), while the result of a measurement is
produced by an abrupt and irreversible change following the quantization principle.
Let us consider how we can obtain this result. After having prepared the system, the second
step of measurement consists of establishing some interface between the input (initial) state |$$
of the system and the final detection event. This is assured by an apparatus, which is coupled with
the object system to be measured. In this case, each component of the superposition state of the
system must be associated with a component of the apparatus, for instance
|$SA$ = cu |u$ |au$ + cl | l$ |al$ , (1.22)
where |au$ and |al$ are the components of the apparatus and |$SA$ describes the states of both
the system and the apparatus. Such a coupling allows for the fact that, when having the system in
the state, say, | l$ , the apparatus will be in the corresponding state |al$ . This coupling is called a
premeasurement. In quantum mechanics, a state of this form is called an entangled state and shows
characteristic interdependencies that are classically unknown (another manifestation of quantum
features). Indeed, if the initial state of the system is a superposition of state of components |u$ and
| l$ , given this entanglement the apparatus will also be in a superposition state, namely of |au$ and
|al$ . This is bizarre, since we expect that an apparatus (being often a macroscopic body whose
function is to provide a determined answer) will be either in the state |au$ or in the state |al$ .
The reason is very simple: The proper job of an apparatus is not only to be a coupling device, but
to be able to faithfully indicate which state the system is in. Now, an apparatus in a superposition
state indicates no determinate value, and since we have seen that there is apparently no possible
transition from a superposition to one of its components, this situation is really puzzling.
However, we have also made an important step. Indeed, the premeasurement (i.e. the exper-
imental context through which we have established a specific connection between an apparatus
and a given observable) will at least ensure that one specific observable (that is, a basis) is chosen
among many ones. It can indeed be shown37 that either the apparatus cannot work properly (there
37[ZUREK 2007].
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is no possible transfer of information from the object system to the apparatus) or there is an abrupt
change in the state of the system, in which several bases were initially on an equal footing. This
means that a slight fluctuation in the environment will determine a preferred basis (and therefore
a preferred observable). This is an example of symmetry breaking, since all bases are no longer
equivalent (we recall that the superposition principle required the relativity of bases). Obviously,
the preferred orthogonal basis will be the one that best fits with the experimental conditions, that
is, with the apparatus we have chosen to employ (i.e. with the premeasurement we have performed).
This explains why entanglement is both the problem and its solution, since this particular situation
ensures that a certain specific basis (and therefore a specific observable), jointly with the action
of the environment, will be finally selected.
1.2.8 Decoherence
Finally, to obtain a determinate outcome (either |u$ or | l$ ) and a faithful indication of the
apparatus (either |au$ or |al$ ), we need something additional. It is again the environment that
plays an important role: All quantum systems are indeed open to the environment, and this, with
its fluctuations, allows for the final determination of the output state. Which particular outcome
will emerge in a detection event (the third and final step of the measurement process) at the end of
this process is completely unpredictable. Indeed, the environment, which is always present in any
interaction between quantum systems, cannot be controlled and in general it does not enter into
our explicit calculations.38 In fact, the only interaction that we can control is the local interaction
between an object system and an apparatus (paradigmatically, in a laboratory). Suppose, instead,
that we wish to control the interaction with the environment in order to foresee the result of the
measurement.39 Since any quantum system is open to the environment, this represents therefore
a huge complex of entanglements through which, although in di"erent degrees, any system of the
universe is directly or indirectly interconnected with any other. Then, the only way to control the
environment would be to know about these entanglements, and this in turn implies the execution
of many local measurements that would have the e"ect of changing the interrelations between all
these systems and therefore also the interrelation between the measured system and many others.40
That is, the outcome that will be produced depends ultimately on the way our system is entangled
with the rest of the universe, but to know this would in turn imply a change in the state of the
universe and also in the outcome of our measurement.
I wish to point out that the centrality of the environment is not restricted to quantum-
mechanical systems. On the contrary, the distinction between object system, detection device,
and environment is quite general, and to have overseen this point is again a consequence of a
simplification introduced by classical mechanics. This means that when measuring we consider
the interaction between two quantum systems from a particular point of view, from the particular
perspective under which we make use of a local interaction between an apparatus and an object
system, and we obtain a local event. Under this particular point of view, the result that we obtain is
an irreversible classical result. However, when considering the global system represented by object
system + apparatus + environment, all of that follows the ordinary quantum-mechanical, reversible
laws, and here non-local features are still present.
The crucial lesson is that the global evolution of the system–apparatus–environment does not
determine measurement results in any ascertainable way. Why? Because quantum-mechanical
38We will see in the second part of this book that biological systems tend to control the environment, although in a
limited way.
39[AULETTA 2006b]. 40As already understood, on a pure classical ground, in [BOREL 1920, p. 294].
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laws only rule probability amplitudes, and therefore probabilities to obtain a given result in a
given environmental context. This shows that local and individual events are a level of physical
reality that is di"erent from the quantum-mechanical sources of our acquired information (the
systems prepared in a certain state) and correlations (the premeasurement). The consequence is
the randomness of quantum events. But this also means that, although any single event is random,
the experimental conditions in which a measurement happens or a measurement-like dynamical
process occurs (which also incorporates quantum-mechanical laws) determine certain regularities
(expressed by the probabilities) when several systems are considered. For instance, a piece of
radioactive matter will decay in a certain amount of time and we can also calculate the probability
that any atom will decay in a certain time interval, but we cannot tell whether the next atom to
decay is this or that one.
Another important consequence is that quantum features are never annihilated. From a local
point of view (that of the apparatus), due to the complementarity principle [Subsec. 1.2.6], they
tend to zero in a very short time, but a form of coherence (correlation) between the di"erent
components of the entangled state is still present.
In conclusion, this solution, known as decoherence, combines two important aspects:
• It ensures that there is no violation of the quantum-mechanical laws regarding the whole system
comprehending object system + apparatus + environment.
• It points out that the measurement result is somehow an objective but random and local
discontinuous event.
Let me stress that decoherence not only provides a solution to the measurement problem but, quite
generally, also describes the way in which open systems spontaneously interact, as we shall see in
more detail later.
1.2.9 Summing up
Collecting our results so far, anytime we measure we have41
• A selection of the observable to be measured;
• A reduction of the initial superposition to one of its components;
• An unpredictability of the outcome, where only the latter will guarantee that an event happened.
All this means that, when measuring, we have a many-to-one function, that is, from a superposition
to one of its components. There are also cases where we have a one-to-many function. For instance,
an input photon entering into an interferometer in a state that is “parallel” to the transmitted
component (say in the state | l$ ) will be transformed by a beam splitter in the superposition
cl | l$ + cu |u$ .
This a"ects the nature of the chronological order and of causality [see end of Subsec. 1.2.5].
Since we can speak of an event only once we have registered it in a measurement-like interaction,
before this detection event we cannot strictly speak of a chronological order [Fig. 1.12]. That is, it is
only the detection event itself that eventually allows a univocal temporal structure to be imposed,
such that, by means of an inference, it becomes possible to reconstruct what has happened in the
41[AULETTA 2005a].
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Fig. 1.12 Graphic representation of how all that “has happened” in the past is influenced by choices made
in the present as to what can be observed. The upper tip of each “leaf” stands for the act of registration.
The lower end of each “leaf” stands for the beginning of the quantum phenomenon being investigated. As
is shown, there is not a single path leading to a single event. The leaf structure reproduces the fact that,
as explained in the text, in quantum mechanics there can be both a function many-to-one and one-to-many.
Adapted from [WHEELER 1983].
past, provided that there are past events.42 Obviously, since there is no univocal time order, but
either a function one-to-many or many-to-one, it is also impossible, in the general case, to speak
of a univocal causal chain for quantum systems.
1.3 General Aspects of Quantum Mechanics
1.3.1 Primacy of Dynamics
The dynamical interaction between the measurement apparatus and the object system is fun-
damental from the point of view of the complementarity principle [Subsec. 1.2.6]. Due to the
evasive nature of quantum entities, it is impossible to speak of a quantum system’s state without
having already somehow interacted with it. Let me summarize the three steps of measurement
[Subsecs. 1.2.7–1.2.8]:
• Before the measurement act itself, as we have seen, a quantum system is subject to a preparation.
In other words, the preparation is a determination of the state of the system and we may say
that a state is a class of preparations.
• When we perform a coupling between the object system and an apparatus in the second step
of measurement, the so-called premeasurement, we choose a specific observable of the object
system. Since premeasurement can be appropriate for measuring a certain observable but not
other ones, an observable can be understood as defined by a class of premeasurements. This
is a consequence of the superposition principle and the uncertainty relations [Subsecs. 1.2.2
42The fact that in quantum mechanics there is not a univocal temporal order was proposed in [AULETTA 2000, pp.
797–802] and independently proved by a theoretical-experimental team [STEFANOV et al. 2002].
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and 1.2.4]. In doing so, we have determined the way in which the state of the system will be
transformed during the measurement procedure.
• Finally, the transition from an initial (superposed) state to a final detection event (in the third
step of measurement) is largely a"ected by the open dynamic interaction between the apparatus
and the object system. We are finally able to assign a property to the system. We can therefore
understand a property as a class of detection events.
Although the measured observable can have di"erent degrees of determination, according to the
extent to which the o"-diagonal terms are washed out, the measurement result is in itself a discrete
event that either happens or does not (a detector either clicks or does not). This reality of the
event is in sharp opposition to any initial superposition, which is characterized by features. The
problem is then to properly understand the relationships between the outcome event and features.
To this purpose, let us discuss an ideal experiment proposed by J. A. Wheeler,43 the so-called
delayed-choice experiment.
1.3.2 Considerations on the Delayed-Choice Experiment
In Wheeler’s version of the Mach–Zehnder interferometer, the final detectors may be switched
from the ordinary positions DA# and DB# to positions DA and DB before BS2 [Fig. 1.13]. This
may be done after the beam has already passed BS1. In the arrangement DA–DB we detect
the (corpuscular) path of the photon, and this represents an event. Instead, in the arrangement
DA#–DB#, we can detect the (wave-like) interference (the features), and this cannot consist in
an individual event; in fact, in order to obtain an interference profile, many experimental runs











Fig. 1.13 Interferometry experiment for testing delayed choice. The setup is essentially a Mach–Zehnder
interferometer in which the two detectors may be switched from positions DA, DB (which-path detectors) to
positions D#A, D#B (interference detectors).
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single system.44 Obviously, the two typologies of detection are incompatible, according to Bohr’s
prediction [Subsec. 1.2.6]. Now, since we are completely free to displace the detectors until the
last attosecond (10!18 sec, the time in which the light covers a third of a millionth part of a
millimeter) before the photon passes the ideal line represented by DA# or DB#, a strange situation
occurs. The system seems to follow a dynamical evolution, but before passing that line no event
happens, since, for the nature of any event, we had otherwise obtained some determined reality.
This shows that the only events that may occur in this experimental configuration are the final
detection events (at DA–DB or DA#–DB#). In other words, in quantum mechanics there are time
intervals—in our case, the time interval in which the photon travels from BS1 to the detectors—
where we cannot assume that “something” happened. This is a strange conclusion, because in
our world it is di!cult to imagine that nothing happened during the dynamic evolution of a
system. Then, the question is: Before the final detection events (at DA–DB or DA#–DB#), is it
right to assume that there is nothing in the interferometer? If so, we are postulating that the
only reality in quantum mechanics is that of detection events and that the initial (superposed)
state is only a fiction, a mathematical tool for calculating detection probabilities but not a form of
reality.45
However, such an idealistic conclusion seems unwarranted. In fact, we have an input photon (in
the interferometer) and an output photon (at one of the detectors). Is it reasonable to assume that
we have nothing inbetween? Can we assume that a photon disappears and then a second photon
comes out from nothing? I think that if one is willing to accept this conclusion, one should also be
willing to accept anything else: No science would be possible. Then, these data strongly suggest
that there must be some form of reality before, or independently of, the detection event.46 What
is the minimal—not event-like—reality that we are obliged to assume in any case? This minimal
reality consists in the non-local correlations between the components represented by the two arms
of the interferometer, i.e. in the quantum features. Note that these components, as far as there is
no detection, have no reality in themselves (independently), and therefore we are not allowed to
assume any reality other than the pure features. One should carefully distinguish here between
two di"erent issues:
• The principle according to which nothing can come out of nothing.
• However, this does not imply that the reality from which something comes out of must represent
necessary and su!cient conditions in order for this something to come out. In many cases in
ordinary life, we understand very well that there can be su!cient but not necessary conditions
for a given event. For instance, we all understand that rain can represent a su!cient condition
for tra!c but that tra!c can also be caused by some accident (then, the rain is not a necessary
condition of tra!c). Now, is it possible that there are only necessary but not su!cient conditions
of a given physical event? Any time, the event could not occur without these conditions, but
additional conditions are also necessary for the event to occur. For instance, a good diet
is very important for health, however it is not su!cient if the heart, say, does not pump
very well.
Consequently, I assume that, given a certain premeasurement, the features of a quantum system
represent a necessary condition for a measurement outcome but not a su!cient one. In fact,
43[WHEELER 1978]. 44[D’ARIANO/YUEN 1996].
45A conclusion that is supported by many leading physicists and philosophers [WIGNER 1961,
WIGNER 1963][VAN FRAASSEN 1991] [ZEILINGER 2004].
46[AULETTA/TAROZZI 2004a, AULETTA/TAROZZI 2004b] [AULETTA/TORCAL 2011].
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they only represent an insu!cient determination for a measurement outcome: Any measurement
outcome is already “comprehended,” at the level of probability or potential, in a given initial
entanglement between object system and apparatus, but this entanglement does not determine
which of these events will be realized. As such, further conditions are needed, which are provided
by the environment. However, these conditions are uncontrollable,47 as mentioned in Subsec. 1.2.8,
and this explains why the measurement outcome is unpredictable.
1.3.3 Some General Theoretical Lessons
Quantum mechanics suggests then the following conclusions48:
• There is a primary form of reality: The dynamical interaction, which determines the conditions
for an event to occur (the essence of the complementarity principle). Besides this dynamic reality,
we have two other fundamental aspects.
• The features represent a reality that has no analogue in classical mechanics and which only
represent a necessary condition for any event (the essence of the superposition principle).
• The event is a discrete, unpredictable outcome that eventually represents the annihilation of the
initial superposed state (a specific instance of the quantization principle).
A measurement is not the only type of dynamical interaction through which determination may
occur. In fact, any time that two systems that are open to the environment interact we can have
an analogue of the measurement process. These interactions should happen very often,49 and, as
we shall see, they constitute the necessary condition for the existence of our macroscopic world.
This means that the supremacy of dynamics does not necessarily imply a form of idealism, in
the sense that quantum mechanics would rely on the role of a human observer who makes use of
an apparatus.50 Neither does it imply the necessity of a macroscopic apparatus as such.51 What
the centrality of interaction dynamics strictly implies is that in quantum mechanics there are no
intrinsic properties52; rather, any property that may be ascribed to a quantum system must be
assigned given the context of a given interaction with at least another open system. In this way,
quantum mechanics becomes a generalized theory of open systems.
The problem is that, in the major part of the literature about quantum mechanics, one does
not distinguish between two concepts, non-intrinsicity and subjectivity.53 The future of science
will depend on the correct evaluation of this di"erence.54 In fact, most of the troubles in quantum
mechanics derive from a conceptual confusion between these two completely di"erent aspects. Let
me therefore clarify that
• A property is intrinsic to a given system if it can be assigned without any reference to other
systems or higher levels of complexity. The properties of classical-mechanical objects pertain to
this kind.
47This was already understood by Heisenberg [HEISENBERG 1958].
48I have already advanced these conclusions [AULETTA 2003a], though still in an unsatisfactory manner.
49[JOOS/ZEH 1985]. 50As sometimes Bohr seems to have thought.
51Again Bohr seems to think that a classical apparatus is necessary [BOHR 1929]. See also [WIGNER 1963].
52[SMOLIN 1997, p. 51].
53It is a very common error that has led to the subjectivist interpretations of quantum mechanics and to the understanding
of information in subjective terms. About the latter point consider the book [VON BAEYER 2003]. A partially di"erent
position can be found in [VON WEIZSÄCKER 1971, pp. 347–9].
54[AULETTA 2006b].
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• On the contrary, a property is subjective if it can only exist when somebody has it “in the mind.”
This does not mean that it exists only in the mind, but that without the concourse of a mind
thinking about it, this property would not exist at all. The so-called secondary qualities (taste,
smell, etc.), introduced in classical physics and philosophy by Galilei and Locke as reducible to
physical primary properties, like motion,55 seem to be of this type.
Now, the properties of quantum systems are in general neither intrinsic, nor subjective. In fact,
for a quantum system to have the actual property of being located somewhere, it su!ces that
an appropriate detector, or detector-like system, clicks that is somehow connected (through
entanglement) with the input system. For this purpose, it is not necessary at all that a human or
a mind read the result. Otherwise, after the big bang the world could not have become classical
or quasi-classical until at least a mind was there, which seems a little bit absurd. Therefore, what
we can say about a quantum system that has been localized through a detection event, is that
the actualization of this property (“To be localized somewhere”) requires at least the existence of
a detector or of an analogue of it (and of its environment), as well as of appropriate correlations
between detector and system, i.e. it depends on the existence (and the correct arrangement) of
at least another (open) system, and precisely for this reason is not intrinsic.56 This other system
(playing the role of a detector) does not need to be a human artifact, but can be an atom (an
atom can indeed absorb photons as photodetectors do) or any other system that could, in a given
environmental context, produce the result above. In these conditions, a spontaneous interaction
occurs that is analogous to the procedure we employ in a laboratory.
Things stand similarly for information. As I will show, once it is accepted that the information’s
properties are not intrinsic, the only way to define them is to consider an environment relative to
which they can be described. My guess is that also the properties of macroscopic objects are not
intrinsic, notwithstanding the predictions of classical mechanics.
For these reasons, the most basic of all quantum principles is the complementarity principle,57
since it is also valid for open systems, and, taking into account the previous examination, it turns
out to state that the basic form of complementarity is between a global behavior and local events,
being the dynamics the joint between these two extreme forms of reality. For this reason, let us
reformulate it as follows
Local events and global features are complementary.
1.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have seen the three main principles of quantum mechanics:
• The quantization principle, allowing for abrupt localizations when several quantum systems
interact.
• The superposition principle that allows us to understand quantum systems as nonlocalized
systems.
• The complementarity principle, according to which local events and global features are comple-
mentary.
55[LOCKE 1689]. 56[AULETTA 2005b]. 57[AULETTA/TAROZZI 2006].
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Moreover, we have studied the way in which measurement can be understood: As a dynamic process
in which systems open to the environment can give rise to certain events. It consists of the three
steps: Preparation, premeasurement, and detection. The centrality of environment is one of the
most relevant results of this chapter and will show its importance when dealing with biological
systems. We have seen that dynamics is here the primary form of reality and that delayed-choice
experiments show that quantum processes are not necessarily causal.
In the next chapter, we shall consider how relevant these results are for the matter of information
and therefore for the understanding of the whole book.
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Quantum and Classical Information
and Entropy
After having examined some misunderstandings about information, in the present chapter I shall
explain why and how quantum systems can be understood as incorporating and dealing with
information. The next step is to consider what the relations are between classical and quantum
information as well as between information and entropy. Finally, I shall summarize the main lessons
of this whole examination for the following analysis.
2.1 Misconceptions About Information
When dealing with information, there are several misunderstandings to be aware of that obscure
the whole matter. Since information plays an important role in this book, some of these misun-
derstandings shall now be examined more closely:
(1) The first is that any dealing-with-information begins with a selection of a given message from
the start. This implies that often only selected information is considered information. Selection
and variety are confused here. In fact, the informational source only needs to provide the
elements that might be selected.
(2) Information is contextual [Subsec. 1.3.3] and often its contextuality is mixed up with some
form of subjectivity.
(3) Information-acquiring is sometimes meant as building some new information.
(4) Information is understood as entropy or as negentropy (entropy with a minus sign). However,
entropy is related to disordered processes (thermodynamically it is to the quality of available
energy) and with energy fluxes. Information, instead, is in itself a pure formal quantity. The
correct relation between these two aspects can be crucial for understanding the matters dealt
with in this book, particularly with the emergence of life and mind.1
(5) As a consequence of the previous misunderstanding, one thinks that, when exchanging
information, something will be traded. As Jackendo! eloquently put it, information is often
misunderstood as a liquid that is poured from one container to another.2
(6) This does not mean that information has no physical e!ect. Formal constraints in general
play a very important role in the whole of nature, and as such it is time to awake from the
dogmatic dream of metaphysical and ontological reductionism.3 The standpoint I shall support
1Even if in an old-fashioned language, C. Lloyd Morgan seemed to understand this point very well
[LLOYD MORGAN 1891, pp. 467–8].
2[JACKENDOFF 1992, p. 2].
33
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in the following is that information is not only a formal structure but also a pure physical
quantity.4 We should not, therefore, mix the concepts of the nonmaterial (not composed of
material particles) and nonphysical. Features have already provided an example of physical
but nonmaterial entities.
(7) As we shall see, there is nonetheless a connection between entropy and information when
information is exchanged (acquired). During those processes, several local increases of order
or disorder are possible. It is a general principle that it is impossible to create order at a
global level. However, as we shall see, the opposite is also true: Order cannot be destroyed
at a global level. Any erasure of local order is in fact only a displacement of some ordered
relations.
2.2 Quantum Systems as Information
2.2.1 The Problem
Quantum-mechanical systems provide both the informational pool and the basic interconnections
of our universe:
• Quantum-mechanical systems can be considered as the sources of any information in our world.
As we shall see, any quantum system, even as elementary as a two-level system, can be considered
as coding an infinite amount of potential information. However, as explained, we cannot extract
this information as a whole [Subsec. 1.2.5].
• As we have seen [Subsec. 1.2.8], all quantum systems are open to the environment. This is
largely an acknowledged fact today and may be a consequence of the common source, as far as
we know, of all physical systems, which have been generated from an original big bang. It is
true that photons will be continuously created and annihilated, but they are created as open
systems, already connected somehow with the other systems of our universe. This conclusion is
reinforced by considering that entanglement is not an absolute concept but has degrees.5
Let us consider the first point. We must sharply distinguish between the concept of information
source and that of determining or e"cient cause. A source of information is only something that,
provided that there is a channel and under a suitable operation (which, as I will show, is in general
a selection), will deliver information (which can eventually be used and then have causal e!ects).
This does not mean, however, that it will provide this information by itself: Additional requisites are
necessary. For this reason, a source of information is not by itself a su"cient cause of information
reception. Indeed, we have already seen the troubles in applying a traditional concept of causation
to quantum systems [Subsec. 1.3.2]. This is true for information exchange in general. It is true that
we have the feeling that a star will provide us with a certain amount of information without those
constraints. We actually forget that this information is delivered to us thanks to many additional
physical factors and parameters that make it possible that the light reaches us.
I follow some particular physicists6 in assuming that all systems of elementary quan-
tum mechanics can be considered in terms of information. Before I explain this matter, I
wish to point out that there are two major problems in understanding quantum systems in
this way.
3[ANDERSON 1972]. 4[LANDAUER 1996a]. 5[VEDRAL et al. 1997a] [VEDRAL et al. 1997b].
6[WHEELER 1990].
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(1) The problem of energy: It seems impossible to have information without energy. Landauer7
showed, however, that throwing bits away (selecting them), not processing them, requires an
expenditure of energy. Later, Bennett8 explained how a computer could be designed that would
circumvent Landauer’s principle by not discarding information and thus virtually dissipating
no energy. Bennett showed that each step in the computation can be carried out in a way that
allows not only the output to be deduced from the input but also the input to be deduced from
the output—in other words, the machine can also run backwards. Such a machine, after having
processed information in the ordinary way, could put itself into reverse mode until each step
is undone. No information is erased here and accordingly no energy is lost. This is precisely
the way in which quantum systems work when ideally isolated. Instead, during a measurement
of a quantum system, information is selected by downloading a part of its initial amount into
the environment. Because and only because of this selection, there is energy expenditure. This
also means that the local entropy of the system and the apparatus must grow. This is, in
fact, what quantum-mechanical calculations show. This energy expenditure together with the
increase in entropy and the inaccessibility of the information that has been downloaded makes
the measurement process for quantum systems irreversible.
Generally speaking, information is not dependent on the flow of energy.9 There are even
cases where the “flow of information” is opposite to the energy flow, or where information
can be transmitted without energy.10 An example of the first case is a telegraph cable, where
a direct current is flowing in one direction, but a message can be sent in both directions by
interrupting the current at one point and recording the interruption at another. An example
of the second case is a photovoltaic cell, where the interruption of energy flows informs the
cell that there is something coming in or going out. Obviously, actual information acquiring
requires energy, as explained, since it involves selection. Therefore, I am not claiming that
quantum systems can be reduced to information. What was previously said shows that other
physical parameters as well, especially energy and entropy, are relevant when they interact.
My point is simply that information is a basic formal quantity that cannot be reduced to other
quantities.
(2) It is also di"cult to understand what an interaction between quantum systems may mean if
they are considered themselves in terms of information. One could be motivated to say that it
means exchange of information, but what does exchange of information mean for two systems
that are already considered in terms of information? In my opinion, the answer is: When at
least two basic quantum-mechanical systems interact, the information they carry or represent
will be modified. The problem then becomes: How can quantum information be modified? In
order to answer this question it is necessary first to briefly recall how the information that a
quantum system carries can be understood.
2.2.2 Potential Information
Let us consider a very useful representation of quantum states, the Poincaré sphere of quantum
states. Any two-level system may be written as
|!! = cos "
2
|1! + eı! sin "
2
|0! , (2.1)
7[LANDAUER 1961, LANDAUER 1996a]. For a review see [LANDAUER 1991].
8[BENNETT 1973, BENNETT 1982] [BENNETT/LANDAUER 1985]. 9[ROEDERER 2005, pp. 115–16].
10[VON BERTALANFFY 1955].
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Fig. 2.1 The state vector of any two-level system, for instance |!! , can be represented as a point on the
surface of a sphere of unitary radius. The parameters " (here represented as an angle between the y axis and
the projection of |!! on the equatorial plane) and # (represented as an angle between |!! and the z axis) are
su"cient to individuate its location. The states |+! and |"! lie on the equatorial plane and represent two
symmetric superpositions of |0! and |1! , located at the south and north poles, respectively. In other words,
orthogonal states that were previously represented as orthogonal vectors in the vectorial representation [like
in Fig. 1.5], are here represented as the two opposite points of the intersection between a diameter and the
surface of the sphere.
which represents a superposition of the states |0! and |1! , shown at the south and north poles
of the sphere respectively [Fig. 2.1], and is actually a generalization of Eq. (1.6) by considering
explicitly the di!erence of phase eı! between the component |0! and the component |1! of the
superposition state |!! , where I recall that a di!erence of phase is the distance among a peak in one
component of the superposition and the corresponding peak in the other component [Fig. 1.1 and
Fig. 1.4]. The exponential function e is the inverse of the (natural) logarithm function. Its value,
for e1 is 2.718281 . . . [Fig. 2.2]. The parameter # covers the parallels of the sphere and represents
the relative phase between the components |0! and |1! of the superposition, while the parameter "
covers the meridians and represents the relative contribution of each of the two components to the
superposition [see also Fig. 1.5]. This state represents a new informational entity: The quantum
bit or, in short, qubit.
The amount of information contained in a qubit is infinite because the parameters # and "
allow the state |!! to be located anywhere on the surface of the sphere (which obviously has an
infinite amount of points). However, it is also potential, because such an amount of information
is not only not accessed at a given moment but is also inaccessible to any observer in any time
window [Subsec. 1.2.5]. Indeed, any time we try to measure the system we are obliged to choose
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Fig. 2.2 Plot of the exponential function en, where the values of n are shown on the x axis.
a given observable [Subsecs. 1.2.5 and 1.2.7]. Suppose that we choose to measure an observable
whose eigenstates are exactly |0! and |1! . Then, we will obtain either |0! or |1! as a result.
However, both |0! and |1! represent one of the two poles on the sphere’s surface and therefore,
when we obtain one or the other as the outcome of a measurement, we have acquired only a bit,
a much smaller amount of information than the initial qubit. The reason is that we download
into the environment the interference terms (the features) that contribute to this initial amount
of potential information by spreading it on the whole surface [Subsec. 1.2.8]. This information is
made active (acquiring in this way some classical bits of information) any time the appropriate
conditions in the dynamic interaction between two open systems are satisfied (anytime we have a
measurement or a measurement-like interaction process).
In classical physics, instead, it is assumed that it is possible to extract all the information
contained in the system’s state. This is however not supported by facts. Indeed, let us consider the
case in which we desire to measure exactly the circumference of a ring (e.g. an ordinary wedding
ring). Let us avoid all the complications that derive from the fact that, when the measurement
becomes very precise so as to arrive at the molecular or even atomic scale, where matter’s
discontinuities and even instabilities (indeed, any piece of matter continuously exchanges photons
with the environment) prevent us from speaking in any meaningful way about a circumference
measurement. Let us, instead, consider a pure ideal case in which matter would be totally
uniform (continuous) and static. In this case, we would very soon run into the di"culty that
the circumference as well as probably the radius of the ring would be a real number. Now, we
cannot (even in principle) exhaust the infinite series of decimals that constitute a real and not
rational number, which means that we cannot measure it with infinite precision.11 In other words,
we cannot acquire the whole of the information contained here due to the finite resolution of any
measurement (the impossibility to reduce to zero the measurement error). We may reformulate all
that in an information accessibility principle:
The whole information potentially contained in a system may only be partially accessed.
From a quantum-mechanical perspective, the reason is that we have interference terms (features)
that cannot be acquired as (classical) information. Classically, this is due to a finite resolution of
measurement. However, in both cases the ultimate source of that impossibility seems to me to be
the discreteness of any codification and therefore of any information acquiring [Fig. 2.3].
Let us consider the quantum-mechanical case. Assuming that |0! and |1! represent information
(they are indeed measurement outcomes), I stress that these states are not essentially di!erent
11[MARGENAU 1950, p. 39].
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Fig. 2.3 The continuous line 0 # x # 1 can be represented as a limiting case when quantized codification
tends towards infinite series represented by real numbers.
from any linear combination (2.1) of them. In fact, if one chooses to observe another (non-
commuting) observable, whose eigenbasis is represented by |+! and |"! [Fig. 2.1], where |"!
is a state orthogonal to |+! , the possible outcomes will be |+! and |"! . Therefore, they will also




(|0! + |1!) , |"! = 1#
2
(|0! " |1!) , (2.2)
where, for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the states |+! and |"! represent symmetric
superpositions of |0! and |1! , and are located on the equatorial line (equidistant from the poles).
What is inaccessible, therefore, is not a linear combination of |0! and |1! as such, but the whole
amount of information contained in any quantum state (independently from any measurement
procedure), which also comprehends, beyond the possible eigenstates, any “interference” of them.
Therefore, I also assume that information expresses the relation between possible events12 and
that consequently it is not only what is actually communicated and received that can be called
information. The reason why many think the opposite is that information-acquiring is meant as
constituting information [Sec. 2.1].
We should not forget, however, that there is also an important di!erence between a prepared
state and a measurement outcome. The states |0! and |1! themselves (as well as |+! , |"!), taken
as possible but not actual measurement results, represent potential information, i.e. information
that has not yet been acquired13 (and possibly never will be). Let me give further evidence:
When any two systems are entangled [Subsec. 1.2.7], they constitute a further informational
entity, called an ebit (entangled bit). The interdependencies displayed by the two subsystems
of an entangled system are not mediated by any detectable physical signal, and therefore there
is no causal connection either14 [Subsec. 1.2.9]; they are nonlocal in character and an immediate
consequence of quantum features. The reason is again to be found in quantum information: Since
information expresses the relation between possible events, it is also independent of space and
time and entanglement is a natural consequence. Therefore, an ebit is a quantum channel, a
12Personal communication, A. Zeilinger.
13[VON WEIZSÄCKER 1972]. See also [KÜPPERS 1990, pp. 36–8]. However, these authors speak of a potential
information in the sense of an information that can later be received. I agree for classical systems. Here, I speak of
potential information in a more radical sense, because the whole of quantum information cannot be received or be accessed.
Nevertheless, in my opinion the concept of potential information can cover both the classical and the quantum case, meaning
information that has (still) not been acquired.
14[MAUDLIN 1994].
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typical quantum-mechanical information-sharing between systems. Now, an ebit allows things to
be done that cannot be performed classically, like encrypting a text or transmitting information
in new ways. Thus, entanglement can be interpreted as a potential resource to transfer additional
quantum information in the future at no further cost.15 This justifies the notion of potential
information.
One may obviously worry about the concept of potentiality as such. However, this worry is again
not particularly supported by facts. It is very common in physics to speak (in the presence of some
field) of potential energy as a potentiality to do work in appropriate conditions (for instance, a
stone that can roll down a hill due to the e!ect of the gravitational field). It is true that one
could object that this is only due to the e!ect of the external field and therefore has nothing to do
with the character of the object as such. This objection does not seem very sound to me however
[Subsec. 1.3.3]; moreover, we have wonderful examples of intrinsic potentiality, if this word can pass
here. For instance, in chemistry the chemical potential is proportional to the Gibbs free energy
and expresses the potential of a chemical substance for undergoing a change in a system.16 This is
interesting because the Gibbs free energy expresses potentiality to do work in pure chemical terms
(that is, without considering the work performed when a system expands in the presence of an
opposite external force). I recall that, at equilibrium, the chemical potential of a substance is the
same throughout a sample, regardless of how many phases are present.
Therefore, the concept of potential information makes perfect sense. We can say that potential
information is any string of codified bits (or qubits) considered independently from information-
acquiring. Thus, we can state that information codification has several requisites:
• A basis representing (a finite set of) mutually exclusive states that:
• Can be linearly combined (in a superposition state). Note that not all combinatorial rules are
linear [Subsec. 1.2.2]. Linearity is, however, necessary for information codification.
• By varying the coe"cients (and/or the parameters " and #), we can obtain an infinite number
of possible combinations, i.e. it is in principle possible to express anything by means of these two
elements and their combinations. Therefore, the coe"cients of any superposition represent the
syntactic rules according to which we can combine the elements |0! and |1! . It also follows that
these elements can be understood as a (binary) code, as, for instance, in quantum computation.17
• There are specific rules that allow the translation of a state written in a given basis to its
formulation in another basis (that is, there are di!erent codes): This is a necessary requirement
for having information. For instance, the basis |0! , |1! is connected to another basis |+! , |"!
by the translation rules (2.2).
Therefore, actual information is only that information which has actually been received. However, in
order to receive something as information, it should already have at least the formal characteristics
of information quoted above, i.e., at least mutual exclusivity of the possible unities of the
message, infinite potency of expression, and linearity of the combination of the unities. Let us
call codified information any combination of alternative physical states representing the units
of a code according to syntactic structures. Note that codified information is always potential,
both classically and quantum-mechanically. For instance, the information contained in a book
is not actual until it is read. Indeed, if the texts written in a certain language are no longer
read, one can even lose the memory of the meaning of the characters in which that language
is written (as happened for ancient Egyptian before the discovery of the Rosetta stone). It is
15[HORODECKI et al. 2005]. 16[ATKINS/DE PAULA 2006, pp. 122–3].
17[DEUTSCH 1985, BENNETT 1995].
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not by chance that, in the case of hereditary transmission, one speaks of activating the inherited
information by appropriate mechanisms.18 A good measure of the classical informational content of
codified information is represented by the Kolmogorov measure of complexity, namely the measure
of the computational resources needed to specify the string of characters instantiating codified
information.19 This measure has also been generalized to quantum mechanics.20 Therefore, both
classically and quantum-mechanically we may assume an information-activation principle:
Any (codified) information is as such potential (or dormant), and only additional (external) conditions may
activate it.
For instance, in order to obtain actual bits from a quantum system we need at the very least
an environment. Moreover, quantum systems can be understood as information processors, since
they evolve with time changing their state, that is, performing a particular transformation
(mapping) of an initial codified information to some other codified information. I recall that this
information-processing is reversible, provided that there is no information selection and therefore
no measurement outcome [Subsec. 2.2.1]. This is also the background of the field known as quantum
computing.21
Summing up, information is in itself only a formal quantity (a potentiality). It needs to be
activated or acquired. As mentioned and as we shall see in the following, information acquisition
is a dynamical process in which entropic fluxes are also relevant. My point, therefore, is that the
di!erence between a qubit and a bit is relative to a measurement procedure within a local context,
that is, relative to a given environment: Any bit can be understood as a qubit made active or
accessed.22 Both can be interpreted as minimal information entities. The only di!erence is that a
qubit is a bit from a counterfactual point of view or, in other words, is only potentially a bit: We
can speak of a bit only once one had chosen or will choose to perform a possible operation (or if
some objective conditions will be spontaneously produced) in which this state could be obtained.
This shows that is not the form that distinguishes |0! from |+! or |"! , but only the fact that
we have obtained it as actual information |0! and not e.g. |+! , given (a) the choice of measuring
the observable of which |0! is an eigenstate, and (b) the selection of |0! in certain environmental
conditions.
Obviously, this does not mean that the transition from a qubit to a bit is so easily performed
from the point of view of the history of our universe. Actually [Subsecs. 1.3.3 and 1.2.8], dynamic
interactions happening spontaneously in nature do simulate, to a certain extent, the process of
information acquisition in our laboratories with artificial devices (or rather vice versa). As a matter
of fact, decoherence provides a necessary condition for classical bits. However, as we shall see, other
conditions are also necessary, which are not so immediately given in a prebiotic environment.
2.2.3 Interpretation of Information Modification
We have seen that any quantum system is in itself a reversible information-processing system
[Subsecs. 1.2.2 and 2.2.2]. However, its information content can also be changed through interaction
with other systems [Subsec. 1.2.4]. My main hypothesis is that such a change of a quantum system
(a qubit) can only happen through two types of information modification:
• the constitution of an entangled state (ebit), and
• information selection (bit).
18[PALSSON 2006, p. 21]. 19[KOLMOGOROV 1963]. 20[BERTHIAUME et al. 2000].
21[NIELSEN/CHUANG 2000]. 22[AULETTA 2005b].
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In the latter case, there is a selection of the initial amount of information. I will call this process in
all its generality (not restricted to quantum mechanics) canalization due to the fact that the final
output state can be understood as a specific component chosen among many that are potentially
given in the initial state, so that we may say that the system has been “canalized” into this
component. Taking into account both this and what has been said about the randomness of
quantum events, I wish to propose here what seems to me the most basic of all nature’s principles,
a true selection principle:
In appropriate conditions, nature always selects one among several options.
Indeed, this principle covers both the cases of quantum mechanics (where we have quantum events
and the quantization principle [Subsec. 1.3.3]) and of the classical world; it also fits perfectly with
the nature and character of biological systems.23 The reason why I consider the selection principle
so general will become clear in the following. For the time being, let me give an example. We cannot
precisely foresee the fracture line in a given piece of material (like glass) even if a certain shape
will emerge after certain local cracks here and there. These cracks are spontaneous selections.
The production of an entanglement of two systems seems to add something new that was not
there before: A quantum channel that did not exist between them before is established. However,
the information that the two entangled systems come to share is the information that each already
contained. Let us call this form of information modification in all its generality (not restricted to
quantum mechanics) channelization because it consists of a reinforcement of a (quantum) channel.
Entanglement is a form of information-sharing (technically called mutual information) in which
two systems become correlated. This does not imply at all that the two systems exchange signals
and therefore have some form of causal connection. Information-sharing can indeed also happen at
a distance. In order to understand this point, I wish to introduce an analogy with a classical case.
If two persons in two distant cities read the same newspaper, they share information even if they
have never met (and never will meet). This can easily be seen, if they indeed meet: In this case
they can exchange comments on some article published in the newspaper exactly because both
of them already share this piece of information. In other words, the fact that both have read the
same news, allows them to talk in a way that they cannot do otherwise.24
The reason why there are only these two forms of information modification is that information
(representing order) cannot be created, or, in other words, that entropy (representing disorder) must
locally increase or at least remain constant. Quantum systems already possess, in the general case,
an infinite—but potential—amount of information. How could further information be added to such
systems? It could be said that it is impossible to “put” information into a quantum system from
the outside. Any attempt at introducing information into a quantum system is actually nothing
more than the enlargement of the original system into a wider system where the environment
or the apparatus must also be considered and where the information is di!erently redistributed
among these subsystems (even if the total system, i.e., the whole universe, remains in the same
state). I also believe that this impossibility is ubiquitous in nature, as shall be shown below by
considering some examples.
Channelization and canalization are of enormous importance and they represent the true
informational foundation of the main thesis of this book: A form of generalized Darwinism, as
I shall explain shortly. Indeed, thanks to mutual information, systems can be correlated even if
23[ELSASSER 1969] [PARISI 2006]. See also [ULANOWICZ 2009a, pp. 43–7].
24Obviously, there are many di!erences between classical correlations and quantum entanglement, as is nicely shown by
so-called entanglement swapping.
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they do not interact directly and are even blind to each other.25 Moreover, they can develop
somehow autarchically by selecting information they already contain. We shall see how relevant
these issues are for epigeny and in particular for the development of the brain.
2.2.4 Measurement and Entropy
The interpretation of the initial (superposition) state in terms of potential information can be
interesting if we wish to give a physical explanation of the measurement process [Subsecs. 1.2.7–
1.2.9]. As a result of the measurement process, as described above, one would obtain a state in
which the interference terms are negligible but not completely eliminated. The physical meaning
of this is that the information contained in the interference terms that express the entanglement
between system and apparatus (the features) is lost into the environment.26 This means that part
of the initial information becomes obscured or disturbed by some environmental fluctuation, and
this part becomes definitively inaccessible (it would be accessible only under the hypothesis that we
could reconstruct exactly the same situation of the whole universe as existed just before the time
of measurement). This is therefore a further application of the information accessibility principle
[Subsec. 2.2.2]. Considering the problem the other way around, the reason for the inaccessibility
of the complete potential information contained in a system’s initial state is that it could be
obtained only by measuring the system, but, on the other hand, any detection event consists of a
selection of a given subset of the initial potential information, which implies that the rest becomes
irremediably lost in the environment. Then, it is precisely this loss or opacity of part of the initial
information that represents the necessary condition for obtaining a measurement’s result. We may
conclude here that, although the problem of accessibility is obviously an epistemological one, this
does not eliminate the fact that the environmental disturbance of the initial information is what
permits, as a physical result, a measurement outcome.
As mentioned, while globally the same quantity of information and entropy is conserved (perhaps
the whole universe is a zero-entropy world), locally we may have di!erent repartitions of entropy
and information. In other words, the entropy (the amount of disorder) of the object system will
in general increase during measurement and other similar dynamical processes. This allows, on a
general plane, the possibility that in other locations the entropy of other systems can also decrease
in order to balance this increase. For this reason, as I have suggested,27 the existence of living
beings, which display a local decreasing of entropy, is allowed by quantum-mechanical laws (and
this is also true for other ordered structures). Here, the term allowed means that, for the emerging
of local order (decreasing in entropy) somewhere, there are already the conditions (increasing in
local entropy) elsewhere, so that the total imbalance remains constant. This is obviously something
very di!erent relative to the classical laws of thermodynamics, which do not provide a justification
for those conditions. I also wish to stress that decreasing in local entropy is a more general character
of nature that is also present in abiotic self-organizing systems.
25A point perfectly understood by D. Hebb when speaking of associations between concepts without having occurred
together in the subject’s past experience [HEBB 1949, p. 132].
26It is interesting to observe that the initial potential information contained in an entangled state can be maximal, while
the state represented by a state without, or at least with less, interference terms (a mixture) does not represent a maximal
amount of information.
27[AULETTA 2005b].
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2.2.5 Global and Local
Any event is view-dependent, interactional and contextual, because it is local (it can depend on
a local measurement). Quantum features are, on the contrary, view-independent, law-like and
global [Sec. 1.1]. Then, while events are perspective-like being local occurrences, laws may be very
well invariant (since are global). However, an event is actual reality, while features, i.e. quantum
interdependencies (like any other relation, structure, or formal constraint), are only potential
(relative to events). As quantum mechanics is nowadays the most basic physical theory at our
disposal, everything at play here with regard to the notion of features suggests that it is a very
fundamental character of our world and that nature is constituted not only by local events but also
by global features. This will be explored in the next part of the book. The predominant problem
and source of all di"culties in this matter is that the distinction between event and relation is at
the same time both relative and absolute:
• It is relative as far as the informational content of an event is a cluster of relations (for instance, as
we have seen [Subsec. 2.2.2], an eigenstate can be considered itself a superposition from another
point of view) and it is unpredictable and surprising only relative to a given set of relations or
to a previous status quo: A measurement outcome has an informational content and therefore
indicates a property only because:
(1) It is a possible outcome in a given set and not in itself. |0! without |1! is nothing but a
closed monad.
(2) There is a correlation (coupling) between the object system and apparatus, such that the
random detection event allows an attribution to the system of a certain property (the
eigenvalue associated to the output eigenstate of the measured observable).
• However, this di!erence is also absolute, as far as there are no means to derive from a given set
of relations a given event (relations are influential only at a general and potential level and not
at the individual one). This is why in quantum mechanics we have true random events, although
often also in the macroscopic world random events are important.
In other words, the di!erence is absolute from the local point of view of the actual information
(locally, only events matter) and relative from the global point of view of the potential information
(here only the form, i.e. the information codification matters). Therefore, from a local point of view,
only an event is absolute: Once it has happened, it has happened; while its associated properties are
relational and therefore not absolute. The reason is that, in quantum mechanics, a measurement
outcome is simultaneously unpredictable but dependent on the environmental conditions (and for
this reason also from the other components of the superposition of which it is a component).
On the other hand, features are relative because they encompass possible outcomes, and in this
sense are only potential. They only represent necessary conditions for possible outcomes. However,
they cannot be accessed from local properties and events only (again the accessibility principle!
[Subsec. 2.2.2]), and in this sense they are absolute or indi!erent to those outcomes. This means
that, if we measure a quantum system, we cannot guess whether it is entangled with other systems
or not. In order to know that, we need to compare several di!erent measurement outcomes obtained
in measuring, for instance, couples of particles prepared in the same state in two di!erent localities.
In this case, we shall discover that in some cases the statistics are so extraordinary that they let
us infer that there is indeed an entanglement.
What I am saying stresses not only the unavoidable randomness of quantum mechanics (and
of our world in general), but also represents the reason why our macroscopic world, which is
constituted by actual information, is not a fiction but a solid reality. In a certain sense, it is the
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only form of reality we understand by this term actual reality. This reality is both allowed by
quantum-mechanical laws and is not deducible from them because, again, quantum mechanics
does not determine actual information (an instantiation of the selection principle [Subsec. 2.2.3]).
As we shall see, this is what can truly be called emergence. This is the great misunderstanding of
the so-called Many-World interpretation of quantum mechanics28; in not having considered this
point, it implies that macroscopic reality is a species of illusion of the mind.
Summing up:
The global cannot be accessed from the local but the global does not determine the local.
The global is perceived as a background noise from the local point of view (the huge amount of
all interference terms that have been downloaded into the environment). The local could probably
be imagined from a global point of view as a cluster of anomalous fluctuations.
The complementarity between local (events, atoms, elements) and global (relations, structures)
is therefore such that these two aspects are (1) opposite aspects (more local at the expense of global
and vice versa) but also (2) tightly interwoven in dynamical processes [Subsecs. 1.2.6 and 1.3.3].
It is a general principle of quantum mechanics (the complementarity principle) and, as we shall
see, provides a solid framework for the study of such di!erent phenomena as perception, complex
systems, and living beings in general.
2.2.6 Summary
I have pointed out that
(1) Quantum systems are information-processing entities, even if they do not reduce to information
when they interact.29
(2) It is impossible to “put” information into a quantum system from outside.
(3) Information modification of a quantum system can only happen through either (a) entangle-
ment (or information-sharing) with another system, which in general terms is called channeliza-
tion or (b) through a type of detection (selection), which in general terms is called canalization.
These general characters are true for any information modification, as we shall see.
A consequence is that it is impossible to transmit the “content” of an entanglement, represented by
the features.30 This is the reason why features can be understood as potential information. Then,
the quantum-information framework presented here sets not only constraints on any exchanging
of or dealing with information in our universe but also on the kind of causal relations that are
admissible. The so-called information causality principle relates to the amount of information
that an observer (Bob) can gain about a data set belonging to another observer (Alice), the
contents of which are completely unknown to him. Using all his local resources (which may
be correlated with her resources) and allowing classical communication from Alice to Bob, the
amount of information that the latter can recover is bounded by the information volume (n) of the
communication. Namely, if Alice communicates n bits to Bob, the total information obtainable by
Bob cannot be greater than n, otherwise entanglement itself would be transmitted or shared.31
Consequently, the amazing result that was found by Paw#lowski et al. is that a hypothetical
theory which fulfills the requirements of causality (being a non-signaling theory), if it exceeds
the so-called Tsirelson bond, which is imposed by quantum mechanics, also violates the principle
of information causality. In other words, the Tsirelson bond sets a limit on the possibility of
28[EVERETT 1957][DEWITT 1970]. 29[AULETTA 2005b].
30[CLIFTON et al. 2003]. 31[PAW#LOWSKI et al. 2009].
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acquiring information that is stronger than the simple no-signaling requirement. It is important to
understand that this result is of general validity since there cannot be in nature any possibility to
violate the principle of information causality. In other words, the result is not confined to quantum
mechanics only and clearly justifies quantum information not only as the most general theory of
information that does exist but also as the theory ruling and framing any kind of interaction in
our universe.
The combination of Theses (2) and (3) above when extended to classical systems can be called,
with some provisos, a generalized Darwinism on the line of Lewontin and Plotkin,32 and represents
the core of this book. It is important to stress that the generalized Darwinism as it is proposed here
is not concerned with a kind of ideological transubstantiation of evolutionary theory, as should be
clear in the following. Indeed, Darwinism can find this general form only by widening itself into a
more comprehensive scientific theory. Selective processes are the mechanisms through which new
levels of complexity and new features in the history of life can come out. However, at the same
time, through these processes, organisms are led both to share information with the environment
(even if no Lamarckian instructive mechanism takes place) and to become more integrated
systems.
2.3 Classical and Quantum Information Acquisition
In a classical world, information is the systematic dependence of a signal on a source. Classically,
the channel is the form under which the receiver becomes and interprets a signal. The channel
is not necessarily physical in the ordinary sense of the word. Also classically, it consists rather in
the mutual information between sender and receiver. The signal can therefore be considered as a
trade-o! between novelty at the source and regularity given by the dependency represented by the
channel.33
2.3.1 The Classical Case
Recall that quantum mechanically, in order to recover the information about an object system,
we need the coupling with an apparatus (channelization). Classically, we have a similar situation.
Here, we have an unknown parameter k whose value we wish to know and some data d pertaining
to a set D at our disposal. This is a very important point, since we NEVER have direct access to
events or things (whose properties are described by k) but always to things through data.34 These
data can be represented by the position of the pointer of our measuring apparatus or simply by
the impulse our sensory system has received, or even by the way we receive information about the
position of the pointer through our sensory system. It does not matter how long this chain may
be. The important point is a matter of principle:
We can receive information about objects and events only conditionally from the data at our disposal.
This is why I have explained [Subsecs. 1.3.3 and 2.2.5] that properties are always relational as
opposed to intrinsic, even in the classical case, and as such quantum mechanics teaches us a
general lesson.35 Let me give a classical example: Suppose that we wished to know exactly what
the distribution of matter was in the early universe. We can know this by collecting data about the
background radiation we receive now. This again shows a very important common point between
quantum and classical physics that is not well understood, and which has been pointed out by
32[PLOTKIN 1993]. 33[VON WEIZSÄCKER 1972].
34[ZUREK 2004] [BATESON 1972, p. xxv]. 35[AULETTA/TORCAL 2011].
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Fig. 2.4 A simple tree for calculating conditional probabilities (from left to right). Suppose that we have an
event k, occurring with a probability p(k) = 1/2, and a particular set of e!ects (data at our disposal) d1, d2, d3,
each one occurring with 1/3 probability given k. It is easy to see then that the probability to select event j
and have event k is p(j, k) = [p(j|d1)p(d1|k) + p(j|d2)p(d2|k)]p(k) = 1/3 · 1 · 1/2 + 1/3 · 1/2 · 1/2 = 1/4 while
the probability to select event n and have event k is p(n, k) = p(n|d3)p(d3|k)p(k) = 1/3 · 1/2 · 1/2 = 1/12.
Note that when p(k) = 1, we have p(j, k) = p(j) and p(di|k) = p(di) for any of the data. Note also that the
sum of the probabilities leaving any node = 1.
Wheeler’s delayed-choice experiment [Subsec. 1.3.2]: We cannot receive any information about past
events unless they are received through present e!ects (data). This is an equivalent formulation of
what I have said before, since, given the relativity theory, any event, represented by a parameter k,
can be known only through a later e!ect, due to the limits of light speed. As a matter of fact, any
perceptual experience we have is mediated and slightly delayed in time36. Moreover, since we always
have experience of a part of the possible e!ects produced by an event, this is again an application
of the principle of information accessibility [Subsec. 2.2.2]. Generally speaking, any spread of a
signal from an initial source is subject to some form of dispersion and therefore also of information
loss, which could be considered as a spontaneous (random) selection or sequence of spontaneous
selections (according to the selection principle [Subsec. 2.2.3]), whose result is therefore a growing
noise added to the initial input. To this extent, information acquisition is embedded in a larger and
spontaneous behavior of nature, whose consequences will be momentous throughout this book.
Obviously, once we have observed or acquired data, we must perform an information extrap-
olation that allows us to guess about the value of the parameter k. This is information selection.
The probability p(j, k) that we select a response j having an event represented by an unknown
parameter k (i.e. the probability that both event k and event j occur) is given by
p(j, k) = p(j|k)p(k), (2.3)
where p(j|k) is the conditional probability that the event j happens given the event k, and p(k) is
the absolute probability that the event k occurs. Now, we may expand this probability by taking
into account the data d that are somehow the interface between the source event k and our final





36[MOUNTCASTLE 1998, p. 3]. 37[HELSTROM 1976].
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where I have made use of a discrete case for the sake of simplicity and the symbol
"
d!D means
a summation over all the data d pertaining to the set D. By inserting the last equation in the








where I have made use again of the fact that p(d, k) = p(d|k)p(k). Eq. (2.5) can be considered a





and it reduces to the latter when p(k) = 1, i.e. when the event k occurs with certainty (when
k cannot occur or never occurs, p(k) = 0). It is important to stress that the two conditional
probabilities p(j|d) and p(d|k) are quite di!erent. This can be seen formally by the fact that in
Eq. (2.4) we sum over the data d, which represent the conditioned results relative to k on the one
hand and the conditions for information extrapolation on the other. This means that the probability
p(d|k) represents how faithful our data are relative to k, that is, how reliable our apparatus (or
our sensory system) is (how good the channelization is). Instead, the probability p(j|d) represents
our ability to select a single j (this is canalization) able to interpret the occurred event in the best
way.38
Having made these considerations, we immediately see that Eq. (2.4) or (2.5) represents the
classical analogue of the quantum process summarized in Subsec. 1.3.1: The classical term p(d|k)
corresponds to the coupling between the object system and the apparatus. Obviously, the di!erence
between the classical and the quantum case is that, when we have an entanglement, we can
have a perfect correlation between apparatus and object system, which is hardly the case for
classical situations. Finally, the counterpart of the probability p(j|d) is, in quantum mechanics, the
probability of a final detection event, given a certain experimental context (i.e. a premeasurement).
This result is very important with regards to the fact that the classical theory of information
has supported the idea that information is a two-term process, namely, a process in which we have
an input and a corresponding output. This is due to the circumstance that it has been formulated
as a communication theory for controlled exchanges of information, so that, in general, we assume
a determined output given a certain input. When, on the contrary, we deal with a general theory
of information acquisition, we are always dealing with at least three terms: An unknown (not
controlled) parameter, some data, and a certain information selection.
2.3.2 The Mechanism of Information Acquisition
As a consequence of the previous subsection, in the most general case, any information acquisition
can be thought of as a three-system and three-step process. To shed further light on this point,
let us come back to the model of measurement, which is a particular instance of information
acquisition (it is also a specific instance of dynamic interactions between open systems). The
whole measurement process is divided into [Subsecs. 1.2.7–1.2.8]: A first step in which we prepare a
system, the premeasurement or coupling (in the quantum case, an entanglement), and the detection
itself, which is a selection act. The detector and the rest of the apparatus can be spatially or
temporally separated. Moreover, the final choice can be random or not (in the quantum mechanical
38[FRIEDEN 1998].
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Fig. 2.5 The fundamental informational triad Processor–Regulator–Decider.
case it is random). However, there is always some sort of incertitude a!ecting the final selection
act. Viewing the whole from the point of view of the involved systems, we have: The object
(measured) system which represents, as I have stressed, codified information changing in time,
and can be considered the processor [Subsec. 2.2.2]. Its variations (which can be either random or
according to a program) provide the starting point of the whole process. The measuring device
that is coupled with the object system is the regulator, while the final act of detection is done
through a decider. The regulator owes its name to the fact that choosing a certain apparatus
with a certain experimental set up and with a certain pointer indeed contributes to determine
the conditions in which information is acquired. However, since these conditions cannot provide
the variation (which is guaranteed at the source by the processor), this determination is rather a
tuning of the measurement process. The only codified activity at this level is in the processor, since
the regulator connects previously independent systems while the decider can provide a selection
that, only thanks to the indirect connection with the processor through the regulator, will finally
consist in an option within a set of alternative possibilities. As we shall see, this is also true for
higher levels of complexity: Information codification is only in the initial information processing.
Let us try to establish a connection with the previous distinction between event, correlations,
and process [Subsec. 1.3.1]: Information selection represents the event, the coupling instantiates
the dynamic connection, and the source of variety, which in itself is unknown to us, in a quantum-
mechanical system contains a set of unknown features, and manifests its information for us only
through the information selection and coupling, that is, becoming in this way a variety that is
accessible to us in this dynamical process.39
The whole process can then be seen as in Fig. 2.5: The relation established between the
regulator and the processor is a coupling, which allows for information to be acquired. The relation
between the decider and the regulator is an information selection. Finally, thanks to this two-
step process, the decider can acquire information about the processor (or the event resulting
from processing), performing in this way the analogue of a guessing (which can be a property
assignment). In other words, any time that a decider (even randomly) selects and eventually
stores some information—which, through an appropriate coupling, reveals something about another
system—we have something that, at a pure physical level and without any reference or goal-directed
39[PEIRCE CP, 6.97]. I am therefore sympathetic with Bateson’s definition of information as “A di!erence that makes
a di!erence” [BATESON 1971, p. 315].
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action, bears some structural relation to what we are authorized, at another level and in another
context, to call a true guess. Therefore, this guessing, or the whole measuring process, must not
be understood merely in subjective terms [Subsec. 1.3.3]. It is also important to realize that
this guessing could be considered part of a further preparation procedure in which a processor is
determined. For instance, we may decide to measure our system again starting from its output state.
The reason could be that we are not sure of our guess because of some doubts about the apparatus
reliability. In this way, the whole process presents a certain circularity, as stressed by Fig. 2.5.
Resuming, the main assumption of this book is that
The above scheme is the basis of ANY dealing-with-information process of our world, and in particular of
biological systems.
Also Shannon understood very well that information is concerned with a reduction of incertitude
(a choice among alternative possibilities) and that, in order to have an exchange of information,
we need both a variety and a channel (an interdependency).40 However, as I have mentioned
[Subsec. 2.3.1], he mainly dealt with engineering problems of communications, in which the task
is to increase the match (fidelity) between an input and an output in controlled situations. In
this case, the reduction of incertitude already happens at the source (by the sender who chooses
a certain message among many possible ones). This is rather a limiting case in ordinary life,
and the problem was that Shannon’s followers took this specific treatment as a general model
of information. The worry consists in the fact that, in the most general case, the reduction of
incertitude is only at the output and not at the input. This is evident for quantum systems: Qubits
are not selected messages41 (due to non-local features) [Subsec. 2.2.2]; consider again the delayed-
choice experiment [Subsec. 1.3.2]. However, this is a truth of general validity: The reason is that,
in most situations (even classically), nobody has perfect control of the source, and therefore, even
if a determined message has been selected, this remains unknown for the receiver (it is as if it
were undetermined).42 In such a situation, one is obliged to make a guess about the input starting
from a certain selection at the output. This is also sometimes true for the sender; if they desired
to be certain about the message that has been sent, they need to process it again, and in this
way reduce the incertitude that may a!ect (their knowledge about) the input message. On the
contrary, the selection operated by the receiver IS the received message (it is the event that has
happened). Obviously, the receiver may also try to verify again whether their understanding is
correct. However, this understanding concerns the guess about the input message and not the
act of selection, i.e. the event itself by which a reduction of incertitude at the output has been
produced for ever [Subsec. 2.2.5]. This is an irreversible event and therefore an ultimate fact. We
may generalize this by saying43 [Subsec. 2.2.1]:
It is the final act of information selection that introduces irreversibility in any information exchanging or
processing.
Quantum mechanics allows us to understand this point quite well, and for this reason, as already
stressed, it is the true generalized information theory. Here, the input information is intrinsically
uncertain and the only event we have is at the output. We shall consider the noticeable consequence
of this in detail in the next part of the book.
40[SHANNON 1948].
41Otherwise quantum bits could be cloned, which is impossible [WOOTTERS/ZUREK 1982].
42[AULETTA et al. 2008]. 43[LANDAUER 1961, LANDAUER 1996a] [BENNETT 1973, BENNETT 1982].
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Fig. 2.6 Plot of the log function. Compare with the Plot in Fig. 2.2.
2.3.3 Quantum and Classical Entropy
The information given by the final outcome (selection) j [Subsec. 2.3.1] in a process of information
acquisition (reduction of incertitude) as described in the previous subsection is given by44
Ij = " lg p(j), (2.7)
where
lg pj = log2 pj . (2.8)
The quantity (2.7) was called surprisal (or surprise) by Shannon.45 The logarithm logz x = y means
that zy = x [Fig. 2.6]. The number z is called base and the logarithm lg with base 2 is appropriate
for binary codification. The properties of the logarithm are
lg(x · y) = lg x + lg y and lg(x/y) = lg x " lg y. (2.9)
The classical Shannon entropy H is given by the sum of all the possible alternative outcomes or




p(j) lg p(j), where
!
j
p(j) = 1, (2.10)
and represents the incertitude of the possible outcomes and as such also the randomness of the
system from which we extract information. Entropy, therefore, also quantifies the information
that could be acquired from a certain system. In other words, entropy is strictly connected with
how much disorder a system displays. In particular, in a first approximation, increase in entropy
means increase in disorder, while decrease in entropy means growing order. For this reason, as
mentioned, entropy is a dynamical quantity (which in thermodynamics is connected with the
ability or inability to do work) while information is formal. In other words, disorder is always the
result of some irreversible dynamical process, while information can be processed in pure reversible
way, as quantum systems show. Many even identify an increase in entropy with the increase of
heat, which is the thermodynamic expression of disorder. This is, however, not correct, for even
at an absolute-zero temperature there is still a residual non-thermodynamic entropy shown by
44See [KHINCHIN 1957] for a short and e!ective introduction to these matters. 45[SHANNON 1948].
46The properties of logarithm and of probability justify why entropy is defined as in Eq. (2.10). Indeed, the joint
probability of independent events A and B is p(A, B) = p(A) · p(B) but the entropy of the whole state obtained by the
combination of the states associated or determined by the events A and B is H(A, B) = H(A) + H(B).
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Fig. 2.7 The six possible locations of hydrogen atoms (white circles) relative to oxygen atoms (grey circles)
in an ice crystal. Two of the hydrogen atoms must be near and two far away from the central oxygen atom.
This incertitude about the location of the hydrogen atoms means that there is entropy even at an absolute-zero
temperature.
the di!erent possible arrangements of the atoms. This is evident for ice molecules47 [Fig. 2.7] and
shows that entropy in its general form is not necessarily connected with heat exchanges but with
the (dynamic) spontaneous tendency to disorder or to display disorder.
This justifies the connection that I wish to establish between Boltzmann (thermodynamic),
Shannon (information-theory), and von Neumann (quantum-mechanical) entropies. It is indeed
possible to write down a quantum counterpart of Eq. (2.10).48 Now, it turns out that most
quantum-mechanical systems (some of those showing interference terms) have a zero von Neumann
entropy—this is the reason why I have suggested that the universe as a whole may have zero
entropy if it obeys to quantum-mechanical laws [Subsec. 2.2.4]. This is due to the fact that features
are the strongest forms of interdependency between systems in our universe. As a consequence,
quantum systems are the most ordered systems in nature. This confirms the fact that they have an
infinite amount of potential information, though it is inaccessible to any information acquisition
[Subsec. 2.2.2]. Moreover, this explains why it is necessary to lose features in the environment and
to locally increase the entropy of the system when measuring [Subsecs. 2.2.3–2.2.5]: It is indeed
impossible to extract information from a system that is too ordered (as well as when it is totally
disordered). Information acquisition is possible when there is a sort of trade-o! between an entropy
that is too high and an entropy that is too low.
We may now use the classical treatment for developing considerations that are also valid for
quantum mechanics. When we have two systems characterized by the sets J and K of elements or
characters j $ J and k $ K, the conditional entropy
47[ATKINS/DE PAULA 2006, pp. 609–10].
48For any density operator !̂ describing a quantum state, which is a generalization of the concept of projectors
[Subsec. 1.2.4], the so-called von Neumann entropy is indeed HV N (!̂) = !Tr(!̂ lg !̂).
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p(j, k) lg p(j|k) (2.11)
means the incertitude that the set J of the output signals will occur if the set K of the input signals
also occur, or, in other words, how much the disorder of the system described by the parameter
set J depends on the disorder of the system described by the parameter set K. Another important
quantity is the total joint entropy H(J,K), which is given by
H(J,K) = H(J) + H(K) " I(J : K). (2.12)
This quantity is the sum of the entropy of the two systems separately, minus the information they
share given by I(J : K). The latter is the mutual information between the sets J and K. Starting
by the simple formula
I(J : K) = H(J) + H(K) " H(J,K), (2.13)
that is banally implied by Eq. (2.12), and using the derivation































= H(J,K) " H(K), (2.14)





p(j, k) lg p(k) =
!
k
p(k) lg p(k), (2.15)
and of the two properties (2.9) of logarithms, it is possible to define the mutual information as
[Fig. 2.8]
I(J : K) = H(J) + H(K) " [H(J |K) + H(K)]




p(j) lg p(j) +
!
j,k
p(j, k) lg p(j|k), (2.16)
where I have made use of Eqs. (2.10), (2.11), and (2.13). The two terms in the second (or third)
line of Eq. (2.16) are also called input information (H(J)) and equivocation (H(J |K)), that is, the
conditional entropy of an output on a di!erent input.
Note that mutual information is a symmetric quantity, so that we have both
I(J : K) = H(J) " H(J |K), and I(J : K) = H(K) " H(K|J). (2.17)
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H(J) H(K)
H(J|K) H(K|J)I(J:K)
Fig. 2.8 Graphic representation of mutual information: It is easy to verify that I(J : K) = H(J) " H(J |K),
where H(J) is the whole set on the left (both dark and light grey regions), while H(J |K) is its light grey
part and I(I : K) is its dark grey part, respectively.
Therefore, when the two systems (or the input and output information) are independent, Eq. (2.12)
reduces to the sum of the independent entropies of the subsystems:
H(J,K) = H(J) + H(K). (2.18)
The concept of mutual information is very important because, as we have seen, it covers the
domains of both classical and quantum (ebits) information theory, and expresses all forms of
interdependencies between systems or parts of a system having informational value. To this extent,
it can be seen as a measure of the order of a system. In fact, by rewriting Eq. (2.16), we see that
the entropy of a given system turns out to be49
H(J) = I(J : K) + H(J |K), (2.19)
that is, as a combination of order (the first term on the left) and disorder (the second term on the
left) relative to a reference system described by K. We can generalize the previous equation by
taking the second system as the environment E (the rest of the world), i.e.
H(J) = I(J : E) + H(J |E). (2.20)
The quantum counterpart of formula (2.16) or (2.12) can be easily written by replacing H(J,K)
by the von Neumann entropy of the compound system, and H(J) and H(K) by the von Neumann
entropies calculated on the two subsystems taken separately.50 In other words, both classically and
quantum mechanically we can treat any physical system as an open system whose entropy depends
on its entropic (dynamic) relations with the environment. We obviously have two limiting cases:
• The case in which the system shares no information with the environment, and can be considered
a true monad. Here the entropies of the system and of the environment are separated and the
total entropy is just the sum of these separated entropies: In analogy with Eq. (2.18) we have
H(J,E) = H(J) + H(E).
49See also [BONSACK 1961]. 50[AULETTA 2005b].
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• The case in which the system is identical with the environment (it shows no di!erence). Here
the entropy is the same, that is, H(J) = H(E). This is exactly the case for quantum entangled
systems with zero entropy. In this case, any subsystem shows the same entropy (zero) as the
whole system, that is, H(J,K) = H(J) = H(K).
This formalism can also be applied to a single system and its parts. In the easiest case in which
we only have two subsets, J,K, using Eq. (2.14), we can express H(J) and H(K) as
H(J) = H(J,K) " H(J |K), H(K) = H(J,K) " H(K|J), (2.21)
so that, thanks to Eq. (2.12), we have:
H(J,K) = [H(J,K) " H(J |K)] + [H(J,K) " H(K|J)] " I(J : K), (2.22)
which implies [see again Fig. 2.8]
H(J,K) = I(J : K) + H(J |K) + H(K|J), (2.23)
where, as usual, the first component represents the order of the system.51 Denbigh52 said that an
organized system is one that can perform certain functions by virtue of its particular assemblage
of parts. However, at the most basic level, the definition of order is purely physical and does not
need the notion of function, which is strictly biological. The second and the third components
of Eq. (2.23) represent the disorder. This can easily be understood if we consider that the
independence of elements is a clear manifestation of the disorder of a given system. This makes
my previous statement about entropy meaning disorder more precise: The conditional entropies of
the form H(J |K) and H(K|J) represent disorder, while the entropy H(J,K) represents the whole
amount of both order and disorder of a system.53 Generalizations to n-dimensional systems are
straightforward but cumbersome when n grows.
A final consideration is the following: We have seen that according to the Landauer and
Bennett’s theorem only selection (erasure) of information costs energy [Subsec. 2.2.1]. This cost
has been precisely quantized: The erasure of any classical bit of information will cost downloading
kBT ln 2 = 0.6931 into the environment,54 which establishes a strong connection between informa-
tion and entropy—we shall come back to this in the appendix at the end of this section. Recall
that ln = loge, where e is the exponential function, kB the Boltzmann constant (a thermodynamic
quantity), and T the temperature of the system. Summing up [Sec. 2.1],
It is information selection that leads to a local growth of entropy.
2.3.4 Stored Information
In the previous subsection we have considered the relations between information and entropy.
Let us have a closer look. High entropy in general means a high capacity to transmit (or
acquire) information, since the acquired information displays the characters of high surprise,
unexpectedness. This does not mean, however, that actual information grows as disorder grows. In
51Eq. (2.23) allows us to immediately understand why for pure quantum states (that have zero total entropy) the
conditional entropies must be negative (to counterbalance the mutual information among subsystems).
52[DENBIGH 1951] [DENBIGH/DENBIGH 1985].
53Also in [LANDSBERG 1984b] a di!erence between the concepts of entropy and disorder is introduced.
54[PLENIO/VITELLI 2001].
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Fig. 2.9 Relationships between maximal entropy (lg n), actual entropy of a single system (H1), Markov
entropy (HM ), mutual information (D2), and stored information (Is).
fact, as mentioned, information needs a certain amount of order and structure, that is, low entropy.
However, too much order prevents information acquiring, as it is the case for quantum systems.
Stored information varies inversely with entropy.55 In order to introduce this concept, let us
first introduce a very useful concept, that of “entropy di!erence”. This is the gap between the
maximal entropy which a particular system (denoted by the subscript 1) could reach and the
entropy it actually has [Fig. 2.9]:
D1 = HMax1 " H1, (2.24)
HMax1 being the maximum value of entropy and H1 = H(J) being the actual value of the entropy
of the system. As is well known, the maximal entropy HMax1 exists when all possible states are
equiprobable (maximal randomness), that is, when p(j) = 1/n, where n is the number of the









= " lg 1
n
= lg n, (2.25)
since
"
n 1/n = 1. Recall that we have defined the entropy of a system as in Eq. (2.19). Conse-
quently, the information that is stored by a system, which is particularly important for biological
systems, is also called information density and is given by
Is = D1 + D2. (2.26)
In other words, in considering information storing, we must also take into account at least a second
system (indicated by the subscript 2). Information storing represents the necessary condition for
structural information. D2 is given by the di!erence between H1 and the conditional entropy,
H(J |K) (which I have also indicated as HM because it is the so-called Markovian entropy), that is,
D2 = H1(J) " HM = H1(J) " H(J |K), (2.27)
in accordance with the above formulation of mutual information (2.16), that is, D2 = I(J : K).
Then, the stored information may also be written as [Eq. (2.24)]
55[GATLIN 1972].
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Is = D1 + D2 = HMax1 (J) " H1(J) + I(J : K), (2.28)
where I have explicitly indicated the dependence on J . In the previous formula, I have only taken
dependencies between two possible systems into account. This formalism can be generalized to
a multidimensional entropy (when many systems are involved). In this case, Eq. (2.26) may be
generalized as Is = D1 + D2 + D3 + . . ., where the rising index indicates the growing number of
interrelated systems. This leads to a simple generalization of Eq. (2.28) that considers the mutual
information between a system and the entire universe, on the same line of Eq. (2.20).
Let us consider these quantities from the point of view of the transmission of a coded message.
D1 is a measure of the classical variety of the message, while D2 is a measure of its reliability. D2
is not allowed to drop below a certain limit because of the resulting inability to detect and correct
errors, due to the lack of context. The entropy
H(J |K) = HM = H1(J) " D2 = HMax1 " D1 " D2, (2.29)
where I have used formula (2.24), is the entropy of a language possessing D1 variety and D2
reliability,56 in accordance with what was said in Subsec. 2.3.2. The most important point of
this examination is that, in any classical transmission of information, an optimal trade-o! between
these two forms of information must be found, i.e. between (a) a high capacity to send information,
which is proportional to high entropy (i.e. to D1), and (b) a high capacity to receive information,
represented by D2.
Therefore, I wish to stress that the concept of stored information (and also that of structural
information, as we shall see) does not reduce to that of mutual information, but also comprehends
an entropic part (in the case of the stored information this is represented by the component D1).
The entropic component is necessary for a structure to emerge. Indeed, quantum systems that
have zero entropy [Subsec. 2.3.3] and thus show a high degree of mutual information through
entanglement, do not possess any structure in the proper sense of the word.
2.4 A General Framework
2.4.1 Physical Processes
An important theoretical consequence of the previous investigation is that we should distinguish
between (i) pure disruption of an existing order representing entropy growth, which is irreversible,
and (ii) a reversible and deterministic (information) processing57 [Subsecs. 1.2.7–1.2.8]. Most
interaction processes show both reversible (pure formal) and irreversible (entropic) aspects and
their roots can be found in the quantum theory of open systems. We have indeed noted that when
a measurement-like interaction occurs, the local entropy of the object system or the apparatus
increases, while the entropy of the rest of the universe decreases in order to have a balance
[Subsec. 2.2.4]. We are then authorized to point out three main types of physical processes.
• When we have local increase in disorder, accompanied often by a structure’s breakdown and by
the mixing of some previous stu!, we speak of mechanical processes.
• When there is a decrease in local entropy which promotes the constitution of new regularities,
interdependencies, and structures, we speak of an order-building process (which may consist
information acquiring and exchanging between physical systems) [Subsec. 2.3.3].58 W. Wundt
56[NICOLIS 1986]. 57[LAYZER 1990]. 58[SPENCER 1860–62, pp. 250 and 464].
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GLOBAL REVERSIBILITY
Fig. 2.10 A constant-entropy (perhaps a zero-entropy) universe in which local disruptive and order-building
processes do not a!ect the configuration of the whole. Actually an adiabatic expansion of our universe can
keep the entropy constant and at least at a value very near to zero.
spoke in this case of positive molecular work denoting the disorder-increasing process as negative
molecular work.59
• The universe as a whole, at a very global level, proceeds in its reversible, law-like quantum
evolution [Fig. 2.10]. This is strongly suggested by the fact that for every irreversible local
(computational) process, a larger reversible context can be found.60
Entropic processes are irreversible, so that here we can clearly establish what exactly the succession
is between events. However, in principle we cannot predict single events, even in many classical
cases. For instance, how many ways are there to break a cup [Subsec. 2.2.3]? It is likely that
there are infinite ways. Let us simply take one of them, say, smashing a cup on the ground; how
many ways are there to break it now? Again the answer is infinite. Even if we perfectly know the
imperfections of the material, so that we can foresee that a break line will pass through such a
point, we cannot foresee the whole breaking pattern. Some of these incertitudes derive ultimately
from quantum mechanics. Indeed, there are as many possible outcomes of a measurement process as
those representing an eigenstate of the measured observable. Statistical fluctuations are ultimately
a consequence of this fundamental principle. This is the reason why quantum events are the source
of any novelty in our world.61 On the contrary, lawful processes are reversible and determine
exactly what the next state will be (or what the previous one has been) given the knowledge of
the actual state and its environment. However, by observing two states, we cannot predict what
comes first or next. This is another expression of complementarity [Subsecs. 1.2.6 and 1.3.3].
The word mechanical has here a certain ambiguity. It can be understood either
(1) In the sense of mechanical engines, which are subject to the laws of thermodynamics or
(2) In the sense of the theory called classical mechanics, which arose between the end of the 18th
century and the beginning of the 19th century, and described systems evolving in a perfect,
frictionless, reversible, and independent way.
59[WUNDT 1893, Ch. 3]. 60[TOFFOLI 1980] [FREDKIN/TOFFOLI 1982]. 61[SMOLIN 1997, p. 44].
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In the second sense, classical systems defined in this way represent a pure idealization. Quantum
mechanics (as far as the interference terms of a system are not destroyed) fulfill the dream of
classical mechanics insofar as quantum systems realize a perfect example of law-like and reversible
physical processes. Obviously, existing classical or semiclassical systems fall under category (1),
and it is in this sense that I am using the word mechanical process here.
With regard to the order-building process, some have believed that it can be cast in a general
principle of creation of structures through combination of some discrete unities (the code), by
generalizing what was said in Subsec. 2.2.2 also to classical systems.62 This is known as the
particulate principle and was first proposed (for explaining biological heredity) by Ronald Fisher.63
However, it is di"cult, as we shall see, to extend this principle to any creation of order. It remains
true that such a principle applies to a lot of systems. All physical systems that make infinite
use of finite means (according to von Humboldt) conform to the particulate principle64: Discrete
units from a finite set of meaningless elements are repeatedly sampled, permuted or combined in
larger units that are higher in the hierarchy (in general, independence of the di!erent levels of the
hierarchy should be maintained).
The particulate principle rationalizes both the combinatorial mechanisms and the hierarchical
structure that is ubiquitous in nature. However, this does not mean that such a combinatorics can
be identified with information codification, which occurs either at a very basic level (as in quantum
systems) or at a very high level (as in living systems). An application of the particulate principle
in a prebiotic domain, according to Abler, is represented by chemistry: Here, electrons, protons,
and neutrons could be understood as a code whose syntactic combination (corresponding to the
physical location in the nucleus and orbitals) give rise to the di!erent sorts of elements. Since these
elements are finite (even if they are of a far greater number than electrons, protons, and neutrons),
they could also be understood as a code giving rise, by combination, to all di!erent sorts of stu!.
However, the matter structure as such does not show the typical aspects of information codification.
Indeed, the only character of codified information that is retained here is the combination of a finite
set of elements, but it is di"cult to see what the other alternative codes are; we have neither the
combination nor the translation rules that are necessary for speaking of information codification.
As mentioned, we must wait for living systems in order to see coding activity again, i.e. the genetic
code. The reason why the typical organization of codified information becomes lost in the passage
from quantum mechanics to the molecular and chemical level and also a!ects many systems of
our macroscopic world is a very great and di"cult problem. With the growing complexity of the
interacting systems, it is possible that the simplicity of a linear combinatory of a small set of
elements gets lost. Here, non-linear e!ects may also play an important role. My guess is that
the domain between quantum mechanics and living organisms is simultaneously too complex for
quantum information (interference terms get lost) and too elementary for classical information
coding and processing, since the conditions through which these processes may be shielded against
environmental perturbations have not yet arisen. I shall come back to this point in the second
part of the book. So, order and information, as explained [Subsec. 2.3.4], are not equivalent
concepts, even if any order has its roots in the quantum or any other higher-level information
codification.
Summing up, here and in the following chapters, I try to support a more generalized under-
standing of dynamics in which the interplay between global and local aspects is taken into account.
Its utility could be measured by its ability to help the future progress of biology.65
62[ABLER 1989]. 63[FISHER 1930]. 64[STUDDERT-KENNEDY 1998, STUDDERT-KENNEDY 2000].
65[THOMPSON 1995b].
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2.4.2 Emergence
Laws are underdeterminate relative to the domain where they apply.66 The more they are general,
the more they are underdeterminate. This is clear for quantum mechanics, where laws have a
general character [Sec. 1.1; Subsecs. 2.2.5 and 2.4.1], but this is a lesson of general validity.67
This underdetermination allows for novelty: Novelty is something that cannot be foreseen or even
understood only on the basis of some previously known laws and which notwithstanding happens
within a general framework provided by those laws [Subsec. 1.2.1]. It comes out from the intrinsic
variety of the lower-level entities from which a new configuration is built. For instance, organisms do
not violate the second principle of thermodynamics, according to which entropy grows or remains
constant in an isolated system.68 However, the way in which organisms build order is not simply
a consequence of thermodynamic laws even if it happens in accordance with them.69 Every time
that such a phenomenon happens, we must have the emergence of a new structure that somehow
represents a new fundamental property or behavior. Such a property or behavior is then robust to
fluctuations or variations of variables or conditions out of which is emerged, becoming in this way
independent of the details determining the latter.70 This new property or behavior can become
in the long run a new “regional” law. As I shall explain in the following, the driving force of
emergence is selection operating canalization, while the adaptation is represented by di!erent sorts
of constraints contributing to channelization [Subsec. 2.2.6]: This is the essence of generalized
Darwinism that I have introduced. We shall indeed learn that features are only a special (quantum-
mechanical) case of formal constraint.
Emergence is a widespread phenomenon that covers many physical situations of our world.71
Among the first scholars to have thought about it was John Stuart Mill, who a"rmed that the
addition of causes does not necessarily imply the proportional addition of e!ects, but may result
in a new configuration.72 Unfortunately, traditional philosophical positions seem to be strongly
committed to a radical reductionism, to a metaphysics of elementary particles that, after quantum
mechanics, seems to be anachronistic.73
We can speak of a direct emergence which relies on properties and relations between individual
elements and of indirect emergence when the relations between individuals are mediated by active
and often complex environmental structures.74A case of direct emergence is the tra"c jam. Here we
see that complex structures are in a constant flux. An example of indirect emergence are termites’
buildings75: A modification of the local environment is a response to the triggers provided by
previous alterations to the environment (made by termites at an earlier time). This is called a
stigmergic signal (usage of work as the signal for more work). Indirect emergence is very important
for living beings due to their capability of canalizing environmental cues in an appropriate way.
When one speaks of emergence, one often takes into consideration the problem of levels of
reality. This is not the place to extensively discuss this point, but I wish to say that the term
“levels of reality” is sometimes ambiguous, while emergence is certainly concerned with properties
66[PEIRCE 1891, p. 296]. 67[BOREL 1920]. 68[ATKINS 1994]. 69[LOTKA 1922b].
70[BATTERMAN 2002] [MITCHELL 2009, pp. 14–15 and 21–6]. In this book I shall be concerned with all five forms of
emergence enumerated in [KIM 1999].
71[LAYZER 1976] [CHAISSON 2001] [MOROWITZ 2002] [ELLIS 2004, ELLIS 2005a, ELLIS 2008b]. See especially the
very useful book [MURPHY/STOEGER 2007] as well as [CLAYTON/DAVIES 2006].
72[MILL 1843, III, Ch. 6].
73J. Smart ones said that he could not “believe that ultimate laws of nature could relate simple constituents to
configurations consisting of perhaps billions of neurons . . . all put together for all the world as though their main purpose
in life was to be a negative feedback mechanism of a complicated sort” [SMART 1959]. This turns out to be almost literally
true for life.
74[CLARK 1997, pp. 73–75]. 75[BECKERS et al. 1994]
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that, as mentioned previously, are neither a simple consequence of other laws nor in contradiction
with them. Quantum mechanics is a general paradigm that allows for the emergence of both
classical or semiclassical systems and biological systems.76
In this way, as suggested in Sec. 1.1, we can understand the emergence of biological systems as
both something new (and therefore displaying properties and principles that are additional to) and
in accordance with the laws of physics (as well as of chemistry).77 I shall define the philosophical
point of view supported in this book as an emergent monism.78
2.4.3 Structures and Elements
A superposition of di!erent eigenstates of an observable that is measured only represents potential
information [Subsec. 2.2.2]. It displays how the system being in this state could behave if it
interacted with an apparatus and the environment. A priori, what guarantees the connection
between global features and local events are the coe"cients entering into an expansion of a quantum
state in a given basis (and therefore also the probabilities of those events that are calculated by
performing the square modulus of these coe"cients). A posteriori, this connection is provided
through the interaction with at least one other open system.
This essential character is also true for any structural relation in the classical world. Any struc-
ture, in fact, represents a potentiality to behave in a certain manner given certain environmental
conditions. For instance, a crystal structure in itself only represents a disposition to behave in a
certain manner and to produce certain e!ects when stimulated by scratching, sounds, light, and so
on. Peirce had already individuated this point, although he seems to have interpreted it in a purely
epistemological style.79 Another example can be represented by a forest. From a certain point of
view (fine-graining), only the individual trees seem to be ontological realities and the forest, on the
contrary, seems deprived of any reality apart from that conferred by the human observer. As we
shall see, this is true to a certain extent. However, it is also true that the forest (that is, the specific
disposition of the trees) will have a crucial role when purely physical agents are in play, e.g. against
wind or fire. For this reason, structures cannot be dismissed as illusionary phenomena.80 In other
words, I am suggesting that any structure or arrangement of elements should be considered as a
complex of formal constraints that can be activated in certain conditions. Now, from the point of
view of the structure, the individual existence of one tree or another is completely indi!erent. In
fact, nothing essential would change if, in place of a given tree, there were another of the same
species or at least one of a similar shape and size. This is almost true for any tree of the forest.
On the other hand, the existence of the individual trees is the only feature that guarantees that
we can speak of a forest. We see, therefore, that there is a certain asymmetry between global
structures and localized objects and events [Subsec. 2.2.5], but also that both, in their manner,
can be perceived as constitutive of our world.
The reason why structures have this character is that they can be thought of as based on the
mutual information or on any relation between connected elements.81 The concept of potentiality
76[AULETTA 2005b]. 77[GOULD 1985, pp. 379–80].
78A concept developed by Lloyd Morgan [LLOYD MORGAN 1891, pp. 471–2][LLOYD MORGAN 1923]. See also
[CLAYTON 2004]. For the concept of monism see [HAECKEL 1899]. See also [PEACOCKE 1999] and [BUNGE 1980]
for a materialist understanding. For a more recent discussion see [ELLIS 2005a].
79[PEIRCE 1872]. Nevertheless, the reduction of pragmatism to a species of relativism without ontological import does
not seem very appropriate [MARGOLIS 1986] and has not produced any relevant result.
80[LAUGHLIN 2005].
81This connection between information and structure was stressed in [VON WEIZSÄCKER 1971, pp. 50–5, 346–48].
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may sound strange to scientifically educated ears, even if I have followed Heisenberg in applying
it to quantum mechanics [Subsec. 2.2.2]. In all its generality, let us define potential as something
that82
• Can be an ingredient of certain dynamical processes in which local interactions also occur,
• Contributes to the final outcome of the dynamical process,
• Needs some additional condition in order to be “activated,” that is, to actually concur in
determining that outcome.
Natural sciences before the end of the 19th century and the birth of quantum mechanics were
strongly reductionist. For instance, the dominant point of view in chemistry was the atomistic
one o!ered by Dalton, according to which the goal of chemistry is to individuate the elementary
substances. However, in 1825 Liebig and Wöhler had already discovered that two di!erent silver
compounds, silver cyanate and fulminic acid, though having the same chemical composition (the
same proportion of carbon, nitrogen, and silver), showed di!erent observable properties. The silver
compound of fulminic acid was explosive, whereas silver cyanate was not. These and similar
substances, called “isomers” by Berzelius, led chemists to suspect that substances are defined
not simply by the number and kind of atoms in the molecule but also by the arrangement of those
atoms, that is by their spatial relations.
2.4.4 System Theory
In order to avoid both dangers of an ontological reductionism and ontological holism,83 this
book can be seen as a treatise in applied system theory (a System biology84). The reason for
system theory’s birth is that the scheme of isolable causal trains and meristic treatment has
proved insu"cient in many fields and especially in biological and social sciences.85 System theory
attempts to provide theoretical explanation and scientific interpretation where previously there
were none, anyway with higher generality.86 Traditionally, analytic procedure in science supposed
that interactions between parts of a system are non-existent or weak enough to be neglected, and
that relations are linear. I invite the reader to consider system theory together with information
theory as the formal tools that may ground biology and cognition as traditional mathematics
grounds physics.
As we have seen, a system can be broadly defined as an ordered complex of interrelated elements
[Sec. 1.1], rather than “interacting,” as originally defined by von Bertalan!y. When dealing with
systems, three features must be considered: The number of elements, their species, and their
relations (structure).87 When systems like the organisms evolve, there is increasing modularization,
which means increasing determination of the functioning of elements which are only dependent
upon themselves, and consequently a loss in regulability which rests on the system as a whole, owing
to the interrelations that are present. As we shall see, this phenomenon is typical in biology. Only
this di!erentiation,88 or decrease in interaction between parts, can determine progress. However,
this process can never be fully accomplished without destroying the system: There is a tension
between wholeness and pure summation (atomism). Therefore,89
82[AULETTA/TORCAL 2011]. 83[ROBERT 2004, pp. 69–70]. 84[BIZZARRI et al. 2008].
85[VON BERTALANFFY 1969b, pp. 3–29]. 86[AGAZZI 1978]. 87[VON BERTALANFFY 1950].
88[SPENCER 1860–62, pp. 277–95].
89[SPENCER 1860–62, pp. 291–5 and 324–7]. See also [LLOYD MORGAN 1891, p. 241].
978–0–19–960848–5 02-Auletta-02-drv Auletta (Typeset by SPi) 62 of 862 June 1, 2011 17:18
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 1/6/2011, SPi
62 Quantum and Classical Information and Entropy
Progressive segregation must be accompanied by at least some form of integration or even a progressive
centralization of the parts.
This statement, which may be called Spencer’s law, is in accordance with a quantum-information
point of view [Subsec. 2.2.5]. This is also the issue of complexity, as we shall see.
In the next chapter I shall begin to develop the specific contents of this system theory. In the
present, very abstract context, it is useful to consider system theory as a generalized theory of
relations and interactions. Let us come back to Fig. 2.5. The problem can also be seen at the
abstract and general level: Why three interrelated systems? For our examination, three systems,
as we have seen, is the minimal level of complexity required [Subsecs. 2.3.1–2.3.3]: Indeed, any
information dependency that is not a pure covariance needs at least three elements. The problem
then, is why 3 and not 4, 5, or even 20? This is a problem of the theory of relations. Peirce
distinguished three types of relations90:
• Monadic relation: This is a zero degree of relations, or a pure absence of relation. Mathematically,
it can be represented by pure numbers. It can be geometrically represented with a point, which
has zero dimensions.
• Dyadic relations: This is the pure (static) interdependency. In physics it expresses the covariance
between several systems. Entanglement is a specific form of this interdependency. In mathemat-
ics, it is the dependence of a function on a variable or inverse relation. Geometrically, it can be
represented by a line (or a vector).
• Triadic relation: This is a true three-term, dynamical relation. Here any element is dynamically
connected with another through a third one (often a medium). Mathematically, it can be
represented by matrices. Geometrically, by surfaces.
According to Peirce, any higher-degree relation can be reduced to some combination of these three.
Therefore, in the most general case, we have three elements, A, B, C. These can be (1) unrelated, (2)
dyadically related (AB, BC, CA: since dyadic relations are interdependencies, they are symmetric),
or (3) triadically interrelated: ABC. Since any element here is dynamically connected through the
other ones in a (feedback) circuit, any combination of the three is equivalent to ABC. This triadic
relation is irreducible to binary relations. When we consider that the zero-degree relations consist
exactly in each of the 3 elements (A, B, C) taken apart, we obtain 3 elements, 3 dyadic relations,
and 1 triadic relation, the magic number seven.91
This can also be seen from a purely physical point of view. It is well known that forces can be
vectorially added. Now, it does not matter how many forces there are in play; any pair of forces
can be reduced to a single one (the resultant) through summation. By reiterating this operation we
finally arrive at two force vectors (which are eventually the sum of many other vectors) and their
resultant. This means that we can consider the resultant either alone in itself (monadic relation),
the two forces giving rise to the resultant (dyadic relation), or the resultant as a resultant of these
two forces (triadic relation). Things stand in a similar way for quantum-mechanical systems, since
their state can be vectorially represented [Fig. 1.5]. The same is true for information codification.
Any n-dimensional code can be reduced to a binary one in the same way [Fig. 2.5]. However,
any binary code is really ternary: 0, 1, and their combinations. I hope to have clarified here the
systemic reasons for the scheme in Fig. 2.5, which will be reiterated throughout the whole book.
Under this point of view, I follow Carnap’s fundamental idea that science essentially consists in
description of relations and structures.92 It is also true that structural descriptions, although basic,
90[PEIRCE CP, 1.293; 1.303–32; 3.472–3]. 91[MILLER 1956]. 92[CARNAP 1928, Ch. 2].
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do not cover the complexity of biology and cognition (they describe the physical level even if they
are also used in biology and cognition). For this reason, in the next part of the book, I shall
introduce functional descriptions, and in the third part mental and social acts. Moreover, I stress
that scientific explanations also rely on mechanisms and not only on descriptions.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have seen that quantum mechanics allows us to think in a new and original
way about some very important physical issues. With regard to the issue of information, we have
learned that:
• Information and entropy are not the same quantity: Information is a formal quantity, while
entropy (especially as conditional entropy) is a measure of the disorder of the system.
• Information is basically codified information. In this form it is essentially potential information
(information that in certain contexts can be acquired). However, there is never access to the
whole information potentially contained in a system.
• Information can be processed, shared, or selected. An appropriate combination of these three
aspects gives rise to information acquisition.
Moreover, I have shown that:
• There is a fundamental complementarity between global and local behavior. This complemen-
tarity should be understood in dynamic and smooth terms.
• Global behavior is, according to the laws of quantum mechanics, continuous and wave-like.
Global behavior does not determine local behavior.
• Local behavior is random, discontinuous, jump-like. Local behavior is blind to global behavior.
• This complementarity is the source of any emergence in our world.
• We probably live in a universe with constant (perhaps zero) entropy with two di!erent processes:
An order-building one and an order-destroying one.
Apart from these specific results, I wish to recall here a general methodological (and epistemolog-
ical) lesson and the first fundamental principle (valuable not only for quantum systems) we have
drawn. The methodological lesson is the following: We need to consider problems both from a
global and local perspective and these two di!erent views need to be integrated. This means that I
shall use both a reductionist methodology and an approach making use of top-down processes, as
will be explained in the following. This also means that I shall avoid a pure subjectivist or idealist
approach but also a traditional objectivist one, putting the stress on both local perturbations
and interdependencies among systems. The principle can be formulated as follows: In certain
conditions, especially when there are interaction processes, nature can operate selections among
several possibilities.
Appendix: The Relation Between Shannon and Boltzmann Entropies
An important relation is that between the Shannon (informational) and the Boltzmann (thermo-
dynamic) entropies. Let us consider the arrangement shown in Fig. 2.11.93 The Boltzmann entropy
of all molecules is given by
93[ROEDERER 2005, pp. 173–87].
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Fig. 2.11 Two vessels, with volumes V0 and V1, are initially separated by a bar that is removed in order
that the gas contained in the first vessel can flow toward the second one.
S = kBN ln W, (2.30)
where kB is the Boltzmann constant, N the number of gas molecules, W the number of possible
configurations of the gas particles, and the natural logarithm is given by lnx = loge x, where e
is the exponential (Euler) function [Fig. 2.2]. I am assuming here that in the final configuration
every particle can be either in the vessel with volume V0 or in the vessel with volume V1. Once
the bar separating the vessels with volumes V0 and V1 is removed, the Boltzmann entropy is
increased by
$S = Sf " Si = kBN(ln Wf " ln Wi)




where Sf and Si are the final and initial Boltzmann entropy, respectively. The number Wf of
possible final configurations (states) in which the gas can be is proportional to V0 + V1 (since the
gas occupies both vessels) while the number Wi of the initial one is proportional to V0 (the gas is
here confined to the left vessel).
On the other hand, the initial Shannon entropy per molecule when it is maximal with some
simplifying assumptions that do not deprive this formalism of its generality, can be taken to be
Hi = lg Wi as well as the final one as Hf = lg Wf [see Eq. (2.25)], since the probability as inversely
proportional to the number of possible configurations. Then, the increase of Shannon entropy is
given by




By comparing the latter two equations and considering the relations between the natural and the
binary logarithm (lnx = lg x ln 2), we have
$S = kB$H ln 2, (2.33)
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or
S = kBN ln W = kBN lg W ln 2
= kBNH ln 2. (2.34)
It is obviously meaningful to associate a Shannon entropy to a thermodynamic entropy (since
any increase in thermodynamic entropy also means increase in disorder), but the reverse is not
necessarily the case, as Fig. 2.10 nicely shows.
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The Brain: An Outlook
In the next three chapters I shall show some basic information-acquiring processes and systems
that are relevant for biology and cognition. The subject of this chapter is the brain, which is the
most studied system for information-acquiring. In Ch. 4 we shall investigate a specific information-
acquiring modality, namely vision. In Ch. 5 we shall deal with the issue of motion. As we shall
see, motion is concerned with both motion perception and movement controlling. This will lead us
further than pure information-acquiring and open the path to the next part of the book, devoted
to information control.
Now, let us briefly consider the contents of the present chapter. After having considered the
reasons for dealing with the (human) brain as an information-acquiring system, I shall consider how
information is processed from the peripheral sensory system to the central nervous system. I shall
then give some basic information about the brain’s structure. Thereafter, I shall deal with three
specific problems: The brain’s modularity, the stages of information-processing, and the brain’s
mapping activity. Finally, I shall introduce the neural networks approach.
3.1 Biological Systems Acquire Information
The archetype of any information treatment by biological systems1 was traditionally considered
as the brain, in particular the human brain, and it is until now the best known biological system
which is supposed to be an information-processing or information-acquiring device. Indeed, in
a biological context, the theory of information-processing was historically first applied to this
complex organ. This is due to the fact that cognitive sciences were dominated (and still are in
part) by a functionalist approach that underestimates the centrality of the biological dimension
for the treatment of information and considers the brain as the proper place for dealing with
information-processing. Obviously, information-processing does not exhaust information-acquiring
[Subsec. 2.3.2], but at this stage of the examination the stress will be put on this aspect. Therefore,
it should not sound strange that, in studying biological systems, we first begin with the brain in its
information-processing function and then, in the next part, we shall deal with organisms (as well
as with the higher functionalities of the brain itself). This allows us also to formulate many basic
distinctions that will turn out to be useful in the following as well as to become acquainted with
the basic schools dealing with cognition. The brain is not the sole organ to deal with information
but in higher animals there are essentially three systems that treat information2:
1I use here the term biological system simply for indicating a system in the sense previously defined that represents a
living organism or a part of a living organism. In the second part of the book, we shall learn a rather technical understanding
of this term.
2[ALBERTS et al. 1983, pp. 879–961].
66
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CNS
HS SS
Fig. 3.1 The three systems dealing with external information and the way it is integrated in the organism
and regulated by it: The central nervous system (CNS), the peripheral sensory system (SS), and the hormonal
system (HS).
1. The peripheral sensory system (SS)—that is part of the peripheral nervous system, which also
comprehends the motor connections to muscles—or any other elementary interface with the
environment,
2. The regulative systems and in particular the hormonal system (HS), and
3. The central nervous system (CNS) or any more elementary analogue.
The three systems may be cast as in Fig. 3.1, in agreement with our previous analysis [Subsec. 2.3.2].
Speaking of vertebrates at least, the function of the sensory system is to acquire and—after a first
processing—transmit information to the CNS; the specific function of the hormonal system is
to regulate the transmission and the exchange of information (thus regulating both metabolic
and CNS processes); the specific function of the CNS (consisting essentially of the brain and the
spinal cord) is to acquire information (from the sensory system) and, in the lowest sensory and
motor areas, process it, as well as to control information exchange and select specific options. The
hormonal system transmits information through the hormones released by the glands. In particular,
it mainly regulates the circulatory system, the digestive system, and the reproductive system, apart
from its influences on the brain and the CNS. It is interesting to observe that information in the
brain is also transferred through local di!usion of neurochemicals in a paracrine way.3 Also the
CNS transmits and exchanges information as well as regulates it. On the other hand, the sensory
system is not able to exercise regulation or control, and, as a consequence, a very violent stimulus
(a very high-pitched sound, a sudden intense emission of light, and so on) can have disruptive
consequences on it. The relationships among these three systems will be clarified especially in the
second part of the book. Let us now introduce some short remarks on the sensory system and the
CNS:
• The peripheral sensory system is an information-acquiring system and also, more specifically,
an information codifier and processor relative to the whole organism. Allow me to give evi-
dence of how information is processed via the visual system from the sensory systems to the
higher brain areas through specific algorithms.4 As we shall see more clearly below, all visual
information starts with two paths, the first for color processing (from visual area V1 to area
V4), the second for motion processing (from area V1 to area V5). (I am not considering here
other aspects like form processing.) The first step in color processing is provided by lightness
3[PANKSEPP 1998, p. 68]. 4[ZEKI 2001].
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algorithms to determine the lightness (or relative brightness) record of a complex scene in
di!erent wavebands. The lightness of a surface will not change with changes in intensity of
light. The second step is a comparator which, confronting at least three di!erent wavebands, is
able to construct what we call color.
• Not all types of CNSs have the same structure. Indeed, here evolutionary development took
place twice: In vertebrates the central nervous system forms a single mass of brain and spinal
cord, whereas in the invertebrate it consists of a series of separated masses (ganglia) connected
by relatively thin neural strands. Although in this chapter I will consider mainly how the human
brain processes information, some of the following considerations have a more general scope,
and, unless noted otherwise, they can be applied to almost any vertebrate.
3.2 Classical Computation, Cybernetics, and the Brain
Two main developments in cognitive sciences must be taken into account here:
• Traditionally, at the beginning of cognitive science, parallel to the first steps of AI, a central-
processor model of brain activity dominated the classical theory of computation and the brain.5
According to the model of the central-processor computation, external inputs are linearly and
logically (syntactically, following logical laws) processed by a unit, and the result is constituted
by the outputs of this central process. Representations (in the sense of explicit or implicit
descriptions of objects) are assumed to be the result of a passive reception of inputs. Von
Neumann was one of the first to notice the characteristic digital functioning of the nervous
system.6
This initial assumption was subsequently rejected along two di!erent lines of investigation. (i)
In strong opposition with the idea of a central processor, Chomsky and his followers proposed
a modular model. (ii) Parallel studies in neurology (in particular due to Hebb’s contribution)
and in computer science (connectionism) have changed our vision of the brain toward a net-like,
parallel processing device. I also mention that a further correction to pure classical information-
processing in both variants—the central-processor model (as it was understood by von Neumann)
and the modular computation model (as it was understood by Chomsky and Fodor)—is the
introduction of feedback circuits: This was the great contribution of the father of cybernetics,
Norbert Wiener.7
• From the perspective of a classical-mechanical physics, a strongly local and reductionist under-
standing of the brain initially dominated, in particular in neurology and neuropsychology. Later
developments have suggested the necessity of the opposite point of view, that is, of a holistic
understanding. This strong dichotomy cannot be overcome from the classical perspective. On
the contrary, quantum information suggests from the start the necessity to adopt BOTH points
of view and to integrate them into a wider framework.
3.2.1 Early (Classical) Models of Brain
As already mentioned, classical computation and cybernetics have determined early models of the
brain. Though these two traditions gave rise to the common scientific enterprise of cognitive science
and, to a certain extent, they also mixed and superposed, there are important tensions between
5[GARDNER 1985]. 6[VON NEUMANN 1958]. 7[WIENER 1948].
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them. Very early in the history of cognitive sciences, the brain and the cognitive activities were
modeled following these assumptions:
• The brain is centrally guided exactly like a classical computer with its central processor. We
have here a central regulation assumption, strongly supported by classical computation.
• Any cognition is symbolically mediated. We have here the symbolic assumption, a view strongly
supported by cybernetics.
• The activity of the brain essentially consists of computation, that is, of a syntactic and logical
combination of symbols. This is the syntactic assumption, again strongly supported by classical
computation.
As a consequence, like a computer, the brain was thought of from the start8 as a general problem-
solver. For Newell and Simon there are four kinds of elements in problem-solving: An initial state,
a goal, operators to undertake actions, and path constraints (on how many steps there are to reach
the solution). The di"culty here is that the size of the space of the computational paths grows
exponentially with the depth of the search (the so-called combinatorial explosion).9 For this reason,
it was assumed that human beings use heuristic searches,10 that is, employ only loosely defined
rules [Sec. 1.1]. For instance, Simon and Chase remarked that expert chess players had acquired
the ability to recognize large and meaningful perceptual units instead of serially searching through
their memory, like conventional computers do. Often, humans perform a means–ends analysis by
swinging back and forth between actual state and goal.
Another consequence of the above assumptions is functionalism.11 In this context, it su"ces to
say that functionalists assume that there is a sharp separation between hardware and software (as
well as between brain and body) and that several di!erent hardwares may run the same program
or algorithm. In the next part of the book we shall deal extensively with this kind of problem.
3.2.2 Cybernetics
Wiener gave the following definition of cybernetics: It “is the science of control and communication,
in the animal and in the machine.” Among the originators of the science of transmission and control
of information, Wiener quotes Fisher, Shannon, and himself.12 Three ideas were prominent for him:
(a) Cybernetics has to do with an irreversible time flow,
(b) Any process and control of information is based on feedback circuits, and
(c) Any control of information has to do only with the form (structure) of the signal, neither with
related physical quantities [Subsec. 2.2.1], nor with its contents.
All three ideas play an important role in this book. They allowed Wiener to interpret information
theory in a very original way that is consonant with the analysis developed in the previous chapter.
According to Wiener, in all classical phenomena where considerations of probability and prediction
enter, the problems become asymmetrical. In fact, one can bring a system from the past into the
present in such a way that one determines certain quantities (preparation), assumes that other
quantities have known statistical distributions (premeasurement), and then observes the statistical
distribution of results after a given time (final detection) [Subsecs. 1.2.7–1.2.8]. This process cannot
be reversed since, in order to do so, one should pick up a fair distribution of systems which, without
intervention on our part, would end up within certain statistical limits (a sort of fore-preparation),
8[NEWELL/SIMON 1972]. 9[HOLYOAK 1995]. 10[SIMON/CHASE 1973].
11[PUTNAM 1981]. 12[WIENER 1948, p. 10].
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and find out what the antecedent conditions were at a previous time (a sort of retro-selection).
However, for a system starting from an unknown position to end up in a tiny statistical range is so
rare an occurrence that it may be regarded as a miracle. In other words, one can prepare a system
in a certain way and then measure it, but not vice versa: Selection comes after preparation and
regulation, as I have said in Subsec. 2.3.2. We shall see the consequences of this important aspect
of the cybernetic theory of information later on.
Another father of cybernetics is W. Ross Ashby. He a"rmed that cybernetics is not concerned
with (mechanical) objects but with ways of behaving.13 It is a functionalist and behaviorist
approach from the start. Moreover, it does not depend on the property of matter or on the laws
of physics as such. Cybernetics stands to real machines as geometry does to extended objects.
Therefore, it is concerned with a set of possibilities: What are all the possible behaviors that
can produce a given result? While biology traditionally took into consideration the problem of
the available free energy for producing determinate results, Ashby, in the same way as Wiener,
stressed that cybernetics is interested in the form of signal exchanging: It studies systems that are
energetically open but informationally closed. This is in accordance with our previous analysis of
quantum information [Subsecs. 1.2.8 and 2.2.3–2.2.4].
Cybernetics also assumes that any dynamical process develops step by step (discontinuously).
This is another important point in common with quantum information, and is true for all biological
systems. A change is a transition from an operand (initial set or state) to a transform (final set
or state) induced by an operator. It is therefore a matricial theory [Subsec. 1.2.4]. When every
element of the operand also occurs in the transform, the transformation is closed. A determinate
machine is that which behaves with a closed single-valued (one-to-one) transformation. If the state
of a whole system can be decomposed in the state of the parts, we can describe it with a vector.
Not all transformations have immediate e!ect on all elements, and there are transformations in
which some elements are transformed in a way that is completely independent of the whole. When
the whole system can be decomposed in functionally independent parts, then it can be reduced to
these parts.
Focusing on the organism, we may define the environment as the set of both those variables
whose change a!ects the organism and those variables which are changed by the organism’s
behavior (it is a feedback system). However, before any regulation can be undertaken or even
discussed, one must be able to recognize which are the essential variables of the problem faced in a
concrete situation and which is the set of states permissible for the organism, that is, the organism
must somehow “know” what is important for its survival and what is its goal.14 Therefore, the
problems of any organism are:
(1) How to block the flow of variety by transforming it from a disturbance into variables essential
for its needs15 (as we shall see, this is the problem of teleonomic causation and, at a higher
level, of representation); and
(2) How to act on the environment according to these needs or representations. This is the issue
of teleology and information control on the environment.
Being able to solve these two problems, organisms are self-regulated systems. Therefore, cybernetics
provides the main systemic foundation upon which this book is grounded, and, as far as I can judge,
it is a very solid one.
13[ASHBY 1956, pp. 1–72]. This is in general an excellent introduction to the problem.
14[ASHBY 1956, p. 219]. 15[ASHBY 1956, p. 201].
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3.3 Information from the Senses to the Brain
Throughout the whole previous chapter, we have learned through quantum mechanics that each
information transmission or acquisition will be the combination of a discrete, local behavior
(information selection) and of a continuous, wave-like, global behavior (coupling). The brain is one
of those classical systems displaying both aspects. Indeed, it is characterized by two phenomena:
Information is acquired in a spike-like way, in discrete terms, while all global (processing) activity,
which involves many neurons or several areas, is treated in a wave-like way.
3.3.1 The Sensory System and the CNS
Sensation is how sense organs (of the sensory system) respond to external stimuli, while perception
is the processing, organization, and, in a wider sense, interpretation (initially in the sensory system
itself but mainly in the CNS) of sensory signals.16 Another way to understand the distinction
between sensation and perception is to introduce that between receptor (which is purely passive and
stimulated) and perceptual organ (which is activated during the perception process).17 Therefore, I
understand by sensation the pure process of information acquisition from the external environment,
and I understand sensory coding as the way in which our senses translate the physical properties
of a stimulus into neural impulses. This is necessary, since an organism can acquire information
only by a digital encoding process [Fig. 3.2]. On the contrary, as we shall see, representations as
well as other higher brain activities and functions are analogical. Sensory qualities are coded by a
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Fig. 3.2 An example of digital encoding. The color (RGB) cube. Color intensities vary from 0 (no color)
to 255 (full color). White can be understood as the maximal intensity of red, green (lime), and blue, while
black is the minimal intensity (no color at all). Some combinations are shown. Note that the human-vision
red–green–blue system is only one of the possible color coding possibilities. Theoretically speaking, also a
magenta–yellow–cyan encoding would work. (This figure is reproduced in color in the color plate section.)
16[GAZZANIGA/ HEATHERTON 2003, pp. 69–94]. This is a traditional distinction that can be found, for instance, in
[CABANIS 1802, pp. 103–5] [HERBART 1816, Sec. 73] [ROMANES 1884, pp. 125–7].
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Table 3.1 Possible reaction when the
signal is present or absent.
Signal hit miss
No Signal rejection false alarm
few receptors (coarse coding). However, most single receptors are tuned on single sensory elements
and properties. For instance, each taste quality (bitter, salty, sweet, umami, and sour) is encoded
by a specific receptor cell.18 Further evidence for sensory information encoding is given by the way
the skin works as a detection system: It is, from this specific point of view, a kind of computer.19
Therefore, receptors are specialized pseudoneurons in the sense organs that pass impulses
to connect neurons when receiving physical or chemical stimulation. This activity is called
transduction: It is a signal transformation through which the organism assimilates the external
environment to itself. At a general level, organisms are very selective in the way they interact
with external physical conditions.20 In particular, all animals show selective responses to some
stimuli (lower organisms show a sensitivity to a smaller range of signals than higher organisms
do) irrespective of the mechanical intensity of the stimulus.21 For instance, not all electromagnetic
energy causes visual perception as such, but only visible light.22 We re-cover here the main aspects
of information acquisition:
(1) An unknown environmental stimulus will be, in a certain sense, guessed [Subsec. 2.3.2] by the
sensory system through:
(2) Information-sharing with the environment that allows sensory coding and
(3) Information selection able to individuate the specificity of the signal.
To detect a stimulus requires an evaluation of its presence or absence, based on inherently
ambiguous information [Subsec. 2.3.2]. There are four critical variables: Signal, response, noise,
response bias. If there is a signal, a hit and a miss are possible, and, if the signal is not present,
a false alarm or a correct rejection are possible [Tab. 3.1]. Noise is therefore continuously mixed
with information in the brain [Subsec. 3.2.2]. The most e!ective way to remove or attenuate noise
is by averaging. Averaging is based on the concept of additive noise: Random (noisy) fluctuations
above and below actual signals will gradually even out as one averages more and more percepts.
Here, perception is considered as the extraction of forms or patterns from stimuli as if they were
signals embedded in noise.
I wish to briefly stress an important point upon which I shall elaborate in due course: Sensation
and perception are possible only because the perceived object and event are in an environment
[Subsec. 1.2.8]. Any perceived item is an item because it is an item against a given background.
However, for the same reason also without the given background, the properties of the item would
not be contrasted with anything else, and therefore would never be segregated on the background
noise. We see again the positive role of the environment whenever information is acquired. It should
be noted that in the proceeding discussion the word environment is not always explicitly used to
denote this fundamental role. Sometimes I also use the word context for referring to it.
17[GIBSON 1979, pp. 53–5]. 18[CHANDRASHEKAR et al. 2006].
19[LIEBERMAN et al. 2007]. See also [LUMPKIN/CATERINA 2007] for a review of the several mechanisms of sensory
transduction in the skin.
20[LEWONTIN 2000, p. 65]. 21[ROMANES 1884, p. 49]. 22[STOFFREGEN/BARDY 2001].
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The smallest increase in stimulus strength that can be detected is proportional to the initial
strength of the stimulus, i.e. the sensitivity is adjusted to the task at hand. The fact that
information is coded at the start of sensation accounts for the fact that there seem to be no
nonlinear transformations in sensation and in the first steps of perception [Subsecs. 1.2.2 and 2.2.2],
leading to Stevens’s law for the stimulus intensities,23 which represents a further development of
Weber’s and Fechner’s laws. It can be formulated as
S = kIp + c, (3.1)
where S is the numerical report of the sensation magnitudes evoked by the stimuli I, k is a constant,
p is the slope parameter of the function plotted in double logarithm coordinates [Fig. 2.6], and c
is the intercept. Our receptors respond to sudden changes and then they adapt (this is the basis
of habituation) to constant stimuli. Therefore, only the change is important here.
Since three parameters are relevant in neural communication of sensory information (modality,
location, and intensity of the stimulus), di!erent codes are used24:
• The labeled-line code that signals with certainty the quality of the stimulus (the type of the
stimulus, for instance whether it is painful or friendly), and
• The frequency code, i.e. by making usage of di!erences in frequency (it is good for the energy
or intensity of the stimulation: On average we only make about seven such categories25).
The location of the stimulus is determined by the spatial distribution of sensory neurons. The
labeled-line code is point-like, the frequency code wave-like. Obviously, as said already, the CNS
too acquires information, this time from the sensory system. And therefore, relative to the latter,
it shows all the above characters of information acquiring:
(i) The character (its survival value for the organism) of the peripheral stimulus (for instance,
whether a visual shape or an odor) is guessed thanks to
(ii) Information sharing with the sensory system through specific sensory pathways leading to the
CNS, and
(iii) Selection of some specific aspects of the sensory information that will be integrated in higher
sensory areas of the brain.
Indeed, as mentioned, all messages received by our sense organs and transmitted to the CNS
consist of streams of very similar impulses26: All information coming from the senses is subjected
to a digital all-or-nothing law—a neuron receptor either fires or does not—and all signals consist
of streams of very similar impulses that are further transmitted essentially through the same
mechanisms.27
Finally, information coming from di!erent sensory sources is integrated into the brain, and here
true representations of external objects and events are produced. The information integration in the
brain is optimized. For instance, the nervous system seems to combine visual and haptic information
in a fashion that is similar to a maximum-likelihood integrator28: Visual dominance occurs when
the variance associated with visual estimation is lower than that associated with haptic estimation.
There are two ways in which information is finally represented in the brain: Transient spatial-
temporal patterns of electrical impulses and strength of interneuron connections, which still changes
23[MOUNTCASTLE 1998, pp. 9–11]. 24[GARDNER/MARTIN 2000]. 25[MILLER 1956].
26For more on the subject of this section the interested reader can turn to a good synthesis like [GLYNN 1999].
27[MOUNTCASTLE 1978]. 28[ERNST/BANKS 2002].
978–0–19–960848–5 03-Auletta-03-drv Auletta (Typeset by SPi) 74 of 862 June 1, 2011 17:18
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 1/6/2011, SPi
74 The Brain: An Outlook
with time but has more stability. Therefore, in the brain there is a hardware, but no software can
be found, apart from the transient patterns. This runs against the functionalist approach and
deals with the tremendous problem of why the brain, though dealing with information, does not
represent the world in a codified way; a problem with which we will deal in the second and third
parts of the book.
To resume, any stimulus determines a twofold change in the nervous system29:
• One is the pure reaction (sensation), which gives rise to changes due to excitability,
• The other one is the result of an appropriate combination of stimuli and consists in the plastic
changes of the nervous system (perception).
Therefore, the translation of the external signal as a whole actually consists of an autonomous
production of the response to a given stimulus rather than of the pure “reproduction” of the
external stimulus30: The organism is informationally shielded. This is evidence for the generalized
Darwinism [Subsec. 2.2.6] I support in this book (there are no “Lamarckian instructions”). Let us
consider two examples:
1. Mammals like cats show spontaneous (endogenous) cortical activity—i.e. independently from
the stimulus—that develops patterns that are typical of orientation maps. This activity is not
random and has a typical cycle, in which there is not only stimulation of the nerve activity
but also periods of inactivity, a pattern that optimizes coordinate connections.31 The same
results can be found for rats.32 Here, the activity of running has been considered and striking
correlations in excitation patterns between running and REM sleep have been found. These
results have been confirmed by similar studies on primates under anaesthesia.33 In my opinion,
all this displays evidence that the structures here associated with vision are spontaneously
produced by the brain, then used and eventually reinforced, in the interaction with the external
conditions, depending on the type of feedback received from the environment.34
2. Another example is the computation of probabilities of events, which can be shown to happen
also in rhesus monkeys.35 In this case, neurons are able to sum and integrate probabilities
and likelihood according to the logarithm rule of product–sum. It is a typical stimulus-free,
information-processing activity.
I also observe that the connections within the prefrontal cortex (both within and between layers) are
far more numerous than the connections coming in from other areas, including sensory processing
systems.36 This means that there is heavy information-processing (as well as information-acquiring)
activity in the CNS, especially when endogenous activity (without referential and therefore
representational import) is developed.
3.3.2 Neurons
Let us consider the cell unity of the brain: The neuron.37 The following pages should be understood
as a quick reminder of some basic notions about the neuron that could become useful for the
following. The informed reader may also skip this subsection. In the human brain, there are 1011
neurons and almost 1015 connections among them. Contrary to what was previously supposed,
29[KANDEL 2000a, p. 34]. 30[VON HELMHOLTZ 1867, p. 586].
31[KENET et al. 2003] [WEST-EBERHARD 2003, p. 111]. 32[LOUIE/WILSON 2001].
33[PINSK/KASTNER 2007] [VINCENT et al. 2007]. 34[AULETTA 2002].
35[YANG/SHADLEN 2007]. 36[LEDOUX 2002, p. 188].
37[GOLGI 1995] [CAJAL 1899–1904]. See also [KANDEL 2000a] [LEVITAN/KACZMAREK 1991].
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Fig. 3.3 Essential components of a neuron: The cell body with its nucleus, the axon, and the dendrites.
neurons are continuously replenished in some areas of the brain and this turnover may play a
crucial role in learning and memory.38
We examine neurons according to their functionality, their anatomy, and their structure. All
of the body’s neurons are of three di!erent functional types:
• Motor neurons for controlling motion, mostly located in the spinal cord and in the brain stem,
• Sensory neurons for receiving sensory inputs, mostly located in the peripheral nervous system,
and
• Interneurons, mostly located in the cortex and mediating between the other two types of
neurons.
Anatomically, a neuron is composed of dendrites, which receive several inputs from other neurons,
a cell body, which integrates these inputs, and the axon (equipped with one or more terminals) for
transmitting outputs to other neurons without attenuation over distance [Fig. 3.3]. Many neurons
have a single axon. However in general, an axon branches many times so that the output will
be transmitted to many neurons, as well as a single neuron being able to receive an input from
many other ones. Many dendrites have little knobs that are called spines. Sometimes, axons can
be directly connected with other axons as well as dendrites with other dendrites. However, in most
cases the terminal of an axon is connected to a dendrite of another cell.
The signals are sent and received through a specialized structure that is called a synapse
[Fig. 3.4]. The synapse consists in a presynaptic membrane at the end of the axon presynaptic ter-
minal, a postsynaptic membrane (pertaining to another neuron), generally attached to a dendrite,
and, between these two structures there is a small gap (200 armstrong) called a synaptic cleft. All
the transmitter-gated channels are constituted by proteins. The information is transmitted through
small signaling molecules known as neurotransmitters (chemical signals mostly of the family of
amino acids) that are able to jump the gap of the synapse and be gathered by appropriate receptors
in the postsynaptic membrane.39 Neurotransmitters can also be biogenic amines (amino acids
enzymatically modified), short proteins called neuropeptides (they are essentially modulators),
38[GROSS 2000]. 39[DEUTCH/ROTH 1999].
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Fig. 3.4 Essential components of a synapse: Presynaptic and postsynaptic membranes, synaptic cleft,
together with neurotransmitters.
or a miscellaneous group including the first neurotransmitter discovered, namely acetylcholine
(ACh). Neurotransmitters induce a flux of ions.40 Ion (Na, K, and Ca) channels are ion selective
and fluctuate between open and closed states.41
Structurally, we mainly distinguish between pyramidal cells, spiny stellate cells, and smooth
(or sparsely spinous) cells [Fig. 3.5]:
1. The pyramidal cells are always involved in excitatory (asymmetric) synapses. Excitatory cells
release transmitters at their synaptic ends that, on contact with the postsynaptic membrane,
create currents that depolarize the postsynaptic cell. The apical dendrite of pyramidal cells
extends until the cortical surface, while the other dendrites (the basal dendrites) and the axon
grow from the base in a downward direction toward the white matter.
2. The spiny stellate cells are mainly excitatory. They are concentrated in the middle layers of the
cortex and are most abundant in the visual cortex.
3. The smooth stellate cells are inhibitory (symmetric), i.e. they release transmitters that hyper-
polarize the postsynaptic cell, diminishing the e!ect of depolarizing currents.
The tissue formed by the neurons is called neuropil—it is probably the most complicated structure
of our universe [Fig. 3.6]. The cortical tissue is composed of two types of cells, neurons and
neuroglial cells. The latter does not take part in the interactions between neurons, although they
may play a role in the slow modulation of neural function as well as for synaptic formation,
maintenance, and e"cacy.42 Neuropil has emerged independently three di!erent times in the
history of our planet, in molluscs, crustaceans, and vertebrates.43
As we have seen, unlike other cells of the body, neurons directly communicate with one another.
In the 19th century it was believed that this communication was mechanically produced through
the propagation of an electric impulse. However, it was shown by von Helmholtz44 that the actual
speed of transmission is too slow, and this in turn suggested that each neuron somehow mediates
40An ion is basically an element which is negatively (anions) or positively (cations) charged, that is, that presents more
or less electron relative to the referent chemical.
41[ALBERTS et al. 1983, pp. 651–92]. 42[GALLO/CHITTAJALLU 2001].
43[FREEMAN 1995, pp. 38–39]. 44[VON HELMHOLTZ 1883, pp. 663–79 and 881–85].
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Fig. 3.5 Interconnections between neurons, including terminations from the thalamus. Solid circles are
excitatory, open circles inhibitory connections, solid cells excitatory, open cells inhibitory. One can also
distinguish the 6 traditional layers of neocortex. The pyramidal cells are easily recognizable. Other neurons
are flagged by following denominations: Arc = arcade cells, B = large basket, Ch = chandelier, DB = double
basket, Ng = neurogliaform, Pep = peptide cell, SS = spiny stellate, SB = small basket. Adapted from
[MOUNTCASTLE 1998, p. 62].
Fig. 3.6 Electron micrograph of neuropil, a tissue including axons (Ax) which are forming synaptic contacts
(Sy) on dendritic shafts (D) or spines (S) and are intervened by glial processes of astrocytes (Ap). Also cell
bodies and processes of oligodendroglia and microglia can be sporadically present as well as numerous blood
capillaries. Adapted from http://synapses.mcg.edu/anatomy/neuropil/neuropil.stm.
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Fig. 3.7 A neuron is initially at rest (the inputs coming from other neurons’ action potentials are not
su"cient to activate the cell). After the activation threshold is passed, the cell’s own action potential starts
and is later transmitted.
and regulates the impulse it receives before further transmitting it.45 When a neuron is at rest, the
electric charge inside its axon is negative, while it is positive outside. The disparity between sink
and source establishes an electric dipole. An electric dipole is a pair of opposite electric charges
usually separated by a small distance. A change of electrical potential in the presynaptic cell triggers
the synapse to release a neurotransmitter: When it receives su"cient excitatory input from other
neurons, electric activity may begin through which the interior and exterior charges are inverted.46
An excitatory stimulus (eventually inducing depolarization) is made by positively charged ions that
flow into the cell (the source) and determine a negative charge in the contiguous extracellular space
(the sink) [Fig. 3.7]. Therefore, an electrical stimulus that exceeds a certain threshold strength
triggers an explosion of electrical activity that is rapidly propagated and amplified along the
neuron’s axon—the so-called action potential (AP). The grand postsynaptic potential (grand PSP)
in a neuron represents a spatial and temporal summation of many small postsynaptic potentials.
While the grand PSP is a continuous graded variable, action potentials are always all-or-nothing
and uniform in size. Following the emission of a spike, a neuron needs time to recover: There is
a period of 1–2 milliseconds in which the neuron cannot emit a second spike. This is called the
absolute refractory period.
Therefore, the synapse can be considered a converter from the input represented by the spike
train of frequency-modulated signals to the wave-like amplitude-modulated signals [Fig. 1.1].
Furthermore, the axon can be considered an inverse converter from the amplitude-modulated
45[LEDOUX 2002, pp. 43–45] [CHANGEUX 2002, pp. 14–18]. 46[KOESTER/SIEGELBAUM 2000].
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signal to the output represented by frequency-modulated signal, e .g. the intensity of the peripheral
stimulus is transmitted in such a way.47 Consequently, the signal goes through the axon of the
presynaptic neuron as a frequency-modulated signal, eventually passes the synapse and is converted
into an amplitude-modulated signal, then eventually, before leaving the postsynaptic soma, is
again converted into a frequency-modulated signal and goes through the postsynaptic axon.
Therefore, neurons also show analogical aspects. Also, from another point of view, neurons
can be considered as complex analogical devices rather than digital ones. Indeed, the fundamental
output information of a neuron is not encoded merely in the form of individual AP signals, but
also in their temporal sequence.48 Moreover, when the neuron is “at rest,” it displays a highly
developed, wave-like activity. Indeed, as I have said, it receives a lot of (excitatory and inhibitory)
inputs, although often they are not su"cient to overcome the threshold of activation. Neurons also
“talk” in between two subsequent action potentials. Specific intracellular–calcium sensors regulate
these interactions.49 Summing up, from the point of view of information acquisition (of the neuron
informational activation), the neuron can be conceived as a digital device, but from the point of
view of the way it treats and processes this information together with other neurons, it is rather
an analogical and wavelike device. As we shall see, this suggests that the brain as a whole is a
pure representational device that is able to treat information but does not make a general use of
a linear combinatorics, which is a necessary requirement for coding [Subsec. 2.2.2].
Excitatory e!ects that are passed to the postsynaptic cell are mainly transmitted through









Fig. 3.8 Excitatory e!ects are transmitted to the postsynaptic cell mainly through glutamate, while
inhibitory ones mainly through GABA.
47[PANKSEPP 1998, p. 82]. 48[ROEDERER 2005, p. 136]. 49[HEIDELBERGER 2007].
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Actually, when glutamate binds to the outside part of a postsynaptic cell, it allows a passage
to be opened through which positively charged ions enter the cell, and this explains the change
in charge when an action potential occurs (depolarization). The reverse is caused by inhibitory
neurotransmitters (hyperpolarization). The e!ects of neurotransmitters are often not a property
of the chemicals themselves as such but a function of the receptors to which they bind: The
same neurotransmitter may be excitatory or inhibitory. This is further evidence that a message
is selected only at the end of the process and not at the start [Subsec. 2.3.2]. Moreover, as we
shall see, any reaction of a cell to an external stimulus can lead either to a sensitization or to a
habituation. Sensitization operates as an alert signal warning that what will follow the stimulation
is not trivial. Habituation, on the contrary, operates as if the cell has learned that there is nothing
relevant occurring or no relevant consequences will follow.
There are not only excitatory or inhibitory actions but, as mentioned, some neurons are also
modulatory (this again shows the importance of regulatory aspects in information processing). The
function of the latter is not that of transmission but rather to cause longer-lasting changes in the
way in which postsynaptic cells respond to excitation and inhibition. The transmitters that act at
synapses of this kind are called neuromodulators and begin a cascade of enzymic reactions. These
e!ects (as the action of glutamate on NMDA cells) are involved in memory and learning.
3.3.3 Brain Waves
It is useful to briefly consider the di!erent brain waves, determined by populations of neurons
and denoting di!erent brain activities. It is a fact that inputs to di!erent brain areas are due to
local field potentials and are smooth.50 Thanks to EEG, we are able to distinguish five di!erent
rhythms51 that I shall order from the slowest to the quickest:
• Delta rhythm (0.5–3 Hz, that is, 1/2–3 cycles per second): Is characteristic of a sleeping subject,
the so-called slow-wave sleep (SWS). We probably have no (or very low) energy expenditure
during this phase [Subsec. 2.2.1].
• Theta rhythm (4–7 Hz): It is also typical of deep meditation, unconscious processing, negative
emotional experiences such as frustration. It is also typical of REM (rapid eye movement) sleep
(during dreaming). REM is an ancient mammal function. This reflects an active information
integration. It is interesting to observe that the electrical activity of the brain stem during
dreaming is the mirror image of waking (most neurons firing during waking are silent during
REM). This is a very important point, as we shall see. REM can be seen as a waking state
with behavior paralysis. During REM the amygdala is very active and the hippocampus exhibits
highly synchronic activity (probably reflecting memory and learning consolidation). It is the same
rhythm when animals explore their environment. This means that this activity is integrative,
and it costs energy.52
• Alpha rhythm (8–12 Hz): It is a rhythm that is typical of rest. It reflects a complete synchronized
activity of neurons and neuron populations, and is a sort of standby of the brain, that is, it
expresses its autonomous information-processing activity.
• Beta rhythm (13–30 Hz): It is a faster rhythm and reflects the sudden desynchronization of the
brain activity (the neurons no longer fire in phase) due to external stimuli impinging on our
senses or in general to our interaction with the world. It is probably the “a!ective” rhythm.
• Gamma rhythm (more than 30 Hz): It probably reflects high cognitive processes, perhaps binding
and decisional ones.
50[LOGOTHETIS et al. 2001]. 51[PANKSEPP 1998, pp. 87–90, 125–42]. 52[VINCENT et al. 2007].
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Fig. 3.10 Activation-state cycles of the brain and hormones. Adapted from [PANKSEPP 1998, p. 137].
The cycle delta–theta–delta rhythm (BRAC: basic rest–activity cycle) during sleeping is dependent
on the metabolic rate of animals (20 minutes for cats). It is interesting to observe that if the higher
brain is completely disconnected from the sensory inputs coming from the peripheral nervous
system (the so-called encephale isolé), it maintains the normal BRAC [Fig. 3.9]. If, on the contrary,
the cut is at the high midbrain level (cerveau isolé), animals become comatose and remain in their
slow-wave (delta) sleeping activity. Only after many weeks do modest returns of desynchronization
occur. If the cut is a bit postcipated (the midpontine pretrigeminal cut), there is a great deal of
waking EEG activity, even if the sensory information is still interrupted by this cut. This suggests
that waking is independent from sensory inputs. This is the ascending reticular activating system
(ARAS).53 Another interesting point is that REM is conserved between the encephale isolé and
the midpontine cut. It seems that REM deprivation compromises a mammal’s ability to learn
complex emotional tasks that are not prefigured in the animal’s evolutionary history, such as two-
way avoidance, which requires back and forth movements between safe and danger zones of a test
chamber.
53[MORUZZI 1949]. See also [PANKSEPP 1998, p. 132].
978–0–19–960848–5 03-Auletta-03-drv Auletta (Typeset by SPi) 82 of 862 June 1, 2011 17:18
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 1/6/2011, SPi
82 The Brain: An Outlook
Finally, it is interesting to observe that hormone secretion and neurochemical changes in the
organism are a function of cycling brain states [Fig. 3.10].
3.4 A Short Look at the Brain’s Structure
3.4.1 Structural Considerations
Phylogenetically and developmentally, the vertebrate brain can be divided into a hindbrain
(cerebellum, pons, and medulla oblungata), which controls basic functions of life (if destroyed,
then life ceases), a midbrain, which controls basic functions of awareness and behavior (as we
have seen, if damaged the subject will enter into a comatose state), and a forebrain (dien-
cephalon, cerebral hemispheres, and corpus callosum), which, in higher mammals, controls the
high mental and behavioral processes (for instance, if damaged the subject can show impair-
ment in problem-solving). In primates, the forebrain contains the neocortex. Di!erent cortical
lobes can be distinguished: An occipital lobe (the posterior part of the brain), a parietal lobe
(lateral on the top), a temporal lobe (lateral below), and a frontal lobe (on the anterior part of
the brain).
More specifically, the spinal cord is the place where the information coming from the sensory
organs is gathered and eventually directed to the brain. The spinal cord is actually the interface
between the CNS and body (it transmits inputs in both directions). Let me remind the reader here
how the CNS is constituted: The informed reader may skip these pages. The CNS is made up of54
[Figs. 3.11–3.12]:
(1) The cerebellum, which is essential for maintaining posture, for coordinating hand and eye








Fig. 3.11 Structure of the brain. Adapted from http://www.lifespan.org/adam/graphics/images/en/19236.jpg.
54[AMARAL 2000].
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Fig. 3.12 Magnification of the limbic systems. Adapted from [GAZZANIGA et al. 1998, pp. 81–2], a very
good textbook for this section.
(2) The brain stem, which is essentially the interface between the metabolic system and the brain,
and covers the hindbrain (apart from the cerebellum), the midbrain, and a part of the forebrain
(the diencephalon). The brain stem is then subdivided into
• Pons. The dorsal portion is involved in respiration, taste, and sleep. It also receives and
passes on information about motion.
• Medulla, an extension of the spinal cord controlling blood pressure and respiration.
• Midbrain, essentially providing linkages between components of the motor systems, though
dealing with some sensory information.
• Diencephalon, which consists in the thalamus and hypothalamus. Hypothalamus is essential
for regulation of vital functions, like homeostasis and reproduction. The thalamus is the
gateway to the cortex for sensory information and for motor information coming from the
cerebellum and basal ganglia. Its function is probably much more dynamic than it was
traditionally thought and probably influences the way in which information is dealt with in
the cortex.55
(3) Cerebral hemispheres, connected by the corpus callosum, with which they constitute the
cerebrum, consisting in
• White matter. It is functionally relevant for assuring quick and reliable connections between
neurons.56
• Basal ganglia and striatum, which regulate movements and are fundamental for learning
new skills.
• Amygdala, which is fundamental for associating emotional responses to world events.
• Hippocampus and hippocampal formation. The hippocampus is relevant for the storage of
new memories.
55[SHERMAN 2006]. 56[WEN/CHKLOVSKII 2005].
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frontal lobe temporal lobe
parietal lobe
occipital lobe
Fig. 3.13 The traditional 52 brain areas individuated by Brodmann.
• The cerebral cortex, the evolutionarily most recent part of the brain, as mentioned, has four
major lobes. Two additional regions are the cingulate cortex, which surrounds the dorsal
surface of the corpus callosum, and the insular cortex.
In the mammalian brain, the very deep folds of the cortex are called fissures and the shallower
folds are called sulci.57 The folded cortex between two adjacent sulci is called a gyrus. The cortex
shows several layers (they are conventionally stipulated as six in number).
The Brodmann model of the human brain consists in a parcelization of 52 areas [Fig. 3.13].
Sometimes the parcelization of von Bonin is used. It is very important to consider that the
human brain shows a spectacular number of di!erent areas even relative to other primates.58
Despite several e!orts to modularize the brain, which we shall consider below, it must be said
from the start that the common properties of all cortical areas are overwhelming. Neurons
are organized into radial columns. Columns do not represent pieces of a mosaic, but rather a
flexible, adaptive field of cooperative activity.59 Interactions are mainly local, otherwise they
pass through the underlying white matter. The cells must interact at high speeds in large
numbers, without giving up their local autonomy. As we shall see, this is one of the most
fundamental characters of self-organization. In other words, the microscopic, local activity of
single neurons (it is spatially and temporally localized, and stimulus-locked) and the macro-
scopic, global activity of neural populations (spatial-temporal patterns, distributed over the entire
sensory cortex, directed to the meaning of the stimulus for the organism) coexist. It is again
a manifestation of the complementarity between point-like local activity and global structure
[Subsec. 2.2.5].
3.4.2 Functional Considerations
In the cerebral cortex we functionally distinguish between the sensory areas, articulated into
primary sensory areas, unimodal sensory areas, posterior association areas, and the motor areas,
articulated into the anterior motor association area, premotor cortex, and primary motor cortex:
57[ABELES 1991]. 58[CHANGEUX 2002, p. 30]. 59[FREEMAN 1995, pp. 48–53].
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(a) Each primary sensory area conveys information to a secondary unimodal association area,
which refines the information of a single sensory modality. Here the information is processed
in parallel.
(b) These elaborated pieces of information are then sent to a multimodal sensory area that
integrates information from several sources.
(c) From this area there are projections to the multimodal association motor area, and
(d) From here to the premotor (secondary motor) area.
(e) From the secondary motor area the information finally joins the primary motor area.
Therefore, while the primary sensory area receives the initial input, the primary motor area receives
the final cerebral output. I stress that no prefrontal area receives direct input from primary sensory
or primary motor cortices. As can be seen after this short examination, the brain, though showing
global aspects, is not a single structure with a single function. It is also true that all pieces of cortex
basically perform the same types of transactions on the information they receive [Subsec. 3.3.1], so
that the di!erences among brains of di!erent species mainly lie in the number of transactions that
can be carried out concomitantly. One can distinguish60 between levels of analysis of information (a
higher-level question is largely independent of the levels below it) and levels of processing (although
there are convergent pathways, the convergences are partial and occur in many places and times).
Two features characterize this organization: (1) Feedback connections and (2) the fact that a large
number of neurons is almost always involved in information-processing.
In this complex elaboration process, the single stimuli are smoothed into an integration
process according to which it is the sensory area of the brain that distinguishes between signal
(perceptual import) and noise in the stimulus.61 The brain is engaged in constant, chaotic but
stable background activity—we have already considered the activity of neurons between two
successive action potentials [Subsec. 3.3.2]. The global origin of this activity is what enables a
microscopic stimulus to send the entire system through a state transition into a unified jump from
one pattern to another (often the brain is in a so-called metastable state). However, the action of
this stimulus is not simultaneous but begins at one point and spreads radially in a wave-like form.
A relevant point, as we shall see, is that this new pattern is only triggered by the stimulus but not
selected automatically by it, as far as it is also determined by previous experience with this class
of stimuli.
There are reasons to suppose that, between the activity of single neurons and that of the whole
cortex, there are also neuron assemblies.62 They can represent multiple dimensions of a single
behavioral event.63 Georgopoulos gave rise to an interpretation of an ensemble of neurons in terms
of a population-vector theory64 for explaining, say, the hand’s movement: Each neuron is assumed
to “vote” in its preferred direction—the direction in which the cell is maximally active—with a
strength that depends on how much the activity of the neuron changes for the movement under
consideration. Then a weighted distribution and a common direction are found. The direction of
the hand movement was estimated to fall within a 95% confidence cone constructed around the
direction of the population vector. This has also been analyzed in the case of rotations.65 However,
successive studies66 have shown that this model cannot account for hand motion: The population
60[CHURCHLAND/SEJNOWSKI 1992, pp. 18–37]. 61[FREEMAN 1995, pp. 58–67].
62[ROEDERER 2005, pp. 137–8]. 63[DEADWYLER/HAMPSON 1995].
64[GEORGOPOULOS et al. 1986].
65[GEORGOPOULOS et al. 1989]. See also [GEORGOPOULOS et al. 1992]. 66[SCOTT et al. 2001].
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vectors should be the sum of all cell vectors and should be congruent with the direction of hand
movement, and instead it is not.
3.4.3 Neural Plasticity
Until the 1980s there was a controversy between brain scientists and behavioral scientists,
because:
• According to the first group, the brain should already be fixed after childhood, while
• For the second group it was evident that humans and animals also show plastic behavior
in a ripe age.
In the 1960s, the first neural evidence was already available that in animals like cats there could
be some recovering of visual ability after the removal of parts like the entire occipito–temporal
neocortex and this was judged to be critical for vision.67 This recovery process is due to the already
observed circumstance [Subsec. 3.3.1] that the brain treats any input information in the same way.
It has also been suggested that sensory stimulation of animals previously deprived of suitable
environmental conditions (characterized by some anatomical changes of the neural connections)
will simply restore the permissive conditions of normal genetic and epigenetic development.68
There is also evidence that shows that active zones and neurons in rats “overrun” zones and
neurons which correspond to functions that are not active.69 Moreover, the connection along the
retinogeniculocortical pathway in cats shows a precision that goes beyond simple retinotopy to
include many other response properties (receptive-field sign, timing, subregion strength, and size).
This complexity in wiring suggests the presence of a developmental mechanism that can select
among a!erents that di!er only slightly in their response properties.70
Relatively recently, it has been shown that all parts of the brain can be modified through
experience. Michael Merzenich and coworkers proved that an alteration of sensorial input in
monkeys through training in discrimination of a tone at a certain frequency causes a modification of
the anatomical-physiological structure of the brain.71 Elbert and coworkers72 showed that learning
can also modify the neural structure (for instance, the brain of a violinist is di!erently mapped
in respect to a non-violinist). This is in perfect accordance with the result that memories are
continuously generated and replaced across the whole life of a mammal73 [Subsec. 3.3.2].
Other evidence of neuronal plasticity is that in neonatal primates visual acuity is six times and
contrast sensitivity at least ten times worse than in adults. Even if at birth most neurons are already
responsive to visual stimuli, the spatial structure of their receptive fields is extremely immature.74
The contrast sensitivity of individual neurons in the LGN and the cortex also matures in a way
that reproduces the improvement in behavioral performance (activity). Therefore, development
of spatial vision depends on visual experience. Although plasticity decreases with age, the brain
retains the ability to rewire itself throughout its whole life, so that all the maps of the brain shift
in response to their activity.75
67[SPRAGUE 1966]. 68[FUSTER 2003, p. 40].
69For a summary of the e!ects of sensory deprivation on animals and humans see [WEXLER 2006, pp. 39–83].
70[ALONSO et al. 2001]. See also [KATZ/SHATZ 1996]. 71[RECANZONE et al. 1993].
72[ELBERT et al. 1995]. 73[GROSS 2000]. 74[BLAKEMORE 1990b].
75An impressive example is represented by Bach y Rita’s experiments with teaching blind patients to see with their
tongue [HAWKINS/BLAKESLEE 2004, p. 61].
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Finally, I stress that transplanted cells in the brain usually transform to the type required
for the new location, but the older the organism is, the more cells become committed to their
identities.76 This shows that it is the context that determines the function of a neuron.
3.4.4 Selectionism versus Constructionism
Another important scientific controversy has developed between:
• A selectionist party, which supported the idea that, with experience, no new connections are
created in the brain, but some are only selected and reinforced from a pool of initially very
weak connections. According to selectionists,77 experience reinforces certain connections and
eliminates those which are not used (as we shall see this has a central importance for memory).
• An instructional party, according to which new connections are created.78
In a study supportive of the latter point of view, M. Stryker and A. Antonini79 showed that
during development there is a certain increase in complexity in the axons. As a matter of fact,
these structural changes are not completely new but are added to preexisting connections, so that
it is probably a phenomenon of quantitative growth rather than a creation of new structures. It
may be interesting here to mention that this growth occurs under the stimulation of synaptic
signals even if in a direction that is opposite to the direction of the stimulus.80 Further evidence
favorable to the selectionist point of view comes from studies81 showing that in the first six
months after birth all senses are connected in children, and only thereafter are some connections
interrupted.
Selectionism and constructionism could also be evaluated in relation to three parameters82: (a)
number of synapses; (b) axonal arborization, and (c) dendritic arborization. (a) has been found to
be very significant; (b) and (c) show selection but also refinement and specification of the structures.
This could be the consequence of the fact that axons and dendrites do not cover a specific location
but rather a whole area. It is indeed important to consider that information in the brain is mapped
with a high sensitivity according to similarity and connectivity of the stimuli. It is a form of
contextual sensitivity and perhaps a general representational principle. The order (permutation)
of a!erent connections onto an excitable dendritic arbor is indeed crucial for determining the cell’s
response to di!erent patterns of synaptic input. It is this spatial ordering that allows for pattern
discrimination. A true representation must preserve some “spatial” ordering of the represented
object, but what features are relevant here is dependent on the selective way we deal with our
environment. This shows that selection is not in contradiction to growth and construction, but
only that one should consider a larger region of cerebral “space” that will become more and more
determined during development. As I shall show in the next part of the book, growth processes
are fully compatible with selection processes (for instance, during epigeny).
3.4.5 Brain Size
Here, I shall make some general and final considerations about the significance of a large brain.
The problem of brain size has traditionally been overestimated. Rats have a brain that is relatively
bigger than ours and elephants have brains that are absolutely bigger.83 The apparent increase
76[GAZZANIGA/ HEATHERTON 2003, pp. 117–19].
77[CHANGEUX/DANCHIN 1976] [EDELMAN 1987]. See also [WEISMANN 1889, I, pp. 85–8].
78[LEDOUX 2002, pp. 70–96]. 79[ANTONINI/STRYKER 1993]. 80See also [CHANGEUX 2002, p. 197].
81[HARRISON 2001]. 82[QUARTZ/SEJNOWSKI 1997]. 83[DEACON 1997, pp. 160–3].
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of the brain in primates is in reality a decrease in somatization. However, a distinction must be
made here. Dwarf animals (like the chihuahua) exhibit slowed body growth only in the late fetal
and postnatal phases, whereas primates start out with small bodies and their growth is regular.
Humans are more similar to dwarves (there is a truncation in the growth curve). This does not
mean that we are dwarves, because our body mass has actually increased in the course of our
evolution. The fact is that the growth of our body and the growth of our brain seem to be distinct,
and the growth of the brain, in particular, is prolonged. Three points seem relevant here:
• By increasing size, there will be some fragmentation of functions, according to the rules of system
theory [Subsec. 2.4.4].
• Larger brains will be less able to rely on genetic mechanisms to determine structural di!erences
and more prone to proportional perturbation.
• The brain’s plasticity also means that the brain adapts to the body: There is no preestablished
harmony between brain and body.
3.5 The Stages of Information-Processing
In humans, there are four neural and psychological stages in the response to a sensory stimulus,
as shown by EEG84 [see Fig. 3.14]:
• Response to the physical qualities of a stimulus. This happens in sensory areas and the two
waveforms are called P1 and N1 (where P and N indicate the polarity—whether positive or
negative—of the waveform). It is the stage in which sensation occurs.
• The waveforms of the second stage (P2 and N2) occur in the temporal cortex and may reflect the
brain’s detection of the general category of an event. The detection of a deviant event enhances
the amplitudes of the N2 and is called mismatch negativity (MMN or N2a): It is independent
from the level of attentiveness. It rather represents an initial orienting of the organism and the





















Fig. 3.14 The four steps of information-processing.
84[KAGAN 2002, pp. 96–108].
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• The next waveforms are called P3 and N4, and may reflect the reaction to a particular event
and its initial evaluation. There is a big individual variation in this stage. A wave called P3a
reflects in particular the initial discrimination of an unexpected or unfamiliar event. Another
wave called P3b deals with its implications. This is the phase of the attention to the external
event, and also represents a highly developed perceptual processing.
• The late slow wave reflects the evaluation of the event and its proper semantic categorizing.
This is the cognitive work of concept formation, which is typically human and involves higher
symbolic and interpretative functions; an issue that will occupy much of the investigation
later.
The whole process is ruled by information-selection mechanisms. Selective listening experiments
have taught us much about the way humans select and pay attention to sensorial data. We shall
come back to the problem of attention in the next part of the book. For now, let me simply point
out some fundamental aspects related to the perception and treatment of information. These
experiments have led to three main conclusions85:
(1) A central, as opposed to a mere sensory, factor is involved.
(2) The e!ects vary with the number of possible messages that might have arrived and from which
pool the actual ones have been chosen (the rate at which the information is arriving at is
important).
(3) The capacity of the brain will limit the number of tasks that can be performed simultane-
ously; therefore a part of the presented information must necessarily be discarded. However,
information is not discarded (selected) at random.
Even if we shall recognize some of the limitations of this model in due course, these conclusions
are nevertheless for the most part correct. The relevant fact for information theory is that the
reaction time to a stimulus varies with the information conveyed by that stimulus. In other words,
the larger the ensemble from which the stimulus is drawn, the longer the reaction time. Instead, if
the ensemble is kept constant in size, the reaction time increases as the di!erent possible stimuli
are made more similar, that is, when their position is very near in an abstract information space in
which the di!erent stimuli are codified: It is easy to see that in Fig. 3.2 the unit 128/255/0 is less
distinguishable from the unit 255/255/0 (pure yellow) than the unit 0/255/255 (pure green) is,
and that the unit 192/255/0 is still less distinguishable from pure yellow. Note that both any new
or intense stimulus and high-pitched noise are very likely to be perceived (the so-called governing
selection).
3.6 Modularity of the Brain
After the first developments in the 1940s in cybernetics thanks to the work of Wiener and Ashby
and the early stages of computationalism thanks to the e!orts of von Neumann, Simon, and others,
the cognitivist school was born in the 1950s [Sec. 3.2]. It was characterized by several theses:
• Modularity of di!erent information-processing brain areas, against the idea of a central processor.
• Nativism, according to which most brain activities follow prewired structures and rules that are
inborn.
85[BROADBENT 1958].
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• Strict separation between syntax and logical rules on the one hand, and between syntax and
semantic contents on the other: Syntax was discovered as an intermediate level between pure
physics and semantics, and this seemed to provide a solid basis for cognitive sciences. This
assumption was rather common also among the computationalists.
I limit the scope of the present examination to the first thesis, leaving the other two assumptions
for a much later discussion. Modules have been defined as domain specific, mandatory, generally
not conscious (especially in their lowest levels of computation), fast, partially informationally
shielded systems against both background and external feedback information, having swallow
outputs, associated with a characteristic neural architecture, exhibiting specific and characteristic
breakdown patterns, and finally as having a characteristic sequencing in information-processing.86
All modules operate in the same way and essentially protect from disturbances that may arise
from other areas and computational tasks.
As we have seen, the di!erentiation and localization of specific activities is, according to system
theory [Subsec. 2.4.4], a general feature of any system that is su"ciently large and complex.
Modularity is an aspect of the general hierarchization of biological systems (as we shall see in the
second part of the book), and it may be considered as due to the tendency to autarchy of parts of
the system as well as to a parallel integration of the subcomponents of each subsystem (increased
information sharing among those subcomponents).
The assumption that brain activity, which is complex, is modular was quite common in the
early days of cognitivism. Later on, some criticism of this assumption was developed. It can indeed
be shown that the same frontal regions are recruited for a broad range of cognitive demands.87
Moreover, Farah88 has pointed out that there is no evidence supporting the assertion that damage
to one module does not a!ect other modules (the locality assumption), which deprives modularity
of its appeal. Finally, the big individual variability in the size and exact location of areas throws
uncertainty on modularization.89 Again, this is in accordance with the examination of Subsec. 2.4.4.
Perhaps a useful compromise could be the following:
(1) Modules (at least in mature brains) are mostly of a functional type, rather than of a structural
type (in the next chapter we shall see some evidence to support this). This means that the
modularity of the brain may well apply not to global systems (for language, vision, and so
on) but to functions (playing, exploring) and specific tasks (a modular circuit for riding a
bicycle, for driving a car), i.e. either on a smaller scale or more distributed than according to
Chomsky and Fodor’s initial proposal. In those cases, di!erent specific, say, visual and motor
competencies are integrated in a whole that, as time progresses and an increasing canalization
of the activity takes place, can even function almost independently from any other activity.
(2) There are also modules that are anatomically distinct and well localized, but this much more
for initial and mid-step information-processing. In particular, it concerns primary sensory and
premotor areas.90
(3) Modularity is a matter of degrees.91 If we assume that such a degree is also temporally variable
and depends on the task at hand, then di!erent modules may plastically cooperate in specific
tasks. This approach is also to a certain extent consonant with Simon’s idea of the near
decomposability of systems92 which means that interactions between elements pertaining to
di!erent subsystems or quasimodules are weaker than interactions among elements of the
86[FODOR 1983]. 87[DUNCAN et al. 2000]. 88[FARAH 1994]. 89[MOUNTCASTLE 1998, p. 83].
90[MOUNTCASTLE 1998, p. 87]. 91[SCHLOSSER/WAGNER 2004b]. 92[SIMON 1969, pp. 197–200].
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same subsystem, but are not totally absent. Let me provide evidence coming from studies on
attention, which proves that auditory tasks strongly interfere with auditory tasks as well as
visual tasks with visual tasks, but also that auditory tasks tend to interfere with visual tasks
and vice versa.93 These results show that a certain modularity is present but also that pools
of attention are not completely separated.
As we shall see, this compromise seems to be the way in which many neurologists consider
modularity today.
3.7 Mapping
The way the brain produces maps is a very interesting subject. Let me first say that there is no
mapping of one neuron to one external item, so that the so-called grandmother neuron (a single
neuron that should be associated with your grandmother) does not exist.94 In general terms, the
problem is the following: As proved by Edelman and coworkers,95 there are not su"cient neurons
available for producing the astronomic number of representations any one of us can have. In fact, as
I have stressed, neurons associate in functional groups in order to perform computational tasks96
[Subsec. 3.4.2].
3.7.1 Maps
There are two types of maps in central neurons97:
(1) Maps that reproduce (wholly or partially) the spatial relationships present in the peripheral
sensory epithelium or retina and these are called topographic or projection maps. The functional
role of these maps is di"cult to establish because the coding of spatial organization might not
be the factor determining their topographic organization. Nevertheless, as we shall see, they
play an important role in the first steps of processing visual information. Moreover, topographic
maps of the surface of the body in the brain are formed during development by projections
that become ordered, in part, through competitive interactions.
(2) The other type of map is called centrally synthesized, because they are the result of higher
cognitive integration activities. Here, primary sensory cells neither register nor extract the
location, delay, or orientation of a stimulus. The selectivity for these cues is created by neuronal
circuits in which the neurons forming the map are sort of nodal points. These types of maps
play an important role in representational processes.
Here, we shall deal only with topographic maps. We can take it as a fact that the primate’s brain
has a topographic map of the body98 [Figs. 3.15 and 3.16]. It is also true that there is no one-to-one
correspondence between, say, fingers and cortical-motor neural cells, so that individual movements
are shaped from more rudimentary synergies, such as those used to open and close the whole
hand.99 Moreover, neural territories controlling di!erent fingers overlap.100 Single primary motor
(M1) neurons are active with movements of di!erent fingers. The control of any finger movement
appears to utilize a population of neurons distributed throughout the M1 hand area.
93[DRIVER/SPENCE 1994, MACALUSO et al. 2002]. See [WILLINGHAM 2001, pp. 73–75].
94[CHANGEUX 2002, p. 51]. 95[TONONI et al. 1992]. 96[VAADIA et al. 1995].
97[KONISHI 1986]. 98[SHERRINGTON 1906, SHERRINGTON 1942] [GENTILUCCI et al. 1988].
99[SCHIEBER 1990]. 100[SCHIEBER/HIBBARD 1993].
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Fig. 3.15 Schematic drawing of the representation of the hand in the brain of owl monkeys: it is a map for









































Fig. 3.16 How the human brain maps the body. Adapted from [GAZZANIGA/ HEATHERTON 2003,
p. 111].
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The topographic (or retinotopic) maps should also be understood in dynamic terms.101 Indeed,
there is a certain evidence that the reorganizations of sensory and motor maps occur in all
major systems at subcortical as well as primary cortical levels102 [Subsec. 3.4.3]. For instance,
the frequency representation in the cortex of adult animals is able to reorganize in response to
partial deafness.103
3.7.2 Images?
Let us now discuss an important topic. The fact that the brain produces or shows maps almost
naturally implies the question of whether or not images in the mind are analogues of the perceived
objects. Three types of imagery have been distinguished104:
(1) Topographic representations of spatial relations (located in the posterior parietal lobes, angular
gyrus; they make use of motor processes),
(2) Figural imagery (located in the inferior temporal lobes: This type of image occurs when a
low-resolution topographic image is generated from the activation of stored representations of
shapes and other object properties),
(3) Depictive imagery (allows one to reorganize, reinterpret, or compare shapes).
Only the first type of image is relevant for the question above. Indeed, the existence of maps of
the second or third type above, which are both kinds of centrally synthesized maps, does not prove
that there is some analogy between representation and represented item, because ultimately these
maps only concern some further elaboration of the spatial relationships between di!erent stimulus
sources. Let us consider the case of the lateral geniculate nucleus, which contains a topographic
map of the retina and therefore of the external space. Now, if the neural map when perceiving a
leopard reproduces the spot structure, this spot structure is in itself only a spatial relationship
between “dark” and “bright” stimuli and reveals in no way that the object is a leopard, which
is a construction that comes much later in our information-processing system (as we shall see in
the next chapter). Moreover, topographic maps, like any spatial mapping, are subjected to typical
distortions and selection processes. Therefore, it would be an error to mix the representations of
spatial relations on the one hand, and the figural and depictive imagery on the other.
At an evolutionary level, there has clearly been a process of adaptation to our environment.
Now, adaptation has determined a fit between the objects present in our environment and our
brain representations. This does not imply, however, any direct relation between object and
representation [Subsec. 2.2.3]. In other words, the argument assuming that maps are pure analogical
reproductions of the external world is rendered circular. As a matter of fact, more elementary
species do not perceive objects as we do.
On this important issue there was a debate between Pylyshyn and Kosslyn105.
• According to Kosslyn, we produce images as analogues of things: Mental images are formed step
by step with analogical but partial correspondence to external structures and the parts are only
later arranged and integrated into the proper configuration.106 Also recently, Kosslyn107 pointed
out that visual mental imagery and visual perception rely on common mechanisms. A certain
101[GAZZANIGA et al. 1998, pp. 110–11]. 102[KAAS 2000]. 103[KING/MOORE 1991].
104[KOSSLYN 1994].
105See [BODEN 1988, pp. 27–44] [ANDERSON 1978] for reconstruction and analysis. See also [FREEMAN 2000b].
106[KOSSLYN 1980, KOSSLYN 1988] [KOSSLYN et al. 1990]. See also [KOSSLYN 1994].
107[KOSSLYN/THOMPSON 2000].
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Fig. 3.17 Consider the object shown in (a). When it is rotated at an angle of 20 degrees around the y axis, as
in (b), it is easily acknowledgeable as the same object. However, the task becomes increasingly di"cult when
the angle is at 90 degrees, as in (c). This shows that we somehow e!ect a mental rotation of a representational
image of the object. However, when rotated at 180 degrees, as in (d), the task can become easier, because
this configuration is apperceived as the result of a double reflection relative to the initial position (a), due to
the cyclicality of rotation.
evidence supporting this view was provided by Shepard and Metzler.108 They tested the capacity
to judge whether solids, which were actually rotated relative to samples, were the same or not
relative to the latter one, and found that the amount of time needed by human participants was
proportional to the magnitude of the angle of rotation [Fig. 3.17].109
• Pylyshyn pointed out that images cannot be considered as internal pictures of things [see also
Subsec. 3.3.1] because this would require a further interpreter, and so on ad infinitum.110 In
general, Pylyshyn showed that an isomorphism between an object and its representation is not
enough: It does not su"ce to specify a representation’s form; one should also specify the way in
which it can be used (a procedural or operational issue), due to the fact that the same form or
neural pattern can represent very di!erent things. As we shall see in the second part of the book,
this is a central point to any theory of representation. Pylyshyn further showed that images are
cognitively penetrable since they can be mapped to descriptions, whereas, if images are analogues
of objects this could not be the case. However, from this fact he incorrectly inferred that imagery
must be explained in terms of language-like representation. Nevertheless, Pylyshyn proved that
subjects may mentally jump from one given location to another independently from the distance,
giving evidence against a pictorial, figurative interpretation of representation and for a proposi-
tional interpretation of it111, at least for humans. This shows that to a certain extent Pylyshyn
was the representative of a traditional, classical computational approach to the brain [Sec. 3.2],
while Kosslyn was somehow in the distributed-processing camp, as will be explained below.
Summing up, even if images cannot be understood as pure reproductions of external objects, they
still cannot be considered irrelevant. If we abandon the strict mirroring theory, figural and depictive
imagery, that is, images that are built before or after perception, may be relevant.112 It has been
shown that the most modality-specific cortical areas activated by stimuli in visual perception
are also activated by higher-order brain regions in imagery.113 Images share common features
108[SHEPARD/METZLER 1971]. 109[BADDELEY 1990, pp. 71–4]. 110[PYLYSHYN 2002].
111[PYLYSHYN 1984, pp. 243–4]. 112[JEANNEROD 2009, pp. 103–14].
113[KREIMAN et al. 2000][FARAH 2000b].
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with visual percepts. Mental images interact with other visual and verbal task components as if
they were ordinary visual representations. At least some modality-specific cortical representations
perform “double duty,” supporting both imagery and perception, and these representations are
functioning in an analogous way. Indeed, in a very interesting imaging experiment performed by
Kosslyn and coworkers114 it was shown that there is a meaningful overlap between cerebral areas
activated during perception and by visual imagery tasks. This shows the insu"ciency of a pure
computational point of view, like that supported by Pylyshyn, and the important role of the iconic
aspect of representation not only in perception itself but also in the so-called iconic memory, as
we shall consider in the next part of the book.
During production of figural and depictive imagery, the direction of information flow is reversed,
and some of the intermediate, spatially mapped, representations are reactivated by (top-down)
higher-level mechanisms rather than by stimuli. An important di!erence between perception and
imagery lies in the automaticity of the processes involved in the first. One cannot perceive a familiar
object without simultaneously recognizing it as that familiar object (I cannot perceive a picture
of my mother without being simultaneously aware that it is a picture of my mother), but one can
think about familiar objects without calling to mind a visual mental image. This suggests that the
activation of spatially mapped visual-cortical regions from memory requires the intervention of a
separate, attention-demanding process, needed for image generation but not for visual perception.
Several studies have confirmed these results from another point of view115: Before executing a
task, metabolic rates have already increased. This e!ect should be due to the central decisional
system and in particular to an action simulation (where the motor output is inhibited). The
function might be that of preparing the organism for the concrete task much better than a mere
simulation of kinematic parameters would allow. Studies of Decety et al. 116 show that the brain
areas activated during motor imagery are the frontal and parietal lobes. The most important
finding of these studies is that to execute and to imagine an action are functionally equivalent (a
concept that we shall develop below), even if the network activated during perceptual imagery is
di!erent from the one activated during motor imagery.
3.8 Neural Communication and Networks
3.8.1 Associationism and Connectionism
The idea that the brain is a network rather than a central processor [Sec. 3.2] has a long prehistory.
I would like firstly to distinguish between three approaches: Associationism, connectionism, and
parallel distributed processing (PDP).
• Associationism is very old (its roots can be traced back to the English empiricism of Locke
and especially Hume) and it amounts to the idea that the results of cognitive activities
like categorizing and conceptualizing are developed by empirical association between sensory
stimuli.117 A branch of this stream is represented by behaviorism,118 with which we shall deal
in the second part of the book. In fact, it seems that associations can be formed following a pure
law of habit.119 Association by simple contiguity of the stimuli in memory storage is here the
114[KOSSLYN et al. 1997]. See also [WILLINGHAM 2001, pp. 286–7].
115[JEANNEROD 2006, pp. 25–41]. 116[DECETY et al. 1989, DECETY et al. 1991].
117[LOCKE 1689] [HUME 1739–40, HUME 1777]. 118[WATSON 1925] [SKINNER 1938].
119[SPENCER 1860–62, pp. 211–12] [JAMES 1890, v. I, pp. 550–71].
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most basilar aspect. Associationism is also the theoretical basis of connectionism and parallel
distributed processing.
• Connectionism is an actualization of associationism and can be considered a derivation from
Thorndike and Hebb’s contributions120: It consists in the idea that the brain and the mind work
as a network of units instead of being an analogue of a central-processor constructed computer
[Sec. 3.2]. In particular, when two elementary brain subsystems have been active together or in
immediate succession, they tend to recur together.
• Not all connectionist models are distributed121: They may use representations similar to those of
the symbolic approach that are called local representations. Distributed representations, instead,
account for the fact that there is content addressability: For instance, any part of a past
occurrence or scene may lead to its later retrieval from memory.
Relative to cognitivism, connectionism represented an important novelty [Sec. 3.6] in five respects:
(1) It is opposed to the nativist positions first supported by Chomsky, advancing the idea that
most or all of the brain’s activities have an empirical, associationist source.
(2) It is opposed to the idea that in order to explain cognitive activities one needs to assume that
the brain applies explicit principles and rules (like Chomsky’s universal grammar, which shall
be examined in the third part of the book).
(3) Any connectionist information-processing is context-sensitive, and for this reason it does not
admit a strict separation, again supported by Chomsky, between syntax and semantics.
(4) Connectionist networks can be mapped in (reduced to) a dynamical physical system.
(5) Additionally, for the reason given in (2), supporters of distributed models, in particular,
refuted the strict observance of information-codification models typical to any form of
computationalism.
Exploration of the last three points must be postponed to the subsequent parts of the book, since
they deals with the issue of language (Point (3)), the issue of complexity (Point (4)), and the
nature of representations (Point (5)). Therefore, in the following subsection I shall focus mainly
on Points (1)–(2).
3.8.2 Hebb’s Rule
Hebb’s assumption122 asserts that when an axon of neuron A is near enough to excite neuron B and
repeatedly takes part in firing it, some sort of growth process or metabolic change takes place in
one or both cells such that A’s e"ciency, as one of the cells firing B, is increased123 [Subsec. 3.4.4].
This also means that there is a time window during which such development is reversible (the
connection is not su"ciently strengthened).124 This is a further form of neural selection. Another
mechanism is when two (or more) a!erent neurons of the same order participate in the firing of
120[THORNDIKE 1931] [HEBB 1949]. 121On this point see [EYSENCK/KEANE 2000, pp. 272–7].
122[HEBB 1949, p. 62]. See also [ROMANES 1884, p. 35].
123Mountcastle has expressed his disagreement that this idea can be attributed to Hebb [MOUNTCASTLE 1998,
p. 234], pointing out that it was a shared belief at that time—rather he let this chain of discoveries begin with T. Lomo’s
work at the beginning of the 1970s [MOUNTCASTLE 1998, pp. 141–3]. I would like to stress that it is quite common that
a scientific idea is “in the air,” so that the role of the famous discoverer is rather that of a catalyst. This, however, does
not negate the fact that such a catalyst becomes the reference point for the future generations. This obviously does not
diminish Lomo’s role either.
124[HEBB 1949, p. 229].
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Fig. 3.18 Hebb’s reinforcement mechanism. Glutamate (the excitatory neurotransmitter) binds to both
NMDA (N-methyl-D-aspartic acid: an amino acid) and AMPA (Alpha–amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-
isoxazolepropionic acid) receptors. (a) However, it has no e!ect on the former because the receptor channel
is blocked by magnesium (Mg) that does not allow the calcium molecules (Ca) to enter the cell. (b) When
the postsynaptic cell fires an action potential, the magnesium blockade is removed, allowing the activation
of kinase that travels up to the cell’s nucleus, where several molecular processes occur, including gene
activation, which leads to the synthesis of a new protein which contributes in strengthening the synaptic
connection.
a third neuron so that they become finally interdependent.125 This is very important for binding
through synchrony.
Let us consider this mechanism a little, as it is known today126 [Fig. 3.18]. Postsynaptic cells
have two glutamate receptors [Subsec. 3.3.2], the AMPA receptor (AMPA actually mimics the
e!ects of glutamate), involved in regular synaptic transmission, and a NMDA receptor, involved
in synaptic plasticity (modulation). Presynaptically released glutamate goes to both receptors.
Binding of glutamate to AMPA receptors is a major way to induce postsynaptic action potential.
On the contrary, when glutamate reaches the NMDA receptor, it initially has no e!ect on
the postsynaptic cell because part of the receptor is blocked. However, when the postsynaptic
cell fires due to the reception of glutamate at the AMPA receptors, the block on the NMDA
receptors is removed, allowing calcium to enter the cell, producing a long-term potentiation
(LTP) as a result. Then, in order that NMDA receptors pass calcium molecules, both presynaptic
and postsynaptic cells must be active (NMDA receptors are therefore coincidence detectors).
Then, NMDA receptors allow the cell to record exactly which presynaptic inputs were active
when the postsynaptic cell was firing and, in this way, when coincidence firing is repeated, a
connection is strengthened. Less persistent and more persistent LTP is called early and late
LTP, respectively. Several parallels have been found between early LTP and short-term memory,
as well as between late LTP and long-term memory. While early LTP only activates preexis-
tent proteins, through enzymes called protein kinases, late LTP involves the formation of new
proteins.
125[HEBB 1949, pp. 70–1].
126[KANDEL/SIEGELBAUM 2000] [SIEGELBAUM et al. 2000] [LEDOUX 2002, pp. 144–51].
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3.8.3 Neural Networks
On these general grounds, let us now introduce what is called the neural networks formalism.127
A neural network is a computing system simulating the brain and consisting in a set of processing
units, a state of activation, a pattern of connectivity among units, a propagation rule, an activation
rule, an output function, and eventually a learning rule.
We must account for the fact that inputs into a given neuron are smoothly graded but the
response is in a binary code: Either the neuron fires or not [Subsec. 3.3.2]. Recall that, when the
traveling signal arrives at the endings of the axon, it causes the secretion of neurotransmitters into
the synaptic cleft. The postsynaptic potential (PSP) di!uses in a graded manner (unlike the spikes
in the axon) toward the soma where the inputs from all the presynaptic neurons connected to
the postsynaptic neuron are summed. Information-processing in the network will therefore depend
on two sets of variables only: The distribution of spikes among neurons and the list of synaptic
e"cacities (i.e. the connectivity between the neurons or the computational elements). The logical
structure of a single neuron consists in: The processing unit (the soma), where the i-th unit is
symbolized by !i, and a number of input lines going to the soma. To each input line a parameter
wij is associated, where the subscript j refers to the input channel j (connected with the unity
!j). The numerical value of wij is the synaptic e"cacy which determines the amount of PSP that
would be added to the i-th soma if the channel j were activated: The value 1 or 0, depending on
whether or not it is active, can be assigned to each input box !j [Subsec. 3.3.1]). The grand PSP





where N is the number of presynaptic neurons !j . The unit is eventually activated and passes a
signal to its neighbors. Recall that, in the case of real neurons, this signal is determined by both
the level of activation of the sender unit and the nature of the connection involved, which can be
either excitatory or inhibitory. However, this level of complication is unnecessary here.
Consider two input channels. If the output is a spike only when both channels spike, we can
represent the logical AND; if only one is required, we have the inclusive OR. McCulloch and
Pitts128 introduced a time variable, so that the operation of this machine can be expressed as the
logical truth function considering a successive time t + 1
!!i(t + 1) = "(hi > Ti), (3.3)
where Ti is the activation threshold and the function " can be 1 or 0 [Fig. 3.19].
Here, learning can be understood, in a first approximation, as a process in which the network
adjusts its synaptic e"cacies dynamically in order to accommodate to a certain pattern.129
In particular, it would be suitable to introduce a Hebbian rule of learning at this level130
[Subsec. 3.8.2]: The change of the weight
#wkj = #aj · ak (3.4)
127[AMIT 1989, pp. 1–96] [ELLIS/HUMPHREYS 1999, pp. 1–44], which are in general good introductions to all this
subject matter. For early mathematical models of the way neurons integrate di!erent dendritic inputs see [RALL 1962].
128[MCCULLOCH/PITTS 1943]. 129See also [AMIT 1989, pp. 97–214].
130See [ELLIS/HUMPHREYS 1999, pp. 17–25].
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Fig. 3.19 Example of a generic and very elementary neural net. The following values have been assigned to
the connections (the threshold is 0.5): w41 = 0.8, w21 = w12 = w45 = 0.5, w24 = w52 = w32 = 0.4, w14 = 0.3.
All Tj are = 0.8. It is easy to verify that: !1 is active, since w12 + w14 = 0.8; !2 is active, since w21 + w24 = 0.9;
!3 is not active, since w32 = 0.4; !4 is active, since w41 = 0.8. In fact, !4 receives nothing from !5, because
the latter is not active, since w52 = 0.4. After one or more cycles, the network will eventually reduce to the
connections between !1, !2, and !4 or be inactive. Suppose, for instance, that initially only !1 is active. It








Fig. 3.20 Hamming binary distance in a three-dimensional space. The distance from 000 to 001 is 1, from
000 to 101 is 2 (000-001 + 001-101 or 000-100 + 100-101), from 000 to 111 is 3 (for instance 000-001 +
001-101 + 101-111: Actually there are 6 di!erent paths connecting 000 and 111). See also Fig. 3.2.
of the connections is increased if and only if both units j and k are excited, where aj , ak are
the activation values of the two units, respectively, and # is a learning parameter. As we have
seen [Subsec. 3.3.2], neurons are essentially integrators of input information. Consequently, the
quintessence of the function of the nervous system131 is the ability to weigh the consequences of
di!erent types of information (and then to decide the appropriate responses). One can also measure
the distance between di!erent states of the network’s parts, each coded by an N -bit word. A good
measure is the Hamming distance, the number of bits at which two strings of informational elements
di!er. The space of all possible states can be represented as a hyper-cube [Fig. 3.20].
131[SHERRINGTON 1906] [KANDEL 2000a, p. 29].
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Fig. 3.22 Vectorial representation of linearly separable problems.
Rosenblatt132 introduced the concept of a perceptron [see Fig. 3.21]. The idea is that the soma
can receive inputs from much more than a few channels. In this manner the network can reproduce
some simple predicates of the perceived world. The output (which is true or false) represents a
classification of all possible inputs into two alternative classes. Indeed, it has been proved that
perceptrons lead to a stable classification scheme. The problem is that perceptrons only deal with
problems that are linearly separable, according to a pure classical computational point of view,
and therefore are not very useful when dealing with the typical representational problems that are
the object of the second part of the book. Consider the vectors shown in Fig. 3.22. It is impossible
to divide the vectorial plane with a single straight line such that the points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are
in one region and the points (1, 0) and (0, 1) are in the other. Instead, points (1, 0) and (1, 1) are
linearly separable from (0, 0) and (0, 1). For this reason, perceptrons cannot perform the exclusive
disjunction XOR or compute functions like commutativity or parity.
A further possibility is to avoid a single output and to have associated pattern pairs (or n-tuples)
in a matricial way, as shown in Fig. 3.23. Therefore, by making use of the vectorial formalism
[Subsec. 1.2.3], we have
132[ROSENBLATT 1962].
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Fig. 3.23 A neural net with several outputs. (a) The connections between units A and units B. (b) A

















b1 = w11a1 + w12a2 + w13a3, (3.6a)
b2 = w21a1 + w22a2 + w23a3. (3.6b)
or, in more compact notation [see also Eq. (1.19)],
|b! = Ŵ |a! . (3.7)
Another improvement is when the multi-perceptron is closed into itself, forming a feedback
mechanism.133 This is called an Attractor Neural Network (ANN). Instead of Eq. (3.3) we write
here
!!i(t + 1) = "(hi(t + 1) " Ti), (3.8)
where the value of " is either 1 or 0 depending on whether its argument is positive or negative,
respectively, and




Once a determined configuration of firing neurons repeats itself indefinitely, we have an attractor
(a stable configuration toward which the system tends spontaneously). A very simple example of
a physical attractor is provided by a damped pendulum [Fig. 3.24]. For an ANN, the following
assumptions have been done from a neurobiological perspective: The individual neurons have
no memory, the network has full connectivity, the connectivity is symmetric, the dynamics of
133[HOPFIELD 1982].
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speed
angle
Fig. 3.24 The attractor for a damped pendulum: Starting with a big oscillation (high speed and large
angle) it ends with a spiral trajectory in the dot representing the rest position (in general with the arm of
the pendulum in a position parallel to the pull direction of the gravitational force).
the network are asynchronous. A network state is given by the list of the simultaneous axonal
activities.
3.9 Concluding Remarks
Let me summarize the main results of this chapter:
• The brain shows both global wave-like behavior and local spikes.
• Also single neurons show a complementarity between continuity–discontinuity.
• We have considered that selectionism (the idea that specific brain connections are selected
and not created ex novo) probably represents the right approach towards brain development,
especially when considering larger areas of neuropil instead of single connections. We have also
remarked that the brain shows a considerable plasticity even in the mature age.
• The brain shows a certain modularity (especially in the way di!erent systems and subsystems
are hierarchically nested) that cannot, however, be stressed too much at the expense of global
behaviors. In particular, we have remarked the relevance of functional and specific-task micro-
modularity.
• There is no isomorphism between the brain and external objects, even if, in a more narrow sense,
we can speak of both topographic and central mapping.
• We have examined the associative Hebb’s rule: When an axon of a neuron repeatedly takes part
in firing another neuron, some growth process or metabolic change takes place in one or both
cells such that they can fire together with higher probability. This is the theoretical basis of the
connectionist theory of neural networks, which tries to reproduce the multipolar way in which
the brain works.
We have also considered several schools, like classical computation theory (a central-processor
model of the brain, symbolic mediation, the brain as an information processor and codifier);
cybernetics (the relevance of irreversibility, feedback, and information control, block of environ-
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mental noise and purposive behavior); the cognitivist school (modularity, nativism, and strict
separation between syntax and semantics); connectionism (antinativist point of view, explicit rules
as unecessary, relevance of context as well as the importance of having dynamical models; no
centrality of having information codification).
The peripheral sensory system codifies information and both the sensory system and the CNS
display information-processing activity. However, we shall show that the brain, in its representa-
tional function, does not codify information and essentially acts according to the rules pointed
out by connectionism. We shall also see that the brain is a complex system in which a correctly
understood modularity plays a central role. Finally, we shall discover that the fundamental function
of the brain is to control environmental information and to display an analogical representational
activity.
978–0–19–960848–5 04-Auletta-04-drv Auletta (Typeset by SPi) 104 of 862 June 1, 2011 17:18
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 1/6/2011, SPi
4
Vision
In the previous chapter we considered the brain as an information-acquisition device. In this and the
next chapter I shall examine two specific and very important aspects of the brain’s information
acquisition: Vision and how the brain deals with motion. After having redefined the di!erence
between sensation and perception, I shall discuss these two stages of vision in detail. Starting from
the first steps of perception, we shall examine both how an object is perceived and the specificity
of face recognition. Finally, some of vision’s impairments are considered.
4.1 More on Sensation and Perception
Up to this point, we have examined some general aspects and functions of the brain. Let us now
consider the specific ways sensory modalities process information. All perceptions can be classified
as (1) somatosensory perceptions, including smell, taste, touch [Fig. 4.1], (2) hearing, or (3) seeing.
The first modality is local, while the latter two are distal. Let us consider, in particular, the visual
system, though a few words will also be said about the other sensory modalities. This is not by
chance, since vision is probably the most studied sensory modality and surely the most important
one in primates. This will confirm in part what has already been said about information-processing
but will also open new perspectives that are worth further investigation.
It is important to underscore the distinction between sensation and perception:
• Sensation, as I explained above [Subsec. 3.3.1], is the pure process of information acquisition
from the external environment and therefore consists mainly of stimulus transduction. Let us
consider how visual transduction works. Since the eye is able to catch single photons, it is evident
that quantum phenomena must directly play a role at the beginning of visual sensation. There
are also other examples of the fact that biological systems, in dealing with light, are subjected
to specific quantum-mechanical e!ects [Ch. 1], for instance in photosynthesis.1 The nanoscale
dimension of the photosynthetic complex is indeed critical for light harvesting. Chromophores
in light-harvesting systems are densely packed, and the distance between di!erent molecules is
smaller than their overall size. At this scale the fine di!erences between the state vectors of
both donor and acceptor ground and excited states are crucial. Both are strongly influenced
by the environment. There has also been a discussion about the possibility that enzymes use
quantum-mechanical e!ects, but the issue is still under scrutiny.2
1[FLEMING/SCHOLES 2004] [JANG et al. 2004] [SENSION 2007] [ENGEL et al. 2007].
2[KOHEN et al. 1999].
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rabbit cat monkey human
Fig. 4.1 The somatosensory cortex in some mammals. Adapted from [KANDEL 2000b].
Fig. 4.2 Luminance as a function of the amplitude of the wave. The wave on the right is a superposition of
the two waves on its left (the three blocks below represent a geometrical projection of the waves above). If
the waves are relatively out of phase, then they can display more complex combinations with several peaks
and valleys. See also Fig. 1.3.
As a matter of fact, as we shall see, visual sensation can be seen as dealing with two
complementary aspects [Subsecs. 1.2.6 and 1.3.3], though it is not clear how the relevant e!ects
can arise in this context. The two complementary ways to specify a pattern are either through
measuring the luminance, i.e. the intensity of the light stimulus at many locations in which
waves of di!erent frequencies superpose [Fig. 4.2], or to discriminate between di!erent values of
the spatial frequencies.
• Perception, at the very least in birds and mammals, is instead accompanied by an expectancy.3
Moreover, perception is characterized by the awareness of further facts associated with the object
of perception—in humans, in the fourth state of stimulus processing [Sec. 3.5]. As an organized
reconstruction, perception tends to build consistent systems. As we shall see, any perception
in a human goes together with at least one implicit inferential process, in which the general
3As already understood by James [JAMES 1890, v. I, pp. 251–3; v. II, pp. 1–3 and 72–84].
978–0–19–960848–5 04-Auletta-04-drv Auletta (Typeset by SPi) 106 of 862 June 1, 2011 17:18
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 1/6/2011, SPi
106 Vision
characters of an object or event are reconstructed. Any perception of the relations constituting
an object is due to such an inferential process. This does not mean that this cluster of relations
is purely fictional.
Following W. James, I assume that there are two main principles of perception (as well as of higher
cognitive processes):4
Any perception is maintained and becomes a habit until it is contradicted by some stimulus
and therefore5
All that can be merged is merged and nothing is separated except for what must be.
We can further distinguish between the segregation of the object from the background and the
discrimination between several (at least two) objects. Subsequently, the second of the above
principles states that the level of discrimination is always imposed by some practical need, and
percepts remain as indistinct as they were, so long as no constraints force them to be otherwise.
The pressures that force to introduced further levels of discrimination can be of phylogenetic or
ontogenetic kind, but finally what does matter here is the ability of the organism to maintain an
adaptive level of control on the environmental information.
At a more general level (involving not only vision), the di!erence between segregation and
discrimination can be expressed as a duality between individuation and identification, and these
two aspects are reminiscent of the localization of the system on the one hand, and the ability to
obtain some structured percept on the other:
• Individuation means roughly to pick up a “black” dot in a uniform bright (noisy) background
or vice versa [Subsec. 3.3.1]. Again, we see the importance of the environment for individuation.
We shall also see that the environment is important for identification as well [Subsec. 1.2.8].
• Identification means to ascertain what this dot can represent or what survival value it has to
the organism, for instance whether noxious or not. Any identification is actually a recognition,
because, in order to identify an object, we must find out a perceptual schema among those that
have been stored in the past able to fit the percept.
Often these two aspects have been confused. They are, however, completely di!erent.6 In many
circumstances organisms only need to individuate a target and not to discriminate it. Take an easy
example: A killer who must shoot a given person in a crowd is given only the information useful
for individuating the target, for instance: The person on the left corner of the square wearing a red
coat (actually, a coat is not a property of the person as such, even if it is somehow connected with
her). Now, any other mark would su"ce for the killer if it were suitable for target individuation.
This shows that it is not the perceptual content of the mark which matters but only its use for
tracking the target. These considerations can be easily extended to many predation contexts for
most animals. Exactly the opposite is true when we need to identify something: We can do it only
by stressing the di!erent perceptual features that can specify the object. Therefore, perception,
when identification is involved, always implies a general aspect: The involved properties.7 Also
in signal detection theory we find a similar distinction between detection and recognition,8 which
can be reduced to the above duality individuation/identification. Detection or individuation is
4[JAMES 1890, v. II, pp. 288–9]. 5[JAMES 1890, v. I, p. 483]. 6[HARRÉ 1986, pp. 97–107].
7[MEAD 1934]. 8[SWETS 1998].
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sometimes strictly connected with a decision procedure, that is, with the procedure necessary to
give rise to some successive operation relative to the target.
We can resume the previous discussion on the most general grounds by saying that there
are two aspects involved here: Proximity (individuation, locality) and similarity (recognition,
wholeness). This duality ultimately brings us back to the quantum-mechanical complementarity
between locality and globality [Subsecs. 1.2.6 and 2.2.5].
4.2 Visual Sensation
Vision evolved providing organisms with distal control of their environments and relative actions.
The protein mechanism involved in vision may also be found in a kind of mobile algae. Euglena,
a single-cell organism that uses light as a source of energy, alters its pattern of swimming as a
function of the ambient light levels in di!erent parts of the pond or puddle in which it lives.9
Subsequently, light has been used more and more by animals as an informational source about the
environment in order to undertake the correct reactions and actions. With the further emergence
of cognitive systems and complex social behavior, a good deal of motor output has become quite
arbitrary with respect to the visual sensory input.
The eye was essentially a photodetector in the first stages of evolution. The most important step
was the detection of light direction (thus segregation comes first). This was accomplished by an eye
with the shape of a cup where light is projected on the back so that, by asymmetric perception (by
activation of di!erent neurons), the organism has a hint about the direction of light.10 Vertebrates
and insects have then developed independent systems for vision. The cells constituting the eye do
not vary with the size of the animal so that eyes can never be very small or very big. However,
there are anatomic constraints: In the case of insects, the pupil would be so small that di!raction
would render a clear image impossible, and for this reason they have developed compound eyes.
The single units are called ommatidia, each of which functions as a separate visual receptor. It
consists of a lens (the front surface which makes up a single facet), a transparent crystalline cone
of light-sensitive visual cells arranged in a radial pattern, and pigment cells which separate one
ommatidium from its neighbors. The pigment cells ensure that only light entering the ommatidium
parallel (or almost so) to its long axis reaches the visual cells and triggers nerve impulses. Thus
each ommatidium is pointed at just a single area in space and contributes information about only
one small area in the view field. In the following pages I shall discuss the mechanism of vertebrate
vision. In the case of vertebrates, the smallness of the entering hole of the eye makes the detection
of shapes possible by using their reflection properties, thereby allowing true discrimination.
Before explaining the route of visual information, it is important firstly to make some short
historical remark on color theory. T. Young and H. von Helmholtz established the trichromatic
theory of color11: The three fundamental colors are blue, green, and red. In 1878 E. Hering
developed the opponent-process theory: One type of process produces the perception of green
versus red, a second type of perception blue versus yellow, and a third type of perception white
versus black. There is a recent synthesis of the two theories12: If the strength of the excitatory
signal is greater than that of the inhibitory one, blue is seen; however if the opposite is the case,
9[GOODALE 2000]. 10[LLINÁS 2001, pp. 100–1]
11[VON HELMHOLTZ 1883, pp. 3–23] [VON HELMHOLTZ 1867, pp. 275–384]. See also [EYSENCK/KEANE 2000,
pp. 38–43].
12[ATKINSON et al. 1993].
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Fig. 4.3 Absorption spectra of the rods (R) and three types of cones: S stands for short waves
(mainly blue), M for middle waves (mainly green), and L for long waves (mainly red). Adapted from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trichromacy. See also Fig. 3.2.
then yellow is seen. Color constancy is the tendency to see an object as being of the same color
even if the color of light and all circumstances change. In general we decide on the color of a surface
by comparing its capacity to reflect di!erent waves as against adjacent surfaces. The presence of
diverse pigmentation in our natural world creates an environment in which the spectral energy
distribution reaching the eye of a viewer varies from location to location in space. Color vision is
the capacity to extract information about the di!erences in these distributions, irrespective of their
absolute energies. The perceptual result is a multihued world in which objects appear to merge
and to contrast by virtue of their di!erences in color.13
Vision is carried out by multiple specialized systems that operate in parallel. In the retina there
is a trade-o! between14
• Spatial resolution: Restriction to those points that are stimulated and, as a consequence, poor
sensitivity.
• Sensitivity to light: In order to detect lower levels of light the output of many receptors is pooled,
implying loss of local information concerning which points were stimulated and which were not.
We already see here a complementarity between localization of light sources and what, at this
level, can perhaps be called global patterns [Sec. 4.1]. The visual system partitions the image in
two ways: The one favors local resolution (through cone cells), the other sensitivity (through rod
cells):15
1. Cones have three di!erent photopigments which absorb di!erent wavelengths of light [Fig. 4.3].
The three fundamental colors define a color space that is the proper space of visual information-
processing [Fig. 4.4]. Therefore, cones require ample (diurnal) light.
13[JACOBS 1981]. See also [HILBERT 1992a].
14For the whole matter of this section I sharply recommend the textbooks of Farah [FARAH 2000a] and of Zeki
[ZEKI 1993].
15[MCILWAIN 1996, pp. 11–74].
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Fig. 4.4 The visual information-processing space. See also Fig. 3.2. Inspired by [LAND 1983].
2. Rods contain the photopigment rhodopsin and are capable neither of high resolution (the
discrimination of two close spatial points), nor of discrimination of the spectral composition
of light (at least two di!erent receptor types are needed). Nevertheless, they are able to detect
photons with low energy thanks to their mechanisms of reception and the fact that many of them,
in the subsequent stage of information-processing, converge into single cells: The (on-center and
o!-center) bipolar cells. Indeed, nocturnal creatures have an eye anatomy that favors rods.
The eye mechanism shows therefore a complementarity between individuating specific frequencies
and catching light in a superposition of any frequency [Subsecs. 1.2.6 and 2.2.5]. Since light is
mostly in a superposition of di!erent frequencies [Subsec. 1.2.2] but di!erent objects emit preferred
frequencies or specific combinations of frequencies, individuating a specific frequency is the surest
mark of a specific, local source. The fact that large sets of entities such as wavelengths are monitored
by a smaller number of basic features is an example of distributed representation [Sec. 3.8], as we
shall see.
The distinction between sensitivity and individuation of frequency has also been tested by
studying impaired patients. Patients with visual field defects in intensity perception were presented
with tests concerning radiation intensity or wavelength16: The test was about either (a) achromatic
target detection with di!erences in intensity only, or (b) both with di!erences in intensity and
red/green discrimination on a low photopic achromatic background, so that here both intensity
and wavelength were involved. While most patients succeeded in the second test, nobody did
in the first one. This confirms that wavelength and intensity are treated di!erentially in visual
information-processing.
An additional information acquisition is guaranteed by the retinal on-center and o!-center cells,
which are very good for contrast and not associated with any particular level of brightness [Fig. 4.5]
but rather with di!erences in brightness between the item they individuate and the background.17
In order to maintain a relative stability of brightness against di!erent environmental conditions,
the eye is probably able to compute three di!erent components of brightness18: The illumination
of the perceived object, the reflectance of the object surfaces, and the transmittance of the space
16[STOERIG 1987]. Note that wavelength is inversely proportional to frequency. 17[MCILWAIN 1996, pp. 75–99].
18[PURVES/LOTTO 2002, pp. 42–64].
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Fig. 4.5 Colors according to the three fundamental dimensions: (1) Brightness (V), the sensation elicited
by di!erent luminances (the local intensity of a visual stimulus), (2) hue (H), the degree of purity of each
of the 4 fundamental colors relative to the other ones, and (3) saturation (S), the degree of approximation
of each color to the central gray zone. Adapted from http://processing.org/learning/color/. Note that this
representation fits that of Fig. 3.2. (The figure is reproduced in color in the color plate section.)
between the object and the observer. Relative brightness is also important, since we need to react
to sudden light and to sudden shadow.
Apart from receptors and collectors, the retina also has ganglion cells [Fig. 4.6], which are
divided19 into [Fig. 4.7]:
• M cells that receive the input from a large number of photoreceptors (they are good for temporal
resolution). M cells are suitable for rapidly changing stimuli, and therefore for perception of
motion and for detection of sudden stimulus onsets.
• P cells that receive inputs from a smaller number of photoreceptors (they are good for spatial
resolution). P cells, being sensitive to the onset or o!set of light, play a role in object recognition.
This means that vision, in its first steps, is also a system for detecting dynamic and kinematic
observables along two separate pathways [Subsec. 1.2.4]. I wish also to add that later shape
formation (global features) can be obtained by integrating many di!erent spatial stimuli over
the P cells, while M cells are good for segregation of items.
Summing up, the retina already performs a significant computation before transmitting infor-
mation.20 This is due to the fact that the eye is directly connected to, and therefore can even be
considered a part of, the cortex (this is a sort of peripheral system included in the CNS, which
also explains its special relevance for the higher cognitive performances of primates) [Fig. 4.8].
4.3 First Steps of Perception
After initial information-processing in the retina, the signals are passed from the retina to the
lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), a six-layered structure of the thalamus [Fig. 4.8], where M and
P cells project separately (actually, as we shall see, the projections are threefold).21 Retinotopy
19[LIVINGSTONE/HUBEL 1988]. 20[GLYNN 1999]. 21[MCILWAIN 1996, pp. 100–14].
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Fig. 4.6 The structure of the eye on the left and a cross-section through the retina on the right, showing
three functionally distinct cells: Receptors on the right, collectors (middle), and ganglion cells (on the left).
The receptors are cones and rods (the di!erent cones catching di!erent colors), while collectors are bipolar
cells. Adapted from http://webvision.med.utah.edu/imageswv/Sagschem.jpeg. (The figure is reproduced in






Fig. 4.7 P neurons (a) are excited over a small region by a single color (here red light), and inhibited over
a larger region (here, by green light). M neurons (b) are instead excited by all wavelengths in the central
region and inhibited by all wavelengths in the surrounding region.
is conserved [Sec. 3.7], and, among many other advantages, this provides a common framework
within which the representation of an object at one location can be coindexed among disparate
brain areas. It is a true labeling, whose importance will be understood later.
Therefore, at least two pathways may be distinguished in visual information-processing22
[Fig. 4.9]:
22[VAN ESSEN/GALLANT 1994] [EYSENCK/KEANE 2000, pp. 69–79] [GOODALE/MILNER 2004].
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Fig. 4.8 The first steps in the treatment of visual information. Adapted from [GAZZANIGA et al. 1998,
p. 152]. It is interesting to observe that, while vertebrates rely on accommodation, binocular convergence, or
stereoscopic vision for obtaining three-dimensional vision, bees use the apparent size of familiar objects and

















Fig. 4.9 A very schematic drawing of the two distinct pathways in the visual information-processing in a
primate’s brain; the one processing the “where” information, the other the “what”. The parietal cortex is the
upper part of the lateral cortex while the temporal cortex represents its lower part.
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• The dorsal or magno LGN pathway, which is mainly concerned with motion and spatial
processing, that is, with the where is it? question.
• The ventral or parvo LGN pathway, which is concerned with color and form processing, that is,
with the what is it? question.23
Trevarthen, Schneider, Mishkin, and Ungerleider24 discovered that corticocortical inputs from the
striate Cortex are crucial for the visuospatial functions of the parieto-preoccipital cortex. Relative
to the inferior temporal cortex, however, the parieto-preoccipital cortex was found to be especially
dependent on ipsilateral striate inputs. Therefore, while pattern discrimination of the inferior
temporal cortex is dependent on inputs from lateral striate cortex, visuospatial functions of the
parieto-preoccipital cortex are equally dependent on inputs from the lateral and medial striate
cortex.25
The dorsal system turns out not to be deceived by optical illusions, while the ventral may
be, because the shape (the what) of the object must necessarily be independent of its distance
from the perceiving subject. Exactly the opposite is true for where-perception: In this case, a
strong perspective-like perception is necessary, in order to ascertain the true position of the object
relative to the body. In other words, vision for localization and action is viewpoint-dependent
and eventually uses short-living representation (due to the rapidity of moving objects or of the
agent), while vision for shape perception is the opposite. The ventral stream is therefore more
connected with memory and other long–term associations. Anesthesia has little e!ect on the visual
selectivity of cells in the ventral stream, suggesting that these cells are not involved in the online
control of the behavior of the animal. It is very important to realize that the dorsal stream also
takes advantage of the contribution of subcortical information.26 Moreover, reception of where-
neurons (parietal lobe) is not selective while reception of what-neurons (inferior temporal lobe)
is highly selective. Although there are mediators between these two functions and both channels
contribute each to both ventral and dorsal streams27 (but, obviously, most of the inputs to the
dorsal stream are magno in origin), it remains true that the transformations carried out in the
ventral (or occipitotemporal) stream allow the formation of cognitive representations, while those
in the dorsal stream allow for the formation of goal-directed actions.28 The fact that here we have
two independent systems is also supported by the study of some vision impairments: Akinetopsia
is an impairment of motion perception, while visual agnosia is an impairment of shape recognition.
Specifically, since the ventral stream is associated with awareness (while the dorsal is not), this
also explains a specific type of visual agnosia: Apperceptive agnosia.29 Below, we shall consider
several forms of visual impairment.
This organization of vision is due to the specific nature of light. However, a similar segregation
in information-acquiring and processing is performed by the auditory apparatus, only that the
localization is obtained here by comparing the sound perceived by the two ears. This is mainly
studied for animals like owls and is not very well understood in the case of humans.
The major cortical path of visual information from the LGN is to the primary visual cortex
(area 17 or V1). The world is topographically mapped in V1 in a smooth and continuous manner
at the macroscopic level [Subsec. 3.7.1] while it is jittery and occasionally discontinuous on the
microscopic scale.30 Sometimes it is assumed that no significant transformation of the retinal input
23See also [BLYTHE et al. 1986] [WILSON et al. 1993].
24[TREVARTHEN 1968] [SCHNEIDER 1969] [MISHKIN/UNGERLEIDER 1982, UNGERLEIDER/MISHKIN 1982].
25This model is rather an oversimplification [DEYOE/VAN ESSEN 1988], that we shall partly correct below.
26[JACOB/JEANNEROD 2003, p. 3]. 27[MILNER/GOODALE 1995, pp. 25–66].
28[GOODALE/HUMPHREY 1998, p. 186]. 29[GOODALE 1995]. 30[KOCH 2004, p. 78].
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(a) (b)
Fig. 4.10 (a) Columnar organization in the TE area of the temporal neocortex (the modules’ size is about
400 µm in the horizontal dimension). (b) Neurons in adjacent modules of the same area respond to di!erent
but related stimulus features, and on this basis two or three may be linked into larger modules. Adapted from
[TANAKA 1996].
occurs in the LGN. However, the forward projection from the LGN to the primary visual cortex
is paralleled by a massive cortical feedback (in cats, ten times more fibers project back from V1
to the LGN than forward).31
In the passage from the LGN to the cortex,32 two further categories of receptive structures
add to the center-surround cells: (1) Simple cells, which respond to edges at particular locations
and orientations (they are very important for motion perception), and (2) the so-called complex
cells, which respond to information that is partly independent from location. This is a process of
increasing specificity with respect to the form and increasing generality with respect to the viewing
condition. Let us consider these two aspects [Fig. 4.10]:
(1) Hubel and Wiesel documented a highly systematic anatomical organization in the primary
cortex:33 There are columns with the same selective orientation34 [Fig. 4.11]. Superimposed
on this organization is a preference for ocular dominance (left or right eye). It takes about
18 or 20 columns to represent all orientations for both eyes, and this aggregate is called a
hypercolumn. Each hypercolumn encodes information about a small sector of the retina, and
adjacent hypercolumns represent neighboring sectors. Then, three di!erent stimulus dimensions
are simultaneously encoded here: Which eye sent the input, orientation, and retinotopic
localization. However, the sequential information-processing hypothesis of Hubel and Wiesel,35
according to which simple cells detecting edges give the input to complex cells that detect lines,
and these to hypercomplex cells that are line segment detectors, was nullified when it was shown
31[KOCH 2004, p. 59]. 32[MCILWAIN 1996, pp. 115–38].
33[HUBEL/WIESEL 1962]. Actually, the first hypothesis of a columnar organization of the cortex was formulated in
[MOUNTCASTLE 1957].
34[GRAY/SINGER 1989]. 35[HUBEL/WIESEL 1977].
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Fig. 4.11 Depiction of the organization of orientation selectivity and ocular dominance in the primary visual
cortex. Inspired by [FARAH 2000a, p. 22].
that the predicted order of latency (the time in which the information is handed over) was
not in accordance with their model.36 Thus our knowledge of the brain’s anatomy is then
essentially clueless about the functionality, and this is the reason why the strict reductionist
program is unlikely to work.
(2) In layers 2 and 3 there are other cells called blobs, which are located in the centers of local
dominance columns. Blobs are suitable for color perception. Interblobs are good at tuning for
high spatial frequencies and binocularity. They are good for shape perception. Both blobs and
interblobs are the continuation of P processes. Blobs project to the visual area V2 (secondary
visual cortex, area 18, also called prestriate cortex), which also has color-selective responses,
which in turn project to the area V4. Objects’ color depends on both the spectral reflectance of
the surfaces and the composition of the incident light. The visual system is able to attain color
constancy in V4 with the use of so-called Mondrian patterns, whose perceived color appears
constant with varying illumination as long as the illumination is homogeneous. The visual
activity is no longer dependent on wavelength. Instead, many V4 neurons respond to the color
of the Mondrian patch and are not influenced by changes of illumination.37 Summing up, the
whole network can be cast as in Fig. 4.12.
4.4 Higher-Level Visual Perception
4.4.1 Loss of Retinotopy
In passing from the retina to higher visual areas which provide visual representations of objects,
there is an increase in receptive field size. Both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms are at
play38 in a reversed Bayesian inference that will occupy us later on. In particular, when arriving
at the visual association cortex (extrastriate visual cortex) the previous topographic organization
of information (maintained up to the primary visual cortex, V1) breaks down [Subsec. 3.4.2]:
• The receptive fields of cortical neurons of V1 are less than a degree of visual angle (as are the
receptive fields of the corresponding retinal ganglion cells and LGN neurons), while neurons in
the extrastriate cortical areas have receptive fields often covering a substantial fraction of the
entire visual field (up to 180! horizontally and 130! vertically) [Fig. 4.13].39 The point is that
up to the primary visual cortex the information is hierarchically organized and therefore also
36[FREEMAN 1995, p. 54]. 37[NEWSOME/PARÉ 1988].
38[LEE/MUMFORD 2003] [YUILLE/KERSTEN 2006]. 39[PURVES/LOTTO 2002, pp. 33–7].
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Fig. 4.12 Hierarchical organization of concurrent processing streams in the macaque monkey. Boxes repre-
sent visual areas, compartments within an area, and subcortical centers; solid lines represent major connections
between structures (usually reciprocal pathways); and icons represent characteristic neurophysiological prop-
erties. Subcortical streams in the retina and lateral geniculate nucleus (LCN) include the magnocellular (M)
and parvocellular (P) streams (gray and pink, respectively: see the color plate; the koniocellular stream,
present in the source paper but poorly understood, is not shown here). Cortical streams at early and
intermediate stages include the magno-dominated (MD), blob-dominated (BD), and the interblob-dominated
(ID) streams (red, green, and blue, respectively). The PP complex is shown in orange. The IT complex
includes posterior inferotemporal areas (PIT), which are components of the BD and ID streams, and central
and anterior areas (CIT and AIT). Adapted from [VAN ESSEN/GALLANT 1994]. (This figure is reproduced
in color in the color plate section.)
serially, while, in the passage from the LGN to the cortex, we observe a progressive fragmentation
of the information (recall the organization in columns and hypercolumns), which is a clear index
of the beginning of parallel information-processing [Sec. 3.8]. Moreover, it is interesting to note
that the neglected region of space is not coded in purely retinal terms (for instance, by neglecting
everything that is on the left of the center of gaze), but depends on the direction of the head
and body or on the focus of attention.40
• Another important aspect to consider here is the feedback from these higher cortical areas to
the areas V1 and V2. I have already remarked upon a similar feedback from V1 to the LGN
40[KOCH 2004, p. 182].
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Fig. 4.13 Visual receptive fields in the primary visual cortex and in the extrastriate cortex. Adapted from
[PURVES/LOTTO 2002, p. 36].
[Sec. 4.3]. This feedback as a whole will act in particular on the slow P neurons and will already
have carved out the local analysis by means of a more global interpretation.41
• Finally, information of di!erent types and coming from di!erent sources is integrated into the
higher areas. It has indeed been proved42 that in the inferotemporal cortex (where form and
color are processed) the analysis of the visual stimuli is not complex enough to specify objects
on the basis of a single neuron, but groups of cells bringing di!erent visual features are necessary
in order to perform such a specification. Here, we find again a modular, columnar organization
as above. However, the combination of information coming from di!erent sources confers a new
meaning on this organization. Here, we have the beginning of what we shall call, in the next part
of the book, representation, which is no longer organized according to the linear combinatorics
of information-processing but to new forms of nonlinear integration.
Therefore, when perceiving an object we must bind several stimuli referred to it. There are two
methods for binding: Convergence of axonal projections (into a neuron) and dynamic selection
due to temporal cues, in particular to synchrony [Subsec. 3.8.2]. The latter may be provided by
a sequence of stimuli but is also endogenous.43 The role of synchronization for binding has not
been fully proven (it is indeed di"cult to infer causality from correlation, and sometimes it is
impossible, as in quantum mechanics [Subsec. 1.3.2]). Recently, the idea has been supported that,
for binding form and shape, awareness is a necessary condition.44 However, as I shall show in the
next chapters, this is not necessarily the case.
The main modifications in object perception are due to45: Viewing positions, photometric
e!ects, object settings (in di!erent backgrounds), and shape changes. One of the most important
features for distinguishing between di!erent objects is depth. The cues for depth are occlusion,
relative size, familiar size, and linear perspective. Another important feature is relative motion:
41[BULLIER 2001]. See also [JACOB/JEANNEROD 2003, pp. 57–61]. 42[TANAKA et al. 1991].
43[SINGER 1999] [VON DER MALSBURG 1985]. 44[MATTINGLEY et al. 2001] [ROBERTSON 2001].
45[ULLMAN 1996].
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We tend to infer that two aggregates are di!erent objects when they are in relative motion to one
another. However, the form (shape) seems to be the most salient cue for object recognition. Object
perception is also characterized by constancy: The apparent size and shape of an object do not
change when the object is in motion.
The di"culty in perceiving objects is that there is an infinite number of three-dimensional
possible configurations in the world that would give rise to the same pattern of stimulation on
the retina.46 Moreover, there is an infinite number of three-dimensional possible configurations
of a single object: This can be seen by performing rotations of a given object about di!erent
angles along any of the three Cartesian axes [cf. Fig. 3.17]. It has been proved that, under normal
circumstances, the changes induced by variations in viewing conditions of the same individual can
be larger than the di!erences between distinct individuals. Therefore it is impossible to rely on
simple image comparison and on pure association.
4.4.2 Elements of Objects
Visual recognition of objects therefore presents a really big explanatory problem, and many
solutions have been proposed.47 At one extreme we have the idea that we associate images directly
with identified objects (strong dependence on viewing conditions) [see also Subsec. 3.7.2], at
the other, the opinion that vision is completely independent of viewing conditions. The direct
approach presents the problem that it relies on a simple notion of similarity—for instance, the
Hamming distance between vectors [Fig. 3.20]. Now, the space of all perspectives on all objects
would be prohibitively large, and in general the image to be recognized will never be su"ciently
similar to images seen in the past.48 Moreover, absolutizing the view-dependent aspect would run
against experimental evidence. For instance, the Drosophila perceives some environmental details
independently of the solid angle under which they have been perceived.49 A mix of both approaches
seems reasonable: We are dependent on viewing conditions but are able to transform our images
in order to catch some invariants.
Essentially, in view-independent explanations there are two methods for facing the problem of
the variety of viewing conditions in object representation50:
• The search for invariant properties. This will not work in many cases. For instance, in order to
distinguish between a fox and a dog one needs a more precise description of the shapes rather
than a restricted set of basic invariant properties. Moreover, there is no reason to assume the
existence of relatively simple properties that are preserved across possible transformations. It
is also impossible to find a set of invariant measurements that are independent of the viewing
position: They must be tailored to the set of objects that need to be recognized.
• The part description introduced by Marr. Marr has built a computational theory of vision
centered on the concept of visual description.51 According to him, there are three major kinds
of representation:
(1) Primal sketch, a two-dimensional description of the main light-intensity changes in the visual
input, including information about edges, contours, and blobs (essentially the content of
Secs. 4.2–4.3). A first raw primal sketch consists of light intensities at the di!erent pixels.
Since this continuously fluctuates, several descriptions are needed. A full primal sketch is
constituted when a label is given to any set of grouped elements (Gestalt principles are used
46[GAZZANIGA/ HEATHERTON 2003, pp. 143–59]. 47[FARAH 2000a] [EYSENCK/KEANE 2000, pp. 83–96].
48[ULLMAN 1996]. 49[LIU et al. 2006]. 50[ULLMAN 1996]. 51[MARR 1982].
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here), and ambiguities are resolved only when there is convincing evidence as to what the
appropriate solution is.
(2) 2 and 1/2-dimensional sketch: This incorporates a description of the depth and orientation
of visible surfaces. Both sketch (1) and (2) are observer-dependent. A range map with local
point-by-point depth information is constructed. Then the information of several maps is
combined.
(3) 3D model description: Three-dimensional and viewpoint-invariant descriptions of shapes and
relative positions of objects.
There are five criteria for this description:52 (1) Accessibility, (2) scope, (3) uniqueness,
(4) stability, and (5) sensitivity to di!erent shapes. The primitive units that Marr proposed
for describing objects are cylinders having a major axis [Fig. 4.14(a)]. The concavities are used
to divide the visual image into segments.
There is some experimental evidence for Marr’s sketches.53 For instance, the anterior part of
the macaque inferior temporal cortex, area TE, shows that neurons selective for 3D shapes are
concentrated in the lower bank of the superior temporal sulcus, whereas neurons in the lateral TE
are generally unselective for 3D shapes but selective for 2D shapes.54 However, there are also some
di"culties:
• Often objects are distinguishable not because of a di!erent arrangement of the parts but because
of detailed di!erences at specific locations. As we shall see, this is the issue of the distinctive
mark.
• Not all objects are easily decomposable into parts (a sleeping cat, for example).
• Perception can be seen as a process in which sensory information, context, and expectation
are combined to create the analogue of a hypothesis relative to an object. For this reason, a
step-by-step process as envisaged by Marr does not accurately reflect the whole process of visual
perception (as already remarked in Sec. 4.3), even if it remains true that the sketch describes
the first steps or later particular substeps in a relatively good way. For instance, faces can be
recognized without information about a three-dimensional layout, implying that the analysis of
the three-dimensional form is not a necessary step for discriminating faces.55
• The visual system probably makes use of di!erent types of shape units in order to construct
complex structures. If this is true, we do not need a single microshape (like cylinders). In fact,
Portland has extended this theory with the superquadrix proposal, and Biederman56 showed
that there are at least 36 basic geometric shapes (called geons) [Fig. 4.14(b)–(c)].
• The same geon should be used, for instance, in perceiving all cups, whereas we are indeed able to
identify THE cup we normally use. Furthermore, perception consists in identifying the general
configuration of objects, which is not the mere assemblage of parts, as we shall see.
Explanations of this kind have perhaps deemphasized the perception of singular objects and the
environmental context of perception a little too much. In other words, they should be combined
and corrected with viewpoint-dependent theories.57 It seems that viewpoint-invariant mecha-
nisms (like those envisaged by Marr and Biederman) are used in easy categorical discrimination
tasks, whereas viewpoint-dependent mechanisms are used when the task requires hard, within-
category discrimination, especially when we are confronted with new objects. There is then a
52[MARR/NISHIHARA 1978]. 53[BOOTH/ROLLS 1998]. 54[JANSSEN et al. 2000].
55[PASHLER 1998, p. 78]. 56[BIEDERMAN 1987, BIEDERMAN 1990]. 57[TARR/BÜLTHOFF 1995].
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Fig. 4.14 Examples of volume-based primitives: (a) Marr’s generalized cylinders, (b) Pentland’s
superquadrix, (c) Biedermann’s geons. Adapted from [FARAH 2000a, p. 77].
sort of a posteriori automatization, as the perceived object is integrated into the experience
of the perceiving agent, and it is here that viewpoint-invariant cues and processes can become
subsequently dominant.
4.4.3 The Ecological Theory of Vision
A viewpoint-dependent explanation of vision was introduced by Gibson. Not by chance, it deals
especially with motor aspects. He stressed that the information about a world that surrounds a
point of observation is not just information about the world but also about the point of observation
itself.58 Therefore, exterospecific information and propriospecific (viewpoint-dependent) informa-
tion are strictly connected. However, the latter type of information cannot be shared by other
observers; this is the most fundamental perceptual ground for the distinction, at a visual level,
between self and others. Gibson proposed a theory of direct perception without the involvement of
internal information-processing or representation at all.59 According to Gibson, perception invokes
picking up the rich information directly via resonance, like a radio that is resonating with the signal
contained in the electromagnetic radiation. The core of the theory is the movement of the individual
(not necessarily a human subject) in its environment. The pattern of light reaching the eye is an
optic array that contains all information about the environment and provides unambiguous and
invariant information about the layout of objects in space [Figs. 4.15–4.16]. Some invariants in
visual perception are the global focus of expansion (the motionless point toward which we are
58[GIBSON 1979, pp. 75 and 111]. 59[GIBSON 1950, GIBSON 1966].
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Fig. 4.15 Gibson’s model of underwater vision. Adapted from [GIBSON 1966, p. 157].
global focus
of expansion
Fig. 4.16 Gibson’s model of aerial vision. Adapted from [GIBSON 1966, p. 161].
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directed) or the ratio of an object’s height to the distance between its base and the horizon. All
the potential uses of objects, i.e. their a!ordances, are also directly perceivable: Gibson called
a!ordances the sensory constants of a particular biological species, which are the measure of the
feasibility of carrying out certain actions. This is a concept that we shall develop in the second
part of the book. The main idea of Gibson, therefore, is that vision displays hereditary structures.
Instead of Gibson’s global radial outflow, according to which the overall outflow pattern specifies
the direction, a “local focus of outflow” theory has been also proposed.60 According to this theory,
the direction of heading is determined by locating a stationary reference point (the local focus of
expansion) in the environment. This account is especially interesting for subjects moving toward
a fixed point.61 Another very important approach62 is focused on the time-to-contact, which is
inversely proportional to the rate of expansion of the object’s retinal image.
These kinds of approaches can explain very well how size constancy and the sense of the third
dimension are innate visual abilities, and are also very fruitful for an ecological and dynamic
understanding of object perception.63 However, even if these viewpoint-dependent theories can
probably account for many results, they cannot be considered as general explanations of vision.
Experiences with chimpanzees show that they clearly have a mental (internal) image (map) of the
location where the food is (food that they previously saw being put in that location).64 This means
that there is some information-processing at work [Sec. 3.7]. Moreover, a!ordances cannot explain
the distinction, introduced by Fodor and Pylyshyn,65 between seeing and seeing as (one can see
a thing but without acknowledging it as the food one searched for). This is especially important
for primates. Finally, the processes involved in identifying invariants not only deal with motion
invariants like the global or the local focus-of-expansion but also with perceptual aspects. I have
mentioned the possibility of integrating di!erent theories. Constructivism (like that of Marr and
Biederman) refers indeed to the ventral elaboration of information [Sec. 4.3], while the ecological
approach to vision (like that of Gibson and Lee) refers to dorsal mechanism66: Therefore, we could
establish an opposition between dorsal invariants versus ventral cues and variants.
4.4.4 Shape Perception
A third approach is to research “ventral” invariants but at a global and not at a local level (i.e.
at the level of the global shape). This is the enterprise first endeavored by Gestalt psychology.67
All laws of the Gestalt stem from the basic law of Prägnanz: Among the possible organizations in
visual perception, the one possessing the best, simplest, and most stable shape will occur.68 The
most important aspect here is the figure–ground segregation [Sec. 4.1]. Proximity and similarity
are in general the two criteria of grouping, which represents a more general aspect than binding,
since it can also consist of the operation of collecting several objects [Fig. 4.17]. Similarity seems to
have a temporal precedence on proximity69 and both represent a higher perceptual manifestation
of the where/what dichotomy. The law of proximity is grounded in the localization procedures of
perception and, as we shall see, is the perceptual basis of metonymy, whereas the law of similarity
is grounded in identification and is the basis of metaphoric transfer. To proximity and similarity
Gestaltists also added (1) the law of good continuation, and (2) the law of closure. These two
laws are actually not primary, since the law of good continuation is an application of the law of
proximity (we suppose that a chain of proximal elements will follow even in zones that are not
60[WARREN et al. 1988]. 61[EYSENCK/KEANE 2000, pp. 65–69]. 62[LEE 1976, LEE 1980].
63[KELLMAN/ARTERBERRY 1998]. 64[SAVAGE-R. et al. 1998, pp. 37–39]. 65[FODOR/PYLYSHYN 1981].
66[NORMAN 2002]. 67[WERTHEIMER 1923].
68[KOFFKA 1935, p. 138]. See also [EYSENCK/KEANE 2000, pp. 25–49]. 69[QUINLAN/WILSON 1998].
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 4.17 Some of the Gestalt perception laws: (a) The law of proximity, (b) the law of similarity, (c) the law
of good continuation, (d) the law of closure. The law of proximity is grounded in the localization procedures of
perception and is the perceptual basis of metonymy, whereas the law of similarity is grounded in identification
and is the basis of metaphor. Adapted from [EYSENCK/KEANE 2000, p. 26].
Fig. 4.18 Example of illusory contours giving rise to a ghostly triangle. It is an instance of both the law of
good continuation and of proximity.
visible) and the law of closure is an application of the law of similarity (we associate the perceived
shape with a memorized structure) [Fig. 4.18].
As we shall see, the two main ways for interpreting objects are exactly those proposed by
the Gestalt theory, i.e. contiguity and similarity. Notwithstanding these important results found
by the Gestalt theory, there are still several problems. The Gestalt theory was discredited among
neurobiologists when Roger Sperry showed in 1958 that, by placing strips of mica and silver needles
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Fig. 4.19 Holism versus localism and invariant versus individuated aspects in vision. A: Marr-like composi-
tion of elementary units (e.g. a table). B: Gestalt-like individuated shapes (e.g. a pitcher). C: Functional tools
(e.g. a hammer). D: Living beings (e.g. a cat). Adapted from [REGEHR/BROOKS 1993]. It is interesting
to note that, in this paper, the shapes of functional tools are not well understood in their specificity.
into the visual cortex of cats and monkeys, distortion in the electrical fields had negligible e!ects
on behaviors involving perception, in contrast to Gestalt’s assumption.70
Moreover, for the Gestaltists, grouping is a bottom-up process where no object information
enters, but contrary evidence was reported by Vecera and Farah,71 who stressed that top-down
activation partly guides the segregation process. This is particularly true when we perceive shapes
in motion. Indeed, grouping must occur later than the Gestaltists supposed. For instance, proximity
in three-dimensional space occurs with depth perception. It turned out, after studies by Restle,72
that what is first perceived is a configuration of random points (in general in coordinated motion,
that is, when points move together sharing a common fate [Subsec. 4.4.1]) that requires less
calculation: If displays are viewed through a collimating lens, so that the points are at optical
infinity, observers tend to give three-dimensional interpretations. When the points break away from
a certain surface, then observers tend to see the distances between points as constant, reducing
several motions to the motion of one rigid body, which is more “economic” than the previous
complex of di!erent motions. This is also evidence for information coding in the peripheral nervous
system [Subsec. 3.3.1]. Therefore, the mechanism envisaged by Gestalt theory does not always seem
appropriate.
70[SPERRY 1958] [FREEMAN 1995, pp. 33–4]. 71[VECERA/FARAH 1997]. 72[RESTLE 1979].
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Fig. 4.20 Some basic tools. Adapted from www.liquidlearning.com.
It is di"cult to give answers to all these problems, but a synthesis of all the previous results
can be helpful. An initial, very important distinction could be between holism and localism (or
analyticity) in vision. These two aspects may be considered complementary [Subsecs. 1.2.6 and
1.3.3], as far as the former deals with the extent to which an item’s features cohere into an
individuated whole pattern, while the latter deals with whether a feature occurs with identical
forms in di!erent items.73 However, this distinction does not cover a second one: That between
invariant and individuated, so that we can distinguish between individuated composed objects and
individuated wholes [Fig. 4.19]: In this case, we may think about objects whose global shape is
not a cluster of parts (there are no distinguishable components) but is very much individuated.
We know these sort of things very well: They are living beings. Indeed, the shape of a cat or dog
responds to these criteria [Subsec. 4.4.2]. A di!erent and somehow intermediate case is represented
by our working tools, like hammers, scissors, pliers, and so on. In this case, they have clearly
distinguished parts, but these parts are specific to the tool, since they must coalesce into a functional
unity74: For instance, a hammer’s handle is very di!erent from pliers’ [Fig. 4.20]. Therefore, Marr’s
theory (interchangeable composite objects) and the Gestalt theory (interchangeable whole shapes)
correspond to very elementary processes of vision that apply very well to (less complex) inanimate
objects, while a deeper distinction between specialized tools (individuated composite objects) and
living beings (individuated wholes) can be drawn.
4.4.5 Object Perception
A common error is to suppose that later areas of vision reconstruct objects as they really are
in the world.75 This is illogical: Why should vision firstly reduce the perception of objects into
small parts [Secs. 4.2–4.3] and later reconstruct them as they are? This is also phylogenetically
counterintuitive, for then if our perception of objects were a pure template of them, we would expect
73[REGEHR/BROOKS 1993]. See also [ZEKI 2001].
74[MOSS et al. 1997, TYLER/MOSS 1997, MOSS/TYLER 2000]. 75[FARAH 2000a].
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such a perception to be present not only in late evolved species, e.g. primates, but already in lower
forms of vertebrates, especially considering its relevance for survival [Subsec. 3.7.2]. Consequently,
either the more primitive animals should already have the ability to perceive complex objects,
which does not seem to be the case, or object perception does not matter at all, which again seems
hardly the case. Thus, the true solution could be the following: Objects are constructions of the
brain, but they are constructed by using the material already present in the primary visual area
(as well as in other primary sensory areas), and therefore their configuration is inferred according
to certain regularities in the interaction between organism and environment76 (the subject of the
next chapter). Moreover, although objects are emergent constructs, delocalized aspects are already
present in the first steps of the visual process [Sec. 4.2]. This means that objects’ perception does
matter, but does matter only for advanced organisms that can interact with them in an appropriate
manner, and have coevolved with a niche environment in which such sophisticated perception is
important,77 according to the above two principles of perception [Sec. 4.1].
Evidence for this comes from the way the vision of objects is built. This growing complexity of
vision does not consist in a linear process through successive steps from the retina to higher
visual areas (as would be expected if object perception were based on templates). It is true
that visual information is transferred in a feedforward fashion from low-level modules to higher-
level ones, as we have seen in Sec. 4.3. However, we have also seen, in addition, that feedback
connections transfer information in the reverse direction. Receptive field properties seem to reflect
mostly the convergent–divergent feedforward cascade of information-processing, while, as already
remarked, feedback connections outweigh the set of feedforward connections.78 Strict feedfor-
ward models are indeed subject to the combinatorial explosion (cascade of increasingly complex
information).
However, we should also avoid the opposite danger: To think that perception can be reduced
to our own constructions and that the external world and its configurations are irrelevant. This
is hardly the case, since we very often experience that the external stimulus interrupts our chain
of thinking and representing.79 This shows that we are not free in our perception of the external
world.
Therefore, one is led to the conclusion that the higher visual areas extract information already
implicit in inputs coming from the primary visual cortex. Although right, this must be properly
understood: The correct point of view is to say that structures and relations are always implicit
and potential [Subsec. 2.4.3], not only for the perceiving subject but for any other action that
can be performed upon them, around them, or through them. In other words, we always perceive
objects and properties of objects due to their interactions with us and even among them, since,
in this way, certain configurations of things can be activated and realized.80 This explains my
previous guess that all properties are relational and interactional [Subsecs. 1.3.3 and 2.3.1]. As we
shall see later, the feedback that the brain receives from the environment, especially when the high
organism actively interacts with its environment, allows for the tuning of the represented structure
in the brain with the structure in the world. However, this does not mean that the structure in
the brain “mirrors” the structure in the world. They have a commonality because of the simple
fact that they are (evolutionarily and developmentally) associated, but the important point is
76[VON HELMHOLTZ 1867, pp. 586–9]. See also [GOPNIK 1993a] [CHURCHLAND et al. 1994].
77Similar considerations have been developed about color vision in [HILBERT 1992b].
78[LAMME/SPEKREIJSE 2000].
79An issue pointed out in [HERBART 1824–5, Sec. 3], the relevance of which we shall see in the next part of the book.
80[VON HELMHOLTZ 1867, p. 589].
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that the structure in the brain is associated to the structure in the world since it has been selected
as an appropriate response by the organism, and not because it is an iconic reproduction—again
a form of generalized Darwinism [Subsecs. 2.2.3 and 2.2.6].
4.4.6 Face Recognition
A surprising result is that mid processing stages of perception are distributed [Sec. 3.8 and
Subsec. 4.4.1], whereas late or higher ones are sparse, even if they are still population-based.81
In the later processes, a single neuron can become associated with a given item acting as a mark,
for instance individuating a certain person.82 Since this association is independent from the cluster
of particular properties we attribute to the person, which are always associated with the specific
perspectives under which this person is perceived, it is unlikely that such an invariance could be
explained by an ordinary perception process. As mentioned, it is a manifestation of a marking
ability (individuating an item) that is not in contradiction with the distributed representation
of the properties (identifying) [Sec. 4.1]. This also confirms that a single neuron or few neurons
cannot be, in a proper sense of the word, a representation of that perceived item83 [Subsec. 3.7.1].
This marking process, as we shall see in the next part of the book, can be generalized to the whole
of brain activity.84
Let us consider this mechanism a little. The inferior-temporal cortex (IT) cells (the area where
the “where” path culminates [Sec. 4.3]) are highly selective for faces, hands, and so on, indicating
a certain marking process that is independent of perception of form, color, and so on. Indeed,
whole faces undergo little or no decomposition at all. The reason is that distributed descriptions
are not well-suited to represent a large number of items simultaneously (i.e. very complex objects
like faces) because, with large numbers of items to be considered, it is much more possible that
these elements can interfere.85 Then, a marking system can be very helpful in solving such a
problem. It is also important to understand that face recognition is very much context-sensitive.
Indeed, face recognition is more orientation-sensitive than the recognition of other types of objects.
Interestingly, adults and children older than 10 years cannot easily recognize faces that are upside
down.86 These di!erent recognition processes belong to di!erent systems, and are anatomically
distinct.
To understand this point, let us now consider in more detail the distinction between whole and
parts introduced in Subsec. 4.4.4. Objects (with the exclusion of living beings) are represented
much more in terms of their components [Subsecs. 4.4.2–4.4.4]. In perceiving compound inanimate
objects (categories A and C of Fig. 4.19), we use first-order relational information (spatial resolution
of the parts of an object relative to another one), whereas in recognition of wholes (categories B
and D of Fig. 4.19) like animate beings we make use of second-order relational information, which
exists only for objects whose parts share an overall spatial configuration and consists of the spatial
relations of the parts relative to their prototypical arrangement (e.g. the species-specific form, which
is independent of the specific state or situation of the animate being).87 Now, face representation
is di!erent from both first-order and configurational levels of visual analysis.
The reason is that at a configurational level of analysis, single properties are psychologically
real or explicit, whereas in perception of faces they are not so. One could, of course, extract such
properties from a holistic representation, and in this sense holistic representations implicitly contain
81[BRINCAT/CONNOR 2004]. 82[QUIAN Q. et al. 2005]. 83[CONNORS 2002].
84See also [CONNOR 2005]. 85[FARAH 2000a, pp. 115–46]. But see [ABBOTT et al. 1996].
86[CAREY/DIAMOND 1977]. 87[DIAMOND/CAREY 1986].
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both first-order and configurational features. However, holistic face recognition is a level higher
than pure Gestalt.88 It is a special case of the perception of living beings. As we shall see, there
are important di!erences between schemata and categories. A Gestalt is related to a perceptual
schema, while animate beings and faces are related to categorization. However, the crucial point is
that faces are not only individuated (like animate beings) but are also related to individuals: Face
recognition involves within-category discrimination (sense of individuality) whereas perception of
other items involves between-category perception.89
For this reason, an important issue here is whether face perception deals with known individ-
uals or not. V. Bruce and A. Young90 provided evidence that the recognition of familiar faces
mainly depends on very specific recognition elements of the face, personal identity nodes, and
name generation (all expressing marking actions), whereas processing of unfamiliar faces requires
more structural encoding, expression analysis, and facial speech analysis (a true information
processing of the overall Gestalt). There are patients91 who match faces and names of famous
people without recalling autobiographical information. By using a positron emission tomogra-
phy (PET) technique, able to produce a three-dimensional map of functional processes in the
brain, it has been shown92 that a face-gender categorization resulted in activation changes in
specific areas of the right extrastriate cortex. In particular, it is necessary to distinguish between
two specific brain regions involved in face recognition93: We have a system for acknowledging
invariant and universal aspects of faces located in the lateral fusiform gyrus and another for the
recognition of faces of individuals located in the superior temporal sulcus.94 In prosopagnosia
(the impairment in face recognition), the impairment is limited to the invariant aspects, whereas
in capgras syndrome the emotional acknowledgment of single faces fails. Cerebral activation
during object recognition, instead, essentially occurs in the left occipito–temporal cortex and
does not involve the right hemisphere regions specifically activated during the face-identity
task.
It is interesting to observe that, also when identifying handwriting of a specific individual,
perception becomes holistic and individuated.95 Summarizing, it seems to me that the general
lesson is that perception, when faces and handwriting are involved, concerns perception of
individuals, while perception of (animate or inanimate) objects is more schematic and general.
Therefore, there are reasons to believe that tools and living beings are not perceived as individuals
(with the exceptions of pets and personal belongings of particular value, as we shall see). This
is, however, a point to be reprised later on, as it has a general significance with regard to the
way humans and primates categorize. Indeed, perception of individuals is a later product of
evolution, in accordance with the analysis developed in the previous subsection. As a matter
of fact, monkeys also show a certain sensibility to face recognition. Macaque monkeys96 have been
trained to look left if a face has been recognized and to turn right if a nonface has been shown.
After training, several images have been shown, even of blurred faces. Cues for recognition were
the profile and both the eye and mouth regions. Monkeys learn quickly to discriminate faces with
di!erent emotional expressions.97 This ability is invariant with changes of color, brightness, size,
and rotation.
88[FARAH et al. 1998]. 89[GAZZANIGA et al. 1998, pp. 231–4].
90[BRUCE/YOUNG 1986]. See also [EYSENCK/KEANE 2000, pp. 106–16]. 91[DE HAAN et al. 1991].
92[SERGENT et al. 1992]. 93[JEANNEROD 2006, pp. 99–127]. 94[HAXBY et al. 2000].
95[GAZZANIGA et al. 1998, pp. 235–7].
96[AFRAZ et al. 2006] [DICARLO 2006]. See also [KANWISHER et al. 1997]. 97[DITTRICH 1990].
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4.5 Some Impairments of Vision
4.5.1 Cortical Blindness
Cortical blindness is damage to visual perception of the what that does not a!ect motor reactions
or perception of motion.98 Indeed, Barbur et al. pointed out that blindsight patients show high
sensitivity to fast-moving objects, but neither shape nor size is discriminated.99 This field of
study owes a lot to work of Weiskrantz,100 who presented interesting evidence that cortical-blind
subjects still show a pupillary response to light. Paradigmatically, a patient with a restricted
lesion of the right occipital lobe (where the primary visual area, V1, is located) was investigated
in order to assess the possible existence of some visual capacity in his hemianopic field which was
conventionally considered blind. Though the patient had no awareness of seeing, he could move in
the direction of visual stimuli with considerable accuracy, could distinguish between the orientation
of a vertical and a diagonal line, and could discriminate the letter X from the letter O. The patient
could also di!erentiate a grating of vertical bars from a homogeneous field. These findings show
that a certain visual capacity can remain after damage to the striate cortex resulting in blindsight.
Perenin and Rossetti101 have even shown that cortical-blind patients could “post” a card in
an open slot but were unable to describe it. They confirmed the previous results in this way, since
their patients could also guess (via eye movements) whether they were being shown a circle, a
horizontal line, or a vertical line, but they could not see the shape, lacking any combinatorial
or Gestalt processing.102 They were also sensitive to a certain extent to colors—because of the
survival of some “perception” cells,103 but, as mentioned, they were especially sensitive to motion,
which is strictly related to movements of head and eye.
A possible explanation of these abilities is that there are fast pathways directly to the prestriate
cortex bypassing the (disrupted) V1 area. Ffytche, Guy, and Zeki found some evidence for this
interpretation.104 The studied visual field was 30! ! 20!. The parallelism is dependent on the
characteristics of the stimulus. Signals relating to fast visual motion (a speed of 22!s"1) reach the
prestriate cortex (located above the striate cortex) before they reach the striate cortex. Signals
related to slow visual motion (speeds < 6!s"1) are traded to the prestriate cortex through V1.
This means that the parallelism is not rigid but dynamically tuned to the stimulus.
Let us now take a short look at the opposite form of impairment: Patients that are disturbed
in their visuomotor system and therefore show deficit in actual grasping, show good grip scaling
when “pantomiming” a grasp for an object that was seen earlier and that is no longer present.105
In the case of apraxia, there is an impairment of action representation, which implies that the
patients a!ected by this disease cannot pantomime an action, even if they show no basic visuomotor
impairment.106 The superior parietal and intraparietal sulcus would monitor the action on objects,
whereas the inferior parietal lobe would monitor the action with objects (for tool use and action
programming107).
4.5.2 Visual Agnosia
Cortical blindness implies visual agnosia. Lissauer108 distinguished two types of object agnosia:
98[MILNER/GOODALE 1995, pp. 67–86]. See also [FARAH 1991].
99[BARBUR et al. 1980]. See also [PTITO et al. 1991]. 100[WEISKRANTZ 1990, WEISKRANTZ et al. 1974].
101[PERENIN/ROSSETTI 1993]. 102See also [MILNER 1997]. 103[STOERIG/COWEY 1989].
104[FFYTCHE et al. 1995].
105[GOODALE et al. 1994, MILNER et al. 2001]. See also [PERENIN/VIGHETTO 1988].
106[JEANNEROD 2006, pp. 13–15]. 107[GLOVER 2004]. 108[LISSAUER 1890].
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• Apperceptive agnosia: The subject cannot achieve a coherent percept of the structure of an
object, and
• Associative agnosia: A subject is able to achieve such a percept but still unable to recognize the
object (it is a semantic disease).109
Therefore, disease in perception is typical only for apperceptive agnosia, while associative agnosia
should consist in the connection failure between perception and reference to a certain object.
Patients a!ected by apperceptive agnosia cannot copy simple objects, though they can draw objects
on the basis of long-term memory. It is possible that in associative agnosia there is also some
impairment of perception: Subjects need very long time intervals in order to draw an image of
an object. Both types of agnosia are concerned with the ventral stream [Sec. 4.3]. Apperceptive
agnosia is probably concerned with an impairment of the elementary ability to build perceptual
schemata, while associative agnosia patients show a certain impairment in their concepts but not
in understanding the functionality of the related objects,110 which, as I shall show, is a typical
mark of a level of information treatment that comes “before” the establishment of true concepts,
namely categorization.
Apperceptive agnosia can be further divided into111
• Apperceptive agnosia in a narrow sense: Here the cause seems to be some disease in organizing
and ordering, while local properties—related to sensation and to elementary perception—of the
visual field are well perceived (color, contour elements, etc.).
• Dorsal simultanagnosia, which is a limitation of visual attention and of the perception of spatial
relationship between objects (but not of their shape). Here a patient can generally perceive only
one object, without awareness of the presence or absence of other stimuli.
• Ventral simultanagnosia: Patients can see multiple objects but generally need a lot of time
for recognizing them (for example they read while spelling each word). Here, the recognition is
piecemeal, it is limited to one object at a time, although—in contrast to dorsal simultanagnosia—
other objects are seen.
When we speak of associative agnosia, we distinguish between
1. Associative agnosia in a narrow sense: Intact visual perception and normal recognition of objects
through the other sensory channels, but di"culty in recognizing a variety of visually presented
objects, for example in naming or grouping objects according to their semantic category.
2. Pure alexia: Patients cannot read normally despite visual capabilities and the ability to under-
stand spoken language and to write.
3. Prosopagnosia: The inability to recognize faces. In prosopagnosia much of the processing of
familiar faces can remain intact despite absence of awareness that recognition occurs (in other
words, patients are able to perform same/di!erent judgments about familiar faces faster than
about unfamilair faces, even if not knowing that the former are in fact familiar faces).112
In an important study on prosopagnosia, A. Damasio and coworkers113 stressed that patients can
recognize other persons by identifying gestures and posture, voice, and also facial expressions. It is
important to note that these patients also show problems in recognizing cars, pets, and personal
e!ects. As I posited earlier [Subsec. 4.4.6], the problem here seems to be the failure to recognize
the uniqueness or individuality of the perceived items. In fact, for Damasio an entity generates
109[MILNER/GOODALE 1995, pp. 120–55]. 110[JACOB/JEANNEROD 2003, p. 81].
111[FARAH 1990, pp. 1–92]. 112[DE HAAN et al. 1987]. 113[DAMASIO et al. 1990b].
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a multiplicity of representations within the same sense and across many sensory modalities. The
important point is that, even when the entity remains the same, the context and the state of
the perceiver are likely to vary. The number of combinatorial arrangements (very high for faces
and less so for single expressions) can define the contextual complexity. Moreover, human faces
almost constitute a continuum, which implies that faces are especially di"cult to distinguish in
their individuality but, conversely, are especially suitable for identifying individuals.
4.5.3 Problems with Specific Concepts or Categories
Although this is not the context to deal with the issue of conceptualization, it would be beneficial
to consider some impairments in concept formation that are somehow related to vision.
A well-known case is that of a patient a!ected by global dysphasia showing impairment in object
(but not living-being) categorization.114 In the category of objects, he was more impaired in the
comprehension of small manipulable objects than of large man-made ones. Moreover, he showed
good comprehension of proper names having a unique and well-known referent (e.g. Churchill) and
a worse one of common names (e.g. Jones). A very well-known case is that of a patient impaired
in naming fruit and vegetables115 but still able to categorize them.116 This means that di!erent
weighting values from multiple sensory channels may be important for the acquisition of di!erent
categories, as well as the sensory/motor contribution.
Let us consider the impairments of the distinctions animate/inanimate and concrete/abstract
in particular.117 Humphreys and coworkers118 found that normal subjects also named pictures
of living things more slowly than pictures of nonliving things. Similar results are true with
monkeys.119 The fact that there is a double dissociation between the perception of objects and
the perception of living beings can be explained by the fact that objects can be manipulated
whereas living beings are mostly only represented. For organisms the problem is a high correlation
of attributes and a high level of perceptual overlap [Fig. 4.19D]. Inanimate objects (especially the
artificial ones) mostly have clearly defined functions. Therefore, there is a dissociation between
perceptual features and functional significance. In the case of tools, structural properties are
indeed strictly related to their function in terms of actions that can be undertaken with these
objects [Fig. 4.19C]. A possible explanation of this dissociation is a diversification in semantics.
T. Shallice cited three types of evidence supporting the multiple semantics hypothesis120: The
existence of modality-specific aphasias, modality-specific semantic memory impairment e!ects,
modality-specific priming e!ects. Caramazza et al., instead, did not think that one can speak of
multiple semantics.121 Therefore, the impairment is not necessarily category-specific (and therefore
semantic) but is probably a consequence of a modality-specific problem: (i) Living beings are more
similar to each other than nonliving things are and (ii) tools are also able to be manipulated.122
This is confirmed by other studies. As already mentioned [Subsec. 4.4.6], it is important
to consider that the information about characters of visual items is a distributed network of
discrete cortical regions. Within this network, the features that define an object are stored close
to the primary sensory and motor areas that were active when information about that object
114[WARRINGTON/MCCARTHY 1987]. 115[HART et al. 1985]. 116[FARAH/WALLACE 1992].
117[WARRINGTON/SHALLICE 1984] [DE RENZI/LUCCHELLI 1994]. 118[HUMPHREYS et al. 1988].
119[GAFFAN/HEYWOOD 1993]. 120[SHALLICE 1988, pp. 269–306].
121[CARAMAZZA et al. 1990]. More recently, Caramazza has strongly supported the thesis of a semantic (conceptual)
organization of human perception [CARAMAZZA/SHELTON 1998], an important issue to which we shall come back in
the third part of the book.
122[GAFFAN/HEYWOOD 1993].
978–0–19–960848–5 04-Auletta-04-drv Auletta (Typeset by SPi) 132 of 862 June 1, 2011 17:18








Fig. 4.21 Farah and McClelland’s model. The di!erences are here in modality not in category.
was acquired.123 Thus, the organization of semantic information parallels the organization of the
sensory and motor systems (concepts must somehow be mapped into perceptual schemata and
categories). An important finding is that naming tools is associated with activity in the left middle
temporal gyrus in the same region that is active in verb generation and is also associated with a
region in the left premotor cortex in the same region that is active when subjects imagined grasping
objects with their dominant hand. In contrast, naming animals is associated with the activation of
the medial occipital cortex, which is stronger left than right. It seems that this reflects top-down
activation. Animals are then defined by their physical form and when the di!erences are subtle,
the occipital cortex is brought into play. I also mention that people’s names are restricted to the
left temporal lobe.
Taking into account some of these aspects, a model proposed by Farah and McClelland124
supposed a distinction between visual and functional units to which visual inputs enter (the units
are also interconnected) [Fig. 4.21]. While the visual units possess information about the visual
properties of objects, the functional units possess semantic information about the use of objects
or about appropriate ways of interacting with them. It is a simple model that accounts for object
recognition, the double dissociation between impairment in recognition of living and nonliving
items, and also for the fact that impairments in recognizing living beings is more common. A limit
of the model is to suppose that all units are interconnected with the consequence that patients
should show impairment both in visual memory for objects and in understanding their functionality.
On the contrary, there is evidence that one can be impaired in the perception of a tool but at the
same time capable of understanding the action in which the same tool is used, like showing an
inability to recognize a cup, but an ability to recognize the act of drinking with a cup.125
Humphreys et al. proposed a model with the stored structural description of objects, semantic
(functional) representation, name representation, and categories.126 It is cascade processing, such
that, in naming pictures, there are three steps: Access to stored structural knowledge about objects,
to semantic knowledge, and to stored names. Moreover, there is no sharp break but rather the e!ects
of previous forms of procesing are passed to the subsequent ones. The three-step process postulates
123[MARTIN et al. 1996, MARTIN et al. 2000].
124[FARAH/MCCLELLAND 1991] [FARAH 1994]. See also [GONNERMAN et al. 1997].
125[MCCARTHY/WARRINGTON 1990, p. 38]. 126[HUMPHREYS et al. 1988].
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sensory processing
perceptual processingfunctional processingsemantic processing
Fig. 4.22 Summary of the di!erent levels and forms of information-processing.
that activation can be passed onto one stage before processing at an earlier stage is completed.127
For structurally similar objects, functional and associative information is derived quickly, whereas
there is an increased competition between category exemplars for individual identification. For
structurally dissimilar objects, activation of functional and associative information will be slower
but individual identification more e"cient.
A way to summarize all the previous results is shown in Fig. 4.22, a reformulation of the
scheme proposed by McCarthy and Warrington.128 Perceptual processing has to do with structural
properties (shape) of the objects. I also recall that the perception of functionality is also related
to visuomotor representations.129 This is the subject of the next chapter. The results that I shall
present and the scheme shown above can be perfectly integrated, and this integration will be one
of the tasks of the next part of the book.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter several issues about vision, as an example of perception, have been raised:
• While sensation is the pure transduction of stimuli, any perception goes together with some
expectancy.
• The first principle ruling perception is: Any perception is maintained and becomes a habit until
it is not contradicted by some stimulus.
• The second principle ruling perception is: All that can be merged is merged and nothing is
separated except what must be.
• Visual perception shows a characteristic complementarity between global sensitivity to light and
local spatial resolution.
• Any perception is constituted by individuation and identification. In visual perception these
aspects are called segregation and visual discrimination, respectively.
• This determines a fundamental complementarity between two paths in processing visual infor-
mation: The dorsal where-path, leading to the parietal cortex, and the ventral what-path, leading
to the inferotemporal cortex.
127[HUMPHREYS et al. 1995, HUMPHREYS/FORDE 2001]. See also [EYSENCK/KEANE 2000, pp. 101–4].
128[MCCARTHY/WARRINGTON 1990, p. 43]. See also [JOHNSON-FREY 2004]. 129[HODGES et al. 1999].
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• Strong modularity has been shown that is not the correct explanation, especially on the higher
levels of information integration where we no longer have a topographic organization of visual
information. Here, there is no linear organization of information-processing.
• Object perception is actually a construction of the brain (and the mind). However, it is not
arbitrary, since it finally represents a guess about external structures and configurations of
events that are not immediately perceptible. In this sense, it is rather a reconstruction.
• When objects are perceived, we should distinguish a double complementarity: Between invariant
holism and localism and between individuated composites and wholes.
• According to this distinction, tools (displaying di!erent functionalities) are individuated com-
posites while living beings are individuated wholes.
• Faces are a specific kind of individuated whole, namely not species-specific individuated but
individual wholes. Here, both general and individual aspects are at play.
• Several impairments in vision suggest that visual perception is a three-level hierarchy, starting
with perceptual (structural) processing, going on to functional processing (the object of the
second part of the book), and ending with semantic processing (the object of the third part of
the book).
The complexity of vision and the huge amount of problems related to issues like reference, cate-
gorization, and conceptualization show that a pure information-processing view is not completely
satisfactory when dealing with such kinds of problems.
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Dealing with Target Motion and Our
Own Movement
One of the traditional limitations of both cognitivism and the neural-network approach [Sec. 3.8]
is the absence of a link with motor features. In other words, these models are characterized by a
strong representational and reproductive style and do not su!ciently take into account the fact
that a central feature of cognition is not only the perception of motion but also an action on the
environment. It is not by chance that the field of motor cognition is a relatively late development of
cognitive neuroscience. This chapter is devoted to three main subjects: Motion perception, visually
guided actions, and movement production. We shall see that many of the results of this chapter
indicate the necessity of going beyond a pure information-acquisition model of the brain towards
more sophisticated ways of dealing with information, which will be the object of the second part
of the book.
5.1 Visual Motion Perception
5.1.1 To “See” as an Active Exploration of the World
The first aspect I would like to consider here is the individuation of a target’s motion. There are
di"erent and parallel visuomotor pathways involved, with no unified representation of the external
world [Secs. 4.3–4.4]. As we have seen, one of the first attempts at dealing with this problem was
the distinction between where and what visual paths, i.e. between the spatial localization and the
identification of objects (shape, color and so on).1 Let me recall that this is supported by studies
on vision impairments. For instance, a patient su"ering bilateral posterior brain damage exhibited
disturbance of motion perception in a rather pure form.2 She could only discriminate between
a stationary and a moving target in the periphery of her otherwise intact visual fields. She also
had some perception in the central part of the field, provided that the target moved at a velocity
not exceeding 10!s"1. Also her visually guided eye and finger movements were impaired, while
the motion perception through acoustic and tactile cues was not impaired. The impairment was
due to damage of the lateral temporal-occipital cortex and supports the view that motion’s visual
perception is a separated function.
Recent studies have enlarged this point of view and suggested that vision’s main aim is not to
statistically represent the world but rather to act on and interact with it. In animals like a water
beetle (Dytiscidæ) or a frog it is evident that the behavior (output) is visually guided, which is far
1[TREVARTHEN 1968] [SCHNEIDER 1969]. 2[ZIHL et al. 1983].
135
978–0–19–960848–5 05-Auletta-05-drv Auletta (Typeset by SPi) 136 of 862 June 1, 2011 17:19
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 1/6/2011, SPi
136 Dealing with Target Motion and Our Own Movement
more important than the elaboration of inputs for representational purposes only, for instance when
memorizing—recall that the behaviorist theory in particular was centered around input instead
of output.3 The same considerations remains true for mammals and even primates, although the
latter have developed a more complex cognitive system for object identification [Subsec. 4.4.6].
We can go even further and say that an internal image of the world can only be carried out
through movement,4 so that motion is crucial even for identification and visual representation in
general. As a matter of fact, plants by definition do not move or see, but rather use electromagnetic
radiation for pure energetic–entropic goals and not for acquiring information from the external
world. The whole of visual perception is influenced by motion perception and proprioception
of a being’s own motion: The gaze represents an active exploration of the world, a form of
grasping.
5.1.2 Perception of Objects’ Motion
One of the first findings of Goodale and coworkers5 was that visual feedback about shape and
the precise relative position of a target are not necessary for visually driven corrections to occur
and that the mechanisms that maintain the apparent stability of a moving target in space are
dissociable from those that mediate the visuomotor output directed at the representation of the
target. Later on6 this dichotomy was stated in terms of a dissociation between the perceptual
report of a visual stimulus and the ability to direct spatially accurate movements toward that
stimulus (patients with damage to one or the other systems were studied) [Subsec. 4.5.1].7
Saccadic eye movements are typically completed while the hand is still moving to grasp an
object.8 A saccade is a rapid movement—of the order of less than a tenth of a second—of both eyes
occurring in coordination. When a second saccade, called a correction saccade—since it brings the
target right onto the fovea—follows, the action can be corrected when the object is displaced (up to
a certain range). No additional time is required for displaced-target trials. As such, the subject can
correctly grasp the displaced object, though at no time is the subject able to perceptually realize
that the object jumped to the new location. If the subject tries to deliberately follow the trajectory
of a displaced object, the movements are slower and fall well outside of the amplitude–duration
curve. In other words, adjustments in the trajectory are a fine-tuning of the visuomotor system
independently of explicit representation. Representations have more to do with the identification
of stable objects and their enduring characters so that they can be recognized when encountered
again in di"erent visual contexts, and therefore independently of the point of view. Instead, the
visuomotor system deals with the exact position or displacement of the target (localization or
individuation). This is confirmed by the use of a prismatic lens (shift of 3! of the visual array to
the left or to the right). After a certain habituation time, the subject can perform the actions in
the same way as there were the lens.9
An important aspect of motion perception is when we perceive the motion of other organisms.
The perception of organisms’ motion is subjected to specific and probably hard-wired constraints
that constitute, as we shall see, a true biological module10: Trajectories must remain compatible
with the biomechanic constraint of the organism; the velocity profile is very di"erent relative to
physical objects, showing a fast acceleration followed by a much longer deceleration; there are
specific rules stemming either from involved goals or from some other requirements. It is possible,
3[MILNER/GOODALE 1995, pp. 1–24]. 4[LLINÁS 2001, pp. 58–9]. 5[GOODALE et al. 1986].
6[GOODALE et al. 1991]. 7See also [AGLIOTI et al. 1995]. 8[MILNER/GOODALE 1995, pp. 156–78].
9[JAKOBSON/GOODALE 1989]. 10[JEANNEROD 2006, pp. 103–5].
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as we shall see, that the pure perception of motion triggers a motor representation in the observer
of how this movement must be performed.
5.1.3 Guessing Dynamics
We cannot directly perceive velocity since any image is fixed upon our retina and only our eyes
move.11 The velocity is reconstructed by comparing di"erent positions of the object divided by
time. In many cases, neurons maintain sensory elements for a certain time [Subsec. 3.7.2] in order
to allow predictions for the future. In order to acknowledge absolute movements, the body uses
inertial cues. To localize an object means to self-represent the movements that would be necessary
to reach it. A motionless being (like most plants) would never have acquired the notion of space
because, not being capable to correct, by its own movements, the e"ects of the change of the
external objects’ position, it would have had no reason to distinguish them from its own internal
state changes.
An important problem arises due to nonlinear e"ects. According to Slotine and Li,12 a mixture
of variables (like speed) and their derivatives (like acceleration) are used by the nervous system in
order to make nonlinear problems linear. As we have seen, there are di"erent channels of object
perception. The problem is how they are combined when the objects move very quickly. A study13
suggests that the visual system extracts certain conspicuous image features based on luminance
contrast14 [Sec. 4.2], and that the signals derived from these are then attributed to other features of
the object, a process that is called motion capture.15 When either illusory contours or random-dot
patterns are moved into the vicinity of a color border, the latter seems also to move in the same
direction even though it is physically stationary. The perception of a moving complex object, such
as a leopard, is not given by a complicated computational calculus in which each single spot is
followed in its movement [see also Subsec. 4.4.2], but is more simply due to motion capture: If the
shape of the leopard is perceived as moving, then so are all spots. In other words, vision discards
the information about the motion of single spots [see also Subsec. 4.4.4]. Obviously, this implies
that one cannot see particulars but this is a small price to pay if one needs to run away from a
leopard as soon as possible.16
5.1.4 Spatial Perception and Motion
We have seen that there is a double visual dichotomy:
• Between perception of form and shape on the one hand and motion on the other [Subsec. 5.1.2],
• Between perception of form and shape on the one hand and spatial location on the other [Sec. 4.3].
We must account for this situation. We have distinguished between discrimination and segregation
[Sec. 4.1]. Conceptually speaking, segregation implies two aspects: We need to locate an object
and we also need to perceive its displacement if it is in motion. This is especially relevant when
we wish to individuate or segregate animals. In other words, I am suggesting that localization
and individuation (or segregation) are not exactly the same since the latter also involves motion
perception. In light of this, there seems to be su!cient grounds for considering the visual system
as having two large subsystems, one for object segregation, which is subdivided into perception of
11On this subject see the interesting monograph by Berthoz [BERTHOZ 2000].
12[SLOTINE/LI 1991]. 13[RAMACHANDRAN 1987].
14Luminance is the photometric measure of the density of luminous intensity in a given direction that describes the
amount of light that passes through or is emitted from a particular area, and falls within a given solid angle.
15[CHURCHLAND et al. 1994]. 16See also [RAMACHANDRAN 1990].
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Fig. 5.1 The three vision pathways.
the object’s motion and object localization, and the other for object discrimination. This double
distinction to a certain extent is supported by studies17 which indicate that we may probably
distinguish between [Fig. 5.1]:
• A ventral stream or pathway (for visual perception of what),
• A dorsodorsal stream (for visuomotor transformations and representations), and
• A dorsoventral stream (for visual perception of where).
Therefore, the latter system also receives some relevant information from the ventral pathway.18
Indeed, in order to spatially localize an object we also need to know something about it. However,
in this case, the quality that we use for localizing the object is not used as a property (as a part of
the form, for instance) but as a mark (for instance to wear a black hat in a crowded place) in order
to individuate the object [Sec. 4.1]. As we shall see in the second part of the book, the concept of
marking is very important when dealing with this class of problems.
5.2 Visuomotor Representations
We have seen that dealing with motion has not only a passive aspect (the perception of objects’
motion) but it has also an active aspect, i.e. the ability to visually guide our own movement (for
instance, prehension acts). We have already considered how important active motor features are
when we deal with the functionality of objects [Subsecs. 4.4.4–4.4.6 and Sec. 4.5]. M. Jeannerod calls
this aspect of vision visuomotor representation since it is somehow the bridge between the visual
system and the motor system19 [Subsec. 3.7.2]. When speaking of visuomotor representations, it is
important to distinguish between determining the position, which is ultimately due to individuating
objects in the environment that can act as reference marks (it is more allocentric), and determining
the direction of our own motion, which makes use of gradients, far away objects helping for
heading [Fig. 5.2].
17[RIZZOLATTI/GALLESE 2006]. See also [CAREY et al. 1998].
18Recent studies seem to call such a classification into discussion [PISELLA et al. 2006].
19[JACOB/JEANNEROD 2003, pp. 64–71].
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DETERMINING DIRECTION DETERMINING POSITION
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
BEARING MAP
Fig. 5.2 Determining the direction (a–c) and determining the position (d–e). (a) a field of gradient intensity;
(b) a distal landmark for heading (too far away to provide positional information); (c) direction deduced from
the polarization of an array of positional landmarks; (d) a topographic map constructed from positional cues;
(e) the building of a rudimentary bearing map by crossing (a) and (b). Obviously, we are dealing here with





















Fig. 5.3 The visual-motor organization of the monkey brain. I limit myself to pointing out some specific
elements, the areas 5 and 7, the primary motor system (M1, area 4), the somatosensory area (S1), and the
dorsal (PMd) and ventral (PMv) premotor cortex (area 6). A more extensive treatment will be the object of
the second part of this book [see in particular Fig. 13.5]. Adapted from [JACOB/JEANNEROD 2003, p. 63].
One of the first discoveries in this field was made by Mountcastle et al.20 who found that
specific neurons in area 5 and in area 7 fire when an animal did goal-directed and not at-random
movements [Fig. 5.3]. Subsequently, it was discovered that neurons in area 7a, in particular, encode
visual stimuli for a specific position of the eye in its orbit, that is, they fire when an object
stimulates a specific location of the retina and when the gaze is fixed in that direction. This means
that information about the change of position of an object relative to the eye is available to the
visuomotor component and not to the perceptual component of the visual system. Indeed, eye and
hand movement exhibits automatic features and presents a specific motor representation of space
20[MOUNTCASTLE et al. 1975].
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(a) (b)
Fig. 5.4 Titchener’s illusion: (a): The two circles in the middle are equal but seem to have di"erent sizes
according to the format of the annulus around it. (b): The two circles in the middle have di"erent size (the
right one is bigger) but seem to have the same format.
that is kept intact in patients with lesions producing a disturbance in the conscious perception
of space.21 Conscious and cognitive representation of motion can contaminate and override short-
lived motor representations but not vice versa. A categorical representation of the action goal may
indeed prevent the expression of a short-lived sensorimotor representation.
Bridgeman et al. found that the accuracy of pointing to a target was independent of the fact
that its displacement was actually perceived, and nor did these failures in perceiving diminish
the ability to point.22 Moreover, Duhamel et al.23 have shown that neurons in the area LIP
fire as a response to a stimulus that is presented not in their receptive fields but within the
area of space where their receptive field will project after the eye movement is made (80 msec
before the movement starts). It is an anticipatory remapping of the representation of space for the
guidance of the arm to the target. Parietal areas like that directly project onto the premotor cortex
(area 6).
Experiments with illusions like the Titchener circles24 [Fig. 5.4] and other ones with objects of
the same weights but di"erent sizes and vice versa25 show that the subject often follows internal
algorithms during image-distance or weight–size evaluation rather than relying on direct perceptual
inputs. Indeed, these kinds of illusions have no e"ect when the subject performs unconscious
actions.
Visuomotor representations are tightly connected with the dorsal treatment of visual infor-
mation and much more loosely connected with ventral treatment [Subsec. 5.1.4]. Indeed, when a
motor response (an arm movement, for instance) must follow a change of color of the target, this
requires at least 80 msec more than a response due to a change in the location (happening in 100
msec or less).26 This also shows a certain di"erence in the nature of visuomotor representations
relative to perceptual ones: They serve as online motor corrections and therefore are particularly
appropriate for learning a new skill, while the latter ones prevalently contribute to the memory
bu"er [Subsec. 5.1.2]. Although we cannot say that memory has no influence on motor behavior,
it remains true that when we perform an action, we must compute the instantaneous egocentric
coordinates and local orientation of the target object, which in turn implies that we cannot rely
21[ROSSETTI 1998].
22[BRIDGEMAN et al. 1979, BRIDGEMAN et al. 1981, BRIDGEMAN et al. 1997]. See also [JACOB/JEANNEROD
2003, p. 106].
23[DUHAMEL et al. 1992].
24[TITCHENER 1909]. Titchener was a supporter of the mentalist approach to psychology.
25[GORDON et al. 1991a, GORDON et al. 1991b]. 26[JACOB/JEANNEROD 2003, p. 108].
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5.5 Titchener’s illusion revisited by recent experiments of Ha"enden et al. (a) A disk surrounded by
a small annulus at a small distance. (b) Same disk surrounded by a small annulus (of the same size as the
former) at a larger distance. (c) Same disk surrounded by a large annulus at a large distance.
on memory because the precise position of the object with respect to our own body coordinates
can vary from one occasion to the next.
To sum up, the existence of motor representations shows that we can perceive motion in two
di"erent ways27: As a pure perceptual event or as a motor execution. In the latter case, only
pragmatic components count while in the former emotional elements are also involved.
Recent experiments performed by Ha"enden et al.28 seem to put these results into discussion.
They used the so-called Titchener illusion but with some adjustments [Fig. 5.5]. The main result
was that visuomotor representations can misrepresent aspects of the visual display. Indeed, while
visual perception is more sensitive to the size of the middle circle and less able to estimate the
distance, grasping is more sensitive to the distance between the disk and the annulus: Grasping is
influenced by the size of the gap between disk and annulus whereas perception is not. These data,
however, are not completely incompatible with a dualistic (or trialistic) model of vision. Moreover,
it has been pointed out29 that the comparison between size and distance in this experiment is not
complete, since the fourth possibility has not been explored, namely a central disk of the same size
as in the other three contexts and surrounded by a big annulus but located near the disk.
5.3 Movement Generation and Control
Later on we shall generalize the results of this section in a wider theory of action planning and
execution. Here, I shall focus mainly on the typical features of brain activity when executing actions.
The philosophers E. Anscombe and J. Searle have pointed out that, when dealing with human
actions, the mind–world relation is reversed relative to ordinary representations,30 in particular
the direction of fit is mind-to-world while the direction of representation is world-to-mind. To a
certain extent this is also true for other organisms and will bring us further than the problem of
information acquiring (a process going always from the world to the perceiving agent).
5.3.1 Structural and Functional Considerations
In humans, we distinguish three types of movement31: Reflexive, rhythmic, and voluntary. In the
case of animals as evolved as mammals we can speak of exploratory movements instead of voluntary
27[JEANNEROD 2006, pp. 116–18]. 28[HAFFENDEN/GOODALE 2000][HAFFENDEN et al. 2001].
29[JACOB/JEANNEROD 2003, pp. 125–9]. 30[ANSCOMBE 1957] [SEARLE 1983].
31[GHEZ/KRAKAUER 2000].
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brain stem motor nuclei
Fig. 5.6 The cerebral hierarchical organization of the motor system. The motor cerebral system may
influence the spinal cord along two di"erent pathways, either directly or through the brain stem. All
these three subsystems receive sensory inputs and are under the influence of the basal ganglia and the
cerebellum. Recall that these two latter systems act on the cerebral cortex through the thalamus. Adapted
from [GHEZ/KRAKAUER 2000].
ones (as we shall see, in this case we have goal-directed movements that are not immediately
induced by the environment and are neither reflexive nor rhythmic).
1. Reflexive movements are elicited by external stimuli. They are still executed even if the brain is
cut from the spinal cord [Subsec. 3.3.3]. However, reflexive movements may also be modulated
by higher functions. In general, any su!ciently coordinated reaction supposes the contribution
of the brain.32 Reaction time varies with the amount of information processed, for instance, a
much longer time is needed when there are choice e"ects.
2. Rhythmic movements involve both the spinal cord and the brain stem. Though they may occur
spontaneously, they are mainly activated by external stimuli.
3. Exploratory movements as well as voluntary ones can be partially triggered by external envi-
ronmental conditions, but are initiated according to some internal goal.
The nervous system both in humans and in higher animals (at least vertebrates) learns how to
anticipate obstacles and correct the movement. The anticipation part is the feedforward control;
the error correction constitutes the servocontrol (a feedback loop) [Subsec. 3.2.2].
The motor system is then a three-level hierarchical system [Fig. 5.6; Subsec. 3.4.1]:
32As remarked already in [ROMANES 1884, pp. 27–8].
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motor cortex
brain stem
basal  ganglia, cerebellum spinal cord
Fig. 5.7 The functional organization of the motor system. The motor cortex is the highest level of the
command or decisional system for goal-directed behaviors and modulation of reflex and rhythmic movements.
The brain stem, together with basal ganglia and the cerebellum, is responsible for feedback and modulation,
while the spinal cord is the executive, being directly connected with the motor output.
• The reflex and rhythmic movements or locomotion generation are mostly dependent on the lowest
level, the spinal cord. However, as I have stressed, these movements may also be modulated by
higher-level subsystems. All motor commands, independently from their origin, converge into
motor neurons [Subsec. 3.3.2] in order to be translated into actions through skeletal muscles.
The motor neurons of the spinal cord are called motoneurons.
• The brain stem consists of two subsystems, the medial and the lateral, which receive inputs
from the cerebral cortex and the subcortical nuclei, and project to the spinal cord. The medial
descending system contributes to the control of posture, while the lateral descending system is
important for goal-directed movement, especially of arm and hand.
• The motor cortex is the highest level, upon which exploratory behavior or fine motor skills like
speech and hand–finger control depend.
The cerebellum and basal ganglia provide for feedback circuits by receiving input information from
various areas of the cortex and projecting to the motor cortex via the thalamus, and in this way
allow for comparing between command and a"erent information as well as for error correction.
They also act directly on projection neurons in the brain stem but do not significantly act on the
spinal cord. We may functionally summarize this scheme as in Fig. 5.7.
Let us have a closer look at the cerebellum. The cerebellum represents 10% of the brain’s volume
but contains half of its neurons. It has three parts33: An external gray matter, an internal white
matter, and three pairs of deep nuclei (the fastigial, the interposed, and the dentate). With one
exception, the cerebellum’s outputs originate in the nuclei. The neurons in the cerebellum cortex are
organized in three layers. It also has three functionally distinct regions: (1) An internal part called
the vermis, (2) two intermediate regions, and (3) two lateral regions. The vermis and intermediate
regions correspond to motor execution and project to descending systems, while the lateral regions
correspond to motor planning and therefore project to the motor and premotor cortices. From a
functional point of view, Snider and Llinás have shown that the cerebellum is crucial for motion
perception and execution. In particular it rules tactile activity (hands for humans and noses for
rats). The maps [Subsec. 3.7.1 and Sec. 5.2] it produces and delivers to motor and premotor areas
are patchworked, due to the need for rapid integration of information coming from di"erent sense
sources.34
33[GHEZ/THACH 2000]. [HOUK/MUGNAINI 1999]. 34[BOWER/PARSONS 2003].
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In the most elementary case,35 motion is e"ected by a group of interneurons called the central
pattern generator network. They are able to activate a set of motor neurons and receiving a"erent
information from sensory neurons. This ability is conditional on certain external or internal events,
like perturbation, stimulus, goal-directed behavior, and so on.
5.3.2 Goal-Directed Movements
As we have seen, both motor and perceptual representation may either present or not present
conceptual features. Any movement is a dynamic process such that there are several physical
consequences, since inertial and centripetal forces are generated that contribute to movements
while they are happening and constitute a continuously changing force field. Due to the complexity
of these dynamic aspects, an organism has to decrease the degrees of freedom involved in order to
control its movements.36 This is obtained by means of the geometrical organization of the skeleton,
by automatizing many movements and making many movements interdependent. However, the
most important aspect is the ability of the organism to group several motor segments under a
common denominator. Let us consider this point.
This field of study was very much improved by the insights of K. Lashley and N. Bernstein.37
Lashley had observed that during a virtuous execution of music, finger alternation could attain
a frequency of 16 strokes/sec, which exceeded the possibility of any sensory feedback influencing
the decisional system. This means that the movements cannot depend on peripheral stimuli. In
order to explain this, the notion of modular motor programs (or engrams) was later developed.
However, the notion of fixed engrams seems to clash with the observed plasticity of movements.
N. Bernstein38 started by understanding that goal-directed movements cannot reflect a one-to-one
relationship between the specific patterns of motor neuron firing, or indeed the forces generated by
muscle contraction, and the actual movement produced. Also D. Hebb39 pointed out that di"erent
motor actions share important general characteristics, even if performed in di"erent ways.
Bernstein refined previous ideas by pointing out that single specific motor acts may be
embedded in more complex ones in a serial and modular sense [Sec. 3.6]. In this way, the di"erent
parts can be assembled moment by moment when a certain need or stimulus would be present
giving rise to a class of similar structural patterns that we call movements. In this way, the
whole movement is plastic while the subcomponents can be hardwired or be ruled by engrams.
As we shall see, in order to fully understand this structure we need to consider a movement as
an equivalence class of chains of motor segments able to obtain the same result. In other words,
several individual motor segments are (up to certain limits) appropriate to be combined in the
pattern (for generating a certain result), therefore giving rise to di"erent possible chains that
can be considered as instances of the same movement, therefore constituting an equivalence class
(individuating an abstract movement). For instance, there are several alternative motor paths for
picking up a cup and they can be considered as equivalent if leading to the desired outcome, e.g.
to drink some tea. Di"erent motor performances able to lead to the same result are then said to
be motor equivalent, which is therefore a functional equivalence. As we shall see in the next part of
the book, the concept of functional equivalence is fundamental for biological systems. The issue of
motor equivalence goes even further than that. Bernstein also acknowledged that the relationship
between movement and the innervational impulse that evokes was not univocal. A given impulse
can produce completely di"erent e"ects under di"erent conditions, since the response will depend
35[GRILLNER 1999]. 36[BERTHOZ 2000]. 37[JEANNEROD 2006, pp. 7–12].
38[BERNSTEIN 1967]. See also [JEANNEROD 1988, JEANNEROD 1999a, pp. 27–8].
39[HEBB 1949, pp. 145 and 153–7]. Actually he draws his ideas from K. Lashley.
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on the initial position of the body and on the external force field in which the movement develops.
This also establishes a further equivalence, that between action execution and action simulation
or imagination [Subsec. 3.7.2].
The interesting point is how the organism reacts when there is an unexpected event. According
to Bernstein,40 when action encounters surprise, it is either impossible or irrelevant to reestablish
the initial plan of action. In other words, action must be reorganized according to unforeseen events.
In this way, a motor equivalence is also somehow established between the original movement and
the corrected one. Proprioception, the sense of the di"erent parts of the body, is involved in this
kind of correction: For Bernstein, this is not reflex-triggering but rather contributed to the central
representation of movement. Therefore, this conception stands half-way between the centralist and
the peripheralist theories of motor programming.41 For instance, reaching movements cannot be
carried out as a series of sequential steps: They present a hierarchical structure,42 which also means
that the neural commands forwarded to muscle groups may be generated in parallel even though
the overt movement appears to be sequential.
Summing up,
• Goal-directed movements are neither single motor performances (like a reflex), nor chains of
details (that is, of individual performances), but hierarchical structures which are di"erentiated
into schematic or prototypical details.
• Moreover, the goal-directed forms of movement are dynamic patterns: They develop and involute,
and the interactions with the environment contribute to define the patterns.
5.3.3 The Motor System
When speaking of motion control we should also distinguish between informational control para-
meters and biomechanical variables.43 Control parameters are specified by the CNS independently
from current external conditions. The reason is the following: Although theoretically speaking it is
always possible to rearrange variables, in the case of motor control this would mean a rearrangement
of the causes of motion and their e"ects, in which case the controlling instance (the brain) would
be controlled by the system that must be kept under control (the environment). This is why any
control cannot be mechanical (which is always bottom-up) and must be performed in informational
terms. Moreover, a pure mechanical explanation of motor control cannot work, since we cannot
distinguish, in terms of pure muscle torque, between the two positions a and b shown in Fig. 5.8(a).
The same is true for electromyographic models, as shown in Fig. 5.8(b). Therefore, a component
of change in the membrane potential produced by descending systems (panels (c) and (d)) may be
independent of muscle a"erent feedbacks and be produced by central control.
Therefore, goal-directed movements presuppose processes, such as monitoring of the initial state
and specifications of the commands that have to occur before the movement is generated, and some
others that are a consequence of the rea"erence of the movement itself.44 Rea"erence denotes then
the consequences of self-produced movement on the sensory inflow. The problem is to build basic
space structures that can apply equally well to both the body-centered frame of reference and
the central representation of space, which assumes an allocentric, stable environmental frame of
reference,45 as displayed in Fig. 5.2. Let us consider this point a little.
40[BERNSTEIN 1967]. 41[JEANNEROD 2009, pp. 48–67].
42[JEANNEROD 1991]. See also [BIZZI/MUSSA-IVALDI 2000]. 43[FELDMAN/LEVIN 1995].
44[JEANNEROD 1988]. 45See also [BERTHOZ 1991].
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Ta = Tb EMGb = EMGc
Fig. 5.8 Mechanical explanation of motor control and control variables. T stands for muscle torque, MN
for motor neurons, IN for interneuron. Adapted from [FELDMAN/LEVIN 1995].
The interaction between subject and goal implies that detailed programs of any movements
features (as, for example, trajectory shaping) are superfluous.46 For a hand to be transported
to a visual target located outside the body, its position with respect to the other body parts
must be represented. This is the function of the proprioceptive map (the cerebellum is the
center of the proprioceptive relation to the world), which is distinct from the visuomotor map
or the representations. The visual and proprioceptive maps jointly project to another part of
the hierarchical structure, where the goal of the action of reaching is defined by the decisional
system. Here other forms of information are also integrated depending on the specific aims related
to the manipulation of the object. The goal level is the area where the target loses its quality
of mere visual stimulus and becomes represented as a goal for an action (we shall see in the
second part of the book the saliency of this point). Several execution levels then depend on the
goal level.
Bernstein developed a system-theory understanding of motion [Fig. 5.9], in which the brain is
able to control muscle centers by comparing decisions taken by a decisional system using a sensory
feedback, and therefore correcting the movement through a regulating system. This model can be
reformulated as in Fig. 5.10, in which the brain’s three facing an external environment systems
are the sensory, regulatory–modulatory, and decisional systems. This is in accordance with the
previous scheme shown in Fig. 5.7.
A target position coded in an allocentric frame of reference gradually influences visuomotor
transformations when the e!ciency of the egocentric frame of reference (necessary for movement
execution) correspondingly decreases. To this purpose, a study47 has made use of the Müller–Lyer
illusion and has shown that test subjects pointed to a target whose position could be erroneously
localized because of an illusionary e"ect [Fig. 5.11].
In schizophrenic patients the delusion of control consists in the lack of awareness of certain
aspects of motor control, which in turn is a consequence of a failure in the mechanism by which
the predicted consequences of an action are derived from a forward model based on the intended
sequence of motor commands.48 The reason is that the patient is unable to attenuate responses
to sensations of limb movements (an overactivity in the parietal cortex is in fact observed) which
arises from a long-range corticocortical disconnection which prevents inhibitory signals arising in
the frontal areas that generate motor commands reaching the appropriate sensory areas.
46[JEANNEROD 1988, pp. 1–40]. 47[GENTILUCCI et al. 1996]. 48[FRITH et al. 2000].
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Fig. 5.9 Bernstein’s comparator model. The information (Sw) generated by the commanding system is
compared with rea"erent input (Iw) resulting from movement execution. The output (Dw) of the comparator





















Fig. 5.10 Bernstein’s model can be schematically simplified as follows: The sensory system produces allocen-
tric maps. The rea"erent information from the sensory system (visuomotor representations) goes to the mod-
ulatory (regulatory) system in order to be stored, and to the decisional system (the command system in Bern-
stein’s terminology), where goals are established, for quick correction of motor outputs. Recall that the cere-
bellum is able to produce proprioceptive maps, which are also sent to the regulatory and decisional systems.
This information will be compared with the previous outputs in a feedback loop between the decisional and
regulatory system. Then, the decisional system finally sends a signal for new motor output (in view of the goal).
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s s s
Fig. 5.11 The line between the arrowheads in the left diagram appears shorter than the line in the right
diagram (Müller–Lyer illusion). In spite of this illusional di"erence, the subject can perform pointing correctly.
S indicates the start position. Adapted from [GENTILUCCI et al. 1996].
5.3.4 Movement and Representationalism
In artificial intelligence and especially in robotics, there has been, in the last 20 years, a radical
rejection of representationalism. Indeed, traditionally navigation in external space was thought to
be performed by using an allocentric map. However, it was observed that going from one place
to another frequently involves traversing a network of intermediate points, that is, following a
route in which familiar landmarks indicate progressive success and dictate new courses of action.49
Then, instead of building a system as a successive series of vertical slices representing functional
units (from sensors to actuators), Brooks proposed a vertical (motor-like) decomposition of the
problem (allowing multiple goals) by considering tasks achieving behaviors with a subsumption
architecture and levels of competence. The robot is elastic and robust, and it is equipped with
parallel processing. The central idea is to let robots act and interact in a real environment
(a proprioceptive approach from the start). The main point here is that an intelligent system
operates as such only in a given environment, since it is able to carve out environmental stimuli
into useful information and therefore to treat the world as its best reservoir of information. No
representations at all are involved here and such a system is intrinsically dynamic.50
Mataric51 has produced robots acting following environmental landmarks and slipping from
the behavior specified by a landmark into a behavior specified by the next, rather than travelling
from one landmark to another. In this way, patterns of activity can interactively emerge. Here,
Mataric follows Brooks’ criticism of all-representational cognitivism.
Also, Maes had assumed that, instead of planning (i.e. internal representation of actions, goals,
and events), a model of situated automata with emergent functionality is more suitable. This is
a result of the interaction with a dynamic environment: Its properties are exploited to serve the
functioning of the system. Here there is no predetermination of the action selection.52 Maes’ goal
was to build adaptive autonomous agents, that is, systems inhabiting a dynamic and unpredictable
environment in which they try to satisfy a set of time-dependent goals or motivations. They are
adaptive if they are able to improve their competence in dealing with a task. These systems are
built in general in an integrated way rather than in a modular one.
49[WILSON 2000]. 50[BROOKS 1986, BROOKS 1990].
51[MATARIC 1992]. See also [HENDRIKS-JANSEN 1996, pp. 135–203].
52[MAES 1990a, MAES 1994]. See also [ALMÁSSY et al. 1998].
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Brooks said53 that cognition is nothing more than the point of view of the observer and that only
such a point of view and related action exist. In reality, cognition is a mediation process between
perception and action. Indeed. it is extremely problematic to completely eliminate the concept of
representation or description, otherwise the organism will be unable to understand the e"ects of
its actions on the environment.54 Therefore, even if the previous approach has rightly pointed out
the central role of the environment and of interaction with the environment in any goal-directed
behavior, the fact remains that representational maps play an important role too [Sec. 3.7]. We
have indeed seen that motion generation and perception are not completely separable. In fact, a
proprioceptive mode of processing spatial information coexists with a representational mode and
both modes generate and store their own mapping of space.
The boundaries of the sensorimotor space are specified by both the perimeter of the receptive
field and the action radius of the motor apparatus.55 The discriminative power of the sensory
surface will determine the basic grain of such a spatial structure. On a mathematical plane, a
collection of separated points is not su!cient for defining a structure in space.56 One needs a
geometry of description, i.e. a rule for describing the potential relationships between these elements
(and here mapping is very important). Certain metric rules that define a structure in space, called
a path structure, are of special interest here. These rules determine, in direction and distance, the
trajectory to follow in order to move from one point to another. A path structure, superimposed on
a collection of separated points, defines the locality of each of these points in a vectorial map. This
is particularly suitable for describing sensorimotor space because motor commands are generally
prescribed in terms of direction and distance. In other words, at least in the case of perception and
generation of motion, localization and directional or vectorial structure, as displayed in Fig. 5.2,
are inseparable aspects (but this is probably a general feature of the brain).
This integration of dynamic and representational aspects is also true for the body’s maps
[Subsec. 3.7.1]. The mapping in the brain of parts of the body is dynamically established and must
be continuously maintained through activation.57 Although we have seen that the brain has maps
of the body [Figs. 3.15 and 3.16], it is also important to understand that such maps do not directly
link to body parts; rather, such maps are the result of the acquisition of sensorimotor schemata
during execution of temporally coordinated movements. Amputee patients progressively lose the
brain areas devoted to the amputated limb, and this process can be slowed down if simulated
actions with that limb are imagined. Singer’s work has led to such a conclusion.58
5.4 Concluding Remarks
The main results of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• We have refined our previous model and established that we have a ventral path leading to the
discrimination of the object, a ventrodorsal path leading to localization, and a dorsodorsal path
leading to motion perception. The latter two paths contribute to the segregation of the object.
• Visuomotor representations lead our cognitive interaction with the world.
• The motor system is a three-level hierarchical system consisting of the spinal cord for the purpose
of ruling reflex movements; the complex brain stem, basal ganglia, and cerebellum for control of
53[BROOKS 1991a, BROOKS 1999b].
54See also [O’REGAN/NOË 2001], and [REES/FRITH 2001] for criticism.
55[PAILLARD 1991b]. 56[ARBIB 1981]. 57[THELEN/SMITH 1994, pp. 129–60].
58[SINGER 1999, SINGER 2000].
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posture and goal-directed movements; the motor cortex for exploratory behavior and fine motor
skills.
• Goal-directed movements are global structures and dynamical patterns. Movements are hierar-
chically nested.
• Movements establish functional equivalence classes of physical and mechanical actions.
• Mechanical explanations of goal-directed and voluntary movements are wrong. Here, the concept
of motor equivalence is very important.
• It is also important to distinguish between a sensory system, a decisional system, and a regulatory
(comparing) system.
• The brain develops both proprioceptive and allocentric maps.
Let me now briefly elaborate on the point arrived at the end of this part of the book. We have
seen that many aspects of vision and especially of the motor system raise important questions
about referential and even semantic issues. There is no way to answer these questions in a
pure information-processing framework, or in a pure information-acquiring context, of which
information-processing, together with information-sharing and information-selecting, is only an
aspect [Subsec. 2.3.2 and Sec. 3.2]. Indeed, information-acquiring is a pure physical process of
dealing-with-information that does not presuppose the ability to be able to be referred to the
input system or input information: It is a process in which a final selection of information, thanks
to coupling, is able to tell (in principle) something about the input information (the initial source
of variety). However, nothing here is said about the way in which this information can actually be
accessed. For instance, this process can finally result in potential information that is stored in some
laboratory device without anybody actually reading it (and without this “reading” it is destined
to remain forever as potential information, like an inscription on a stone that is buried deep in
desert sand). This somebody (the experimenter, for instance) is instead an agent that is able to
understand that the output information is about a certain input system and therefore he or she
can also undertake certain actions relative to the input system. This seems quite reasonable in the
case of human agents. Now, the big hypothesis this book deals with is that prehuman organisms
are also able to do this. They indeed permanently monitor, refer to, and deal with the external
world through goal-directed actions. To understand this mystery, we need to switch to another
perspective, which is the subject of the next part of the book. This perspective is biological and is
centered on the concept of function, which requires an expansion of the concept of information to
information control. The concept of functional equivalence that we have introduced here relative
to movements will be generalized and shown to be a basic category of life.
